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In several cases addressing the constitutionality of affirmative action admissions
policies, the Supreme Court has recognized a compelling state interest in schools
with diverse student populations. According to the Court and affirmative action
proponents, the pursuit of diversity does not only benefit minority students who
gain expanded access to elite institutions through affirmative action. Rather, diversity also benefits white students who grow through encounters with minority students, it contributes to social and intellectual life on campus, and it serves society at
large by aiding the development of citizens equipped for employment and citizenship in an increasingly diverse country.
Recent scholarship has nevertheless thoughtfully examined the negative effect of the
“diversity rationale”—the defense of affirmative action policies based on a compelling interest in diversity—on minority identity when that identity is traded on by
majority-white institutions seeking to maximize the social and economic benefits
that diversity brings. By contrast, little has been said about whether and how the
diversity rationale impacts white identity. Consideration of how the diversity rationale influences white identity formation is particularly timely in light of the
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endeavors, personal or professional.
425

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\89-2\NYU201.txt

426

unknown

Seq: 2

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

25-APR-14

11:45

[Vol. 89:425

Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on affirmative action in Fisher v.
University of Texas at Austin.
This Article begins to fill that gap, ultimately concluding that the diversity rationale
reaffirms notions of racial superiority among Whites. Unlike the jurisprudence of
seminal civil rights cases, such as Brown v. Board of Education, that rejected old
narratives about the legitimacy of subordinating Blacks, the diversity rationale does
not promote progressive thinking about race and identity. Rather, it perpetuates an
old story—a story about using black and brown bodies for white purposes on white
terms, a story about the expendability of those bodies once they are no longer
needed. Moreover, by reinforcing the “transparency” and “innocence” of white
racial identity, as well as by emphasizing hyperindividualism, the diversity rationale
stunts the development of antiracist white identity.
By cultivating white identities grounded in a sense of entitlement and victimhood
relative to people of color, the diversity rationale, ironically, perpetuates the subordination of people of color by prompting the elimination of affirmative action programs. It also distracts Whites from addressing the ways in which their own
presence at elite institutions of higher education is genuinely undermined, especially
in the case of working-class Whites who are consistently underrepresented at such
institutions. Given this reality, institutions of higher education committed to diversity must account for the diversity rationale’s effect on Whites through more honest
and substantive explanations of the value placed on diversity in admissions.
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INTRODUCTION
In an interview about her decision to challenge the University of
Texas’s (UT) consideration of applicant diversity in its admissions process, Abigail Fisher explained that she was “devastated” by her own
rejection from the institution1: “I had dreamt of going to UT since the
second grade.”2 Although the university insisted that Fisher’s application would not have merited admission even if the University did not
consider race among some of its applications,3 Fisher was certain that
the sole attribute distinguishing her from her peers of color who were
accepted was their skin.4 Reflecting on the potential outcome of her
case, Fisher said she “hop[ed] that [the Supreme Court would] take
race out of the issue in terms of admissions and that everyone will be
able to get into any school that they want no matter what race they
are but solely based on their merit and if they work hard for it.”5
Fisher insisted that she was cheated out of a seat. She felt that she
had done all the work she considered necessary to gain admission to
UT.6 She seemed certain that, unlike the minority student she
assumed had taken her place, she genuinely deserved admission, not
having benefited from any unearned advantage or privilege in her
own life. She seemed never to have considered that her skin color
likely ensured a childhood filled with positive representations of
people of her own race, a benefit that has been shown to aid children’s
psychological and emotional development;7 that subjective assessments made of her intellectual or emotional capacities in school were
1 Adam Liptak, Race and College Admissions, Facing a New Test by Justices, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2012, at A1.
2 Mike Tolson, Supreme Court to Take Up UT Admission Case, HOUS. CHRON. (Oct.
7, 2012), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Supreme-Court-to-take-up-UTadmission-case-3927014.php; see also infra notes 86–105 and accompanying text (discussing
Fisher’s suit against UT).
3 See infra notes 47–48, 91–95 and accompanying text (describing UT’s admissions
process, its consideration of diversity, and Fisher’s application).
4 See Tolson, supra note 2 (quoting Fisher as stating that “[t]he only difference
between” Fisher and high school classmates who had been admitted to UT with “less polished” résumés “was the color of our skin”).
5 Liptak, supra note 1.
6 Tolson, supra note 2.
7 See Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of
Coming to See Correspondences Through Work in Women’s Studies, in CRITICAL WHITE
STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR 291, 293–94, 298 (Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic eds., 1997) (including in a list of the daily effects of white privilege: “When I am
told about our national heritage or about ‘civilization,’ I am shown that people of my color
made it what it is”; “I can be sure that my children will be given curricular materials that
testify to the existence of their race”; “I can easily find academic courses and institutions
which give attention only to people of my race”; “My children are given texts and classes
which implicitly support our kind of family unit”).
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likely interpreted in ways that enhanced, rather than undermined, her
intellectual development;8 or that skin color likely aided her family’s
financial stability.9 She even seemed unaware that the very things she
identified as examples of her hard work also demonstrated privilege
bestowed on her through no effort of her own. For instance, Fisher
was able to participate in extracurricular activities because her
family’s financial stability likely freed her from the necessity of an
afterschool job; she could become a cellist because she had free time
for instruction, possibly paid for by her parents; and she could enroll
in AP classes because, even though many schools throughout the
United States do not offer such courses, the one that she attended
did.10
Instead, Fisher seemed confident that somebody was erroneously
granted the spot in UT’s entering class that belonged to her. Moreover, to the extent that evaluation of that interloper’s application
included consideration of racial or ethnic heritage, he or she was
admitted unfairly.11 In media interviews, Fisher presented herself as
8 Racial minorities are subject to over-identification for special education, independent of their disproportionate representation among the poor. See Daniel J. Losen &
Kevin G. Welner, Disabling Discrimination in Our Public Schools: Comprehensive Legal
Challenges to Inappropriate and Inadequate Special Education Services for Minority Children, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 415 (2001) (noting that “distortions in the representation of racial groups [in special education programs] cannot be explained simply because
minority groups are disproportionately represented among the poor” and that “as factors
associated with wealth increased, contrary to the expected trend, African American children were more likely to be labeled ‘mentally retarded’”). Moreover, black school children
are underrepresented in “hard” disability categories like deafness or blindness, which are
less stigmatizing and most objectively assessed, while overrepresented in disability categories like educable mentally retarded (EMR) or emotionally disturbed, which are more stigmatizing and are assessed more subjectively. See Theresa Glennon, Race, Education, and
the Construction of a Disabled Class, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1237, 1250–52 (surveying statistics
relating to the overrepresentation of African American students in special education);
Losen & Welner, supra, at 416 (discussing how African American children are much more
likely to be underidentified in “hard” disability categories than in cognitive disability
categories).
9 See infra note 226 (exploring the relative impermanence of minority middle-class
status); see also DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 9 (1993) (arguing that racial segregation, particularly residential segregation, is responsible for perpetuating black poverty in
the United States); Tara Siegel Bernard, Blacks Face Bias in Bankruptcy, Study Suggests,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2012, at A1 (describing a study that found Blacks are twice as likely as
Whites to end up in the “more onerous and costly form of consumer bankruptcy”).
10 See Tolson, supra note 2 (quoting Fisher’s description of her academic and extracurricular activities).
11 The “undeserving minority receives benefits properly belonging to a white person”
trope is by no means limited to higher education and has popped up in various contexts,
including political campaigns. Consider the 1990 reelection campaign of Senator Jesse
Helms, featuring a television commercial in which a white man’s hands crumpled up a
letter while a voice-over lamented, “You needed that job. And you were the best qualified.
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an innocent victim: Some undeserving nonwhite applicant had stolen
her seat.12
Moreover, Fisher’s statements to the media demonstrated neither
understanding of why a person of color’s academic excellence might
convey character or perseverance lacking from her own admission
profile, nor insight into the larger societal structures and social phenomena that would justify a university’s choice to consider race when
assembling an entering class. To quote Peggy McIntosh’s insightful
recollection of her own racial education, Fisher was taught to see
racism “only in individual acts of meanness . . . , never in invisible
systems conferring . . . dominance on [her] group from birth.”13 UT
offers the product of elite education and, according to Fisher, race and
ethnicity should play no part in decisions about how to distribute that
commodity.
Even assuming, for argument’s sake, a problem with the consideration of race in college and university admissions, Fisher’s sense of
entitlement to admission at a flagship state university that receives
thousands of applications every year might be considered unreasonable.14 Yet her reaction to her rejection from UT is not surprising.
Although characterizations of affirmative action as “reverse discrimination” have intensified in recent years,15 even the earliest legal chalBut they had to give it to a minority because of a racial quota. Is that really fair?”
SnakesOnABlog, Jesse Helms “Hands” Ad, YOUTUBE (Oct. 16, 2006), http://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=KIyewCdXMzk; see also Peter Applebome, The 1990 Campaign; Subtly and
Not, Race Bubbles Up as Issue in North Carolina Contest, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1990, at A1
(describing Helms’s ad as one in “a blistering, explicitly racial series”).
12 See infra notes 94, 259, 289 and accompanying text (discussing Fisher’s reaction to
her rejection and her portrayal of herself as an innocent victim of racial discrimination).
13 McIntosh, supra note 7, at 298.
14 In its 2014 survey of undergraduate programs, U.S. News & World Report ranked
UT forty-sixth in academic reputation among national universities, and sixteenth among
public schools. Rankings & Kudos, U. TEX. AUSTIN, http://www.utexas.edu/about-ut/
rankings-kudos (last visited Mar. 13, 2014). With an acceptance rate of less than fifty percent, the school is one of the nation’s more selective public institutions. See University of
Texas--Austin, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., http://colleges.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/
best-colleges/university-of-texas-austin-3658 (last visited Mar. 13, 2014) (reporting UT’s
acceptance rate as 46.8%).
15 See FRED L. PINCUS, REVERSE DISCRIMINATION: DISMANTLING THE MYTH, at x–xi,
3–9 (2003) (describing the widespread perception amongst the white population that
affirmative action policies constitute reverse discrimination); William D. Evans, Jr.,
Reverse Discrimination Claims: Growing Like Kudzu, MD. B.J., Jan./Feb. 2004, at 48, 48
(noting that between 1991 and 1996, the percentage of discrimination claims filed with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission that involved allegations of reverse discrimination almost doubled to 17.1%, and predicting that the trend will continue); Does Affirmative Action Punish Whites?, NBCNEWS.COM (Apr. 28, 2009), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/
30462129/ns/us_news-life/t/does-affirmative-action-punish-whites (detailing a string of
cases in which Whites claimed they were discriminated against in favor of Blacks and
Hispanics).
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lenges to affirmative action policies demonstrated entitled thinking
like Fisher’s: If an unqualified nonwhite person had not been unjustly
awarded my spot, I surely would have successfully claimed what was
rightfully mine.16
I argue that this kind of entitled thinking demonstrates a particular, antiprogressive form of white identity development and performance.17 While identity often refers to a “person’s interior sense of
self[,] . . . when the context is law and the subject is race . . . the term
typically refers to a social relationship, an ‘identification with,’ a role
the person is seen to play in society.”18 Thus, racial identity is also
performed: Maintaining an identity requires performances corresponding to symbolic representations evocative of a particular racial
or ethnic identity.19 Identity performance, however, need not always
be conscious. The white identity to which I refer above entails the
phenomenon of “transparency” naı̈veté about one’s whiteness and its
16 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 713
(2007) (providing the example of a high school student who was accepted into a selective
program but denied assignment to the school where the program was located because of a
“racial tiebreaker”); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 317 (2003) (noting the petitioner’s
argument “that her application was rejected because the [University of Michigan] Law
School uses race as a predominant factor,” which benefits certain minority applicants to
the detriment of “students with similar credentials from disfavored racial groups” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 249–51 (2003) (considering an
equal protection challenge to the University of Michigan’s use of racial preferences in its
undergraduate admissions process); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
277–78 (1978) (recounting the petitioner’s allegation that the University of California at
Davis Medical School’s special admissions policy had the effect of “exclud[ing] him from
the school on the basis of his race”). Mathematically, of course, this is not the case. See
Neil S. Siegel, Race-Conscious Student Assignment Plans: Balkanization, Integration, and
Individualized Consideration, 56 DUKE L.J. 781, 807 n.112 (2006) (noting that affirmative
action programs lead to only a modest decrease in white students’ chances of being
admitted); see also Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic
of Selective Admissions, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1046 (2002) (exposing the “causation
fallacy,” the “common yet mistaken notion that when white applicants . . . fail to gain
admission ahead of minority applicants with equal or lesser qualifications, the likely cause
is affirmative action”).
17 Every individual has “a personal identity and multiple social identities—all of which
contribute to one’s sense of self.” LOUISE DERMAN-SPARKS & JULIE OLSEN EDWARDS,
ANTI-BIAS EDUCATION FOR YOUNG CHILDREN AND OURSELVES 12 (2010). Personal identity includes factors such as name, age, or talents. Social identity refers to the significant
group categorizations assigned to us by the society in which we live. “These include our
racial, ethnic/cultural, gender, and religious identities, as well as economic class, geographic
identities, and so on.” Id. Racial identity, in particular, is performed, as identity maintenance requires repetition of culturally intelligible symbolic acts that can evoke a particular
racial group. See infra notes 182–93 and accompanying text (describing the performance of
racial identity).
18 Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of Race and
Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 263, 282–83 (1995).
19 See infra notes 182–93 and accompanying text (discussing and providing examples of
racial identity performance).
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attendant privileges accompanied by an understanding of race as
something that happens to other people20—and a perception of
Whites as innocent victims in an unfair system that awards handouts
to undeserving non-Whites. It also entails a belief that achievement—
academic and otherwise—is solely the product of individual work and
perseverance and is not also influenced by societal power structures
informed by race and ethnicity.
Racial diversity in educational settings imparts important civic
and attitudinal lessons that undermine problematic white racial identity performance and enable us to sustain a healthier and more successful democracy.21 The diversity rationale—the defense of
affirmative action policies based on a compelling interest in diversity—thus justifies the use of race-conscious policies in pursuit of this
20 See Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, but Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 957, 970 (1993) (“For most
whites, . . . to think or speak about race is to think or speak about people of color, or
perhaps, . . . to reflect on oneself (or other whites) in relation to people of color. But we
tend not to think of ourselves or our racial cohort as racially distinctive.”).
21 See CATHERINE L. HORN & MICHAL KURLAENDER, THE END OF KEYES—
RESEGREGATION TRENDS AND ACHIEVEMENT IN DENVER PUBLIC SCHOOLS 5 (2006)
(observing that students who attend diverse schools report greater levels of comfort with
members of racial groups other than their own, and that “White students in integrated
settings exhibit more racial tolerance and less fear of their Black peers” than their segregated counterparts); Maureen T. Hallinan, Diversity Effects on Student Outcomes: Social
Science Evidence, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 745 (1998) (identifying studies “find[ing] that interracial contact in desegregated schools leads to an increase in interracial sociability and
friendship”); Goodwin Liu & William L. Taylor, School Choice to Achieve Desegregation,
74 FORDHAM L. REV. 791, 797 (2005) (observing that black and white students who graduate from desegregated schools are more likely “to attend college, work, and live in desegregated settings”); Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, The Academic Consequences of Desegregation
and Segregation: Evidence from the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1513,
1548 (2003) (discussing research demonstrating that diverse classrooms thwart students’
tendency to rely on learned thinking routines and instead promote more critical thinking);
Sharon E. Rush, Protecting the Dignity and Equality of Children: The Importance of Integrated Schools, 20 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 73, 76 (2010) (arguing that “integrated
schools protect children’s dignity by invalidating the myth of black inferiority and white
superiority”). The proper function and purpose of democracy is subject to debate. For the
purposes of this Article, however, a healthy and successful democracy is one that is committed to genuine racial equality and shared decisionmaking, and is free from interracial
distrust, subordination, and racial disparities in the distribution of societal resources. When
the experience of marginalization converges around a particular group, it can “illuminate[ ]
imperfections in the democratic structure that were formerly only dimly perceived, and . . .
force[ ] a . . . reexamination of the true meaning of American democracy.” LANI GUINIER
& GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING POWER,
TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 14 (2002) (quoting MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHERE DO
WE GO FROM HERE: CHAOS OR COMMUNITY? 146 (1968)). For a more detailed analysis of
American democracy as being plagued by these three characteristics, see generally
DANIELLE S. ALLEN, TALKING TO STRANGERS: ANXIETIES OF CITIZENSHIP SINCE BROWN
V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (2004) (discussing race, citizenship, and democracy); GUINIER &
TORRES, supra (discussing a novel approach to racial identity and politics).
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worthy goal. What if, however, this legal doctrine, invoked to promote
a more vital democracy, ultimately undermines that mission by
stunting the formation of antiracist white identity? The plaintiffs in
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin did not explicitly ask the
Supreme Court to reject the diversity rationale, the legal basis for
UT’s ability to consider race during its admissions process.22 Nonetheless, the diversity rationale may be responsible for perpetuating the
exact type of white identity performance that inspires such lawsuits
and may ultimately undermine the rationale itself.
Substantial literature exists on the impact of law and legal doctrine on racial identity. Indeed, critical legal scholars have examined
the impact—both positive and negative—of jurisprudential framing of
affirmative action on people of color.23 What demands further consideration is how this same affirmative action jurisprudence impacts
Whites. Other than assertions that affirmative action spurs balkanization or suspicion,24 critical scholarship considering how this doctrine
22 Indeed, if they had, the outcome of the case may very well have been different.
Several justices who joined the majority opinion that kept Grutter intact nonetheless
expressed opposition to the diversity rationale. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S.
Ct. 2411, 2422 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“‘The Constitution proscribes government
discrimination on the basis of race, and state-provided education is no exception.’ The
petitioner . . . did not ask us to overrule Grutter’s holding that a ‘compelling interest’ in . . .
diversity can justify racial preferences in university admissions. I therefore join the Court’s
opinion in full.” (citation omitted)); id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I write separately to
explain that I would overrule Grutter v. Bollinger, and hold that a State’s use of race in
higher education admissions decisions is categorically prohibited by the Equal Protection
Clause.” (citation omitted)).
23 See, e.g., WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONGTERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS
258–69 (1998) (challenging arguments about affirmative action programs actually harming
the students they purport to help and summarizing reports from beneficiaries of affirmative action programs); STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
BABY 50 (1991) (“[T]he durable and demeaning stereotype of black people as unable to
compete with white ones is reinforced by advocates of certain forms of affirmative
action.”); CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III & MARI J. MATSUDA, WE WON’T GO BACK:
MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 129–30 (1997) (arguing that “the stigma of
racial inferiority predates affirmative action,” and that minorities should recognize white
supremacy as “the real source of the stigma and confront it directly”).
24 See Richard Delgado, 1998 Hugo L. Black Lecture: Ten Arguments Against
Affirmative Action—How Valid?, 50 ALA. L. REV. 135, 147 (1998) (describing and refuting
the argument that “affirmative action balkanizes, encouraging people to regard themselves
as members of small groups, jealously guarding their positions vis-á-vis each other, rather
than simply being Americans”); Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization:
An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1301 (2011)
(explaining that “[p]roponents of antibalkanization are concerned that the pursuit of racial
justice” through race-conscious remedies “poses threats to community and are prepared to
subordinate the pursuit of racial justice to the preservation of social cohesion”); Bruce
Goldner, Book Note, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1291, 1294 (1992) (reviewing DINESH D’SOUZA,
ILLIBERAL EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX ON CAMPUS (1991)) (referring to
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impacts white identity development and performance has been scarce.
Instead of considering how diversity impacts people of color, or
whether diversity benefits white people, this Article asks whether the
diversity rationale is bad for white people by undermining the development of antiracist white identity.
Of course, one could ask this same question as it pertains to
various strands of equal protection jurisprudence, much of which has
resulted in formal, but not substantive, equality.25 This Article considers the question as applied to the diversity rationale, one of the
most widely recognized and commonly invoked justifications for the
use of race-conscious measures. Given the Supreme Court’s recent
reaffirmation of the diversity rationale in Fisher, educational institutions will likely continue to invoke diversity as they craft admissions
policies.
Furthermore, despite the Supreme Court’s current resistance—
beyond instances of intentional discrimination—to remedial measures
aimed at addressing past and present racial injustices, conscious and
unconscious racism persists. More substantive justifications for the use
of race in nonremedial contexts should be considered, if only to
deepen national dialogue about racism and discrimination in the
United States. Accordingly, it is important to examine how institutions of higher education26 deploy the diversity rationale and how the
diversity rationale perpetuates racial subordination through racist
white identity, while considering whether it can be utilized in ways
D’Souza’s argument that affirmative action breeds balkanization as minority students seek
“to find ‘a haven from the anxieties that spring from sharp differences in academic preparation among various racial groups’”).
25 Like the difference between the principles of anticlassification and antisubordination, the difference between formal and substantive equality refers to how the Fourteenth
Amendment should be interpreted. An anticlassification or “formal equality” perspective
suggests that the Constitution merely prevents the government from reducing an individual
to an assigned racial identity for differential treatment. As such, government action that is
facially neutral but has a disparate impact on minorities is tolerated. In contrast, an
antisubordination or “substantive equality” perspective focuses on protecting members of
historically disadvantaged groups from injuries stemming from unjust social stratification.
As such, even those government actions that impart a negative impact but are facially
neutral must be condemned unless “justified by a weighty public purpose.” Siegel, supra
note 24, at 1287–89; see also Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future
Equal Protection Doctrine?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059, 1063–64 (2011) (noting scholarly
debate regarding “whether the Equal Protection Clause should be interpreted to require
universal treatment of individuals or guarantee commensurate outcomes for certain
subordinate minority groups,” and how “[t]his dichotomy . . . has also been historically
represented as the difference between the principles of antisubordination and anticlassification, or between the concepts of formal and substantive equality”).
26 Although this Article focuses primarily on the context of public education, this
examination is equally important in any context in which a public or private actor pursues
diversity.
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that advance, rather than retard, racial justice. Ultimately, this Article
asks: How can we promote diversity in ways that are not subordinating, but empowering?
In an effort to answer this question, this Article proceeds in three
parts. Part I presents the diversity rationale, discussing the genuine
importance of racial diversity, explaining how the diversity rationale
has successfully expanded access to higher education, and exploring
criticisms to which the diversity rationale has been subjected. Part II
contemplates how the diversity rationale, as constructed by the
Supreme Court, may influence individual identity formation. This Part
considers how the Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence inspires
and perpetuates a destructive form of white “identity performance”
that is itself counterproductive to the cause of racial justice. Part III
offers preliminary thoughts about how the diversity rationale might be
remediated and deployed in ways that encourage the development of
antiracist white identities, while preserving a commitment to the compelling goal of racial inclusion in our national institutions.
I
THE DIVERSITY RATIONALE
The Supreme Court articulated its diversity rationale for affirmative action policies in a line of cases beginning with Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke. The Court’s pronouncements have
relied primarily on utilitarian justifications, rather than social and
racial justice arguments, for diversity in higher education. As applied,
the diversity rationale has yielded social and political benefits both for
minority students admitted after the adoption of race-conscious policies and for the institutions whose student bodies have consequently
diversified. Yet the diversity rationale has not been immune to critique. Some scholars have noted that the Court—by recognizing a
compelling state interest in diversity rather than a compelling interest
in remedying societal discrimination—has allowed policymakers to
ignore difficult truths about the nature of enduring racial bias in the
United States. Others have questioned whether the diversity
rationale’s principal beneficiaries are white people and institutions
rather than people of color.
A. The Court’s Diversity Jurisprudence: Plaintiffs and Problems
The Supreme Court first discussed diversity as a compelling
interest justifying race-conscious admissions policies in higher educa-
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tion in 1978.27 In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, a
five-Justice majority held that the University of California at Davis
Medical School’s admissions policy, which reserved sixteen out of 100
seats in its entering class for disadvantaged and/or minority students,28
was unconstitutional.29 Justice Lewis Powell, however, wrote separately to maintain that the state had a legitimate interest in diversity
that could be served by considering race or ethnic origin as one of
many factors in a competitive admissions process.30 He explained that
a college or university’s interest in promoting broad diversity, of
which racial diversity is merely one subset, is grounded partly in the
academic freedoms that have historically been afforded to institutions
of higher education.31 Yet, in Bakke, the diversity rationale was not
adopted by a majority of the Court and diversity was not decisively
established as a compelling interest justifying consideration of race by
institutions of higher education. Fourteen years after Bakke, the Fifth
Circuit addressed this diversity rationale in Hopwood v. Texas.32
27 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In Bakke, the Court
struck down the school’s race-conscious policy but reversed a lower court ruling that race
could never be considered as a factor in admissions. Id. at 271–72.
28 See id. at 274–75 (describing the university’s “special admissions” procedure for disadvantaged or minority candidates).
29 Justice Powell provided the fifth vote necessary to hold the admissions program
unconstitutional on the basis that it used a quota system, which prevented nonminorities
from competing for seats reserved exclusively for minorities, but allowed minorities to
compete for every seat in the class. Id. at 319–20.
30 As an example, Powell referenced the Harvard College admissions program, in
which race was weighted as a “plus factor” but all applicants were free to compete for all
available spots. Id. at 316–18.
31 See id. at 311–12 (“[T]he attainment of a diverse student body . . . is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education. Academic freedom . . . long has
been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment. The freedom of a university to
make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body.”).
Justice Powell listed several characteristics a school could consider to diversify its class,
including “exceptional personal talents, unique work or service experience, leadership
potential, maturity, demonstrated compassion, a history of overcoming disadvantage, [and
the] ability to communicate with the poor . . . .” Id. at 317. In the context of equal protection, however, such a broad definition of diversity is meaningless. That is, diversity is meaningful in equal protection analysis only to the extent that suspect or quasi-suspect
classifications, such as race, are involved. See Sharon E. Rush, Beyond Admissions: Racial
Equality in Law Schools, 48 FLA. L. REV. 373, 384–85 (1996) (arguing that an applicant
who is diverse under Justice Powell’s definition—but who is not a member of a suspect or
quasi-suspect class—will be unsuccessful in bringing an equal protection suit because, in
such a case, the university’s decision will be subject to less rigid scrutiny by the court, and
such a decision will almost always be rational). Accordingly, although other types of diversity are important, the focus of this Article is racial diversity because of the strong psychological response race and racial diversity prompts among students and would-be
challengers, as well as the author’s commitment in this Article to an inquiry framed by
current equal protection jurisprudence.
32 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), abrogated by Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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In the early 1990s, the University of Texas School of Law based
its initial admissions decisions on an applicant’s “Texas Index” (TI)
number—a composite of undergraduate GPA and LSAT scores—
which was used to rank candidates and predict law school performance.33 Yet admissions officers were also permitted to exercise discretion in interpreting the TI scores and to consider factors like the
strength of an applicant’s undergraduate education, the difficulty of
an applicant’s major, particular qualities an applicant might bring to
the classroom, and an applicant’s life experiences and outlook.34 In an
initial sorting based on applicants’ TI scores and consideration of
these additional factors, the school placed each applicant in one of
three categories: “presumptive admit,” “presumptive deny,” or a “discretionary zone.”35
After having been rejected from the University of Texas School
of Law in 1992, Cheryl Hopwood filed suit claiming that she had been
discriminated against in the application process because the “presumptive admit,” “discretionary admit,” and “presumptive denial”
category cut-offs to which her application had been subjected differed
according to race.36 Specifically, the TI ranges used to place black and
Mexican American applicants “into the three admissions categories
were lowered to allow the law school to consider and admit more of
them.”37
A white mother who hailed from a working-class background,38
Hopwood had earned a degree in accounting from Montgomery
County Community College and a bachelor’s degree from California
State University-Sacramento.39 Hopwood’s file was downgraded from
a presumptive admit to the discretionary zone because the admissions
committee believed that her 3.8/4.0 GPA overstated her educational
background.40 According to admissions officials, Hopwood did not
attend schools that were academically competitive with those of a
majority of other applicants, and she completed the majority of her
33

Id. at 935.
Id.
35 Id.
36 See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants Hopwood and Carvell at 6–7, Hopwood, 78 F.3d
932 (No. 94-50664), 1994 WL 16173330 [hereinafter Hopwood Brief] (listing the Index
scores of Texas residents for each racial group).
37 Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 936.
38 Hopwood Brief, supra note 36, at 4 & n.4.
39 Albert H. Kauffman & Roger Gonzalez, The Hopwood Case: What It Says and What
It Doesn’t, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION’S TESTAMENT OF HOPE: STRATEGIES FOR A NEW ERA
IN HIGHER EDUCATION 227, 234 (Mildred Garcı́a ed., 1997).
40 See Hopwood Brief, supra note 36, at 8 n.7 (noting Defendants’ testimony that the
basis for this downgrade was that Hopwood had attended less academically competitive
institutions, including junior colleges, than many of her peer applicants).
34
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work at a junior college.41 Furthermore, Hopwood filed no letters of
recommendation, provided no personal statement, and did not elaborate on her background or skill in response to application questions.42
The Fifth Circuit ultimately struck down UT’s race-conscious
admissions policy in Hopwood v. Texas, writing that Bakke had not
established diversity as a compelling state interest under the
Fourteenth Amendment because Justice Powell’s opinion in that case
had not garnered a majority.43 Nonetheless, in striking down the UT
policy, the court of appeals emphasized the fact that Hopwood was
raising a severely disabled child and was married to a member of the
Armed Forces,44 ostensibly to explain how she might contribute to
diversity on campus.45
Following the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Hopwood, the Texas
Attorney General required all admissions and scholarship policies in
the state university system to conform to the appellate court’s reasoning.46 As a result, UT adopted an undergraduate admissions policy
that featured a “Personal Achievement Index” (PAI), a number
reflecting a “holistic” review of each applicant’s “leadership and work
experience, awards, extracurricular activities, community service, and
other special circumstances . . . .”47 The PAI was considered in conjunction with the “Academic Index,” a number reflecting an applicant’s high school class rank, standardized test scores, and high school
curriculum.48
Despite devoting efforts to several race-neutral initiatives
intended to increase enrollment of underrepresented minorities under
the new system,49 minority enrollment nevertheless plummeted. In
1997, for example, African American enrollment dropped almost 40%
41

Kauffman & Gonzalez, supra note 39, at 234.
Id.
43 See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944–45 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Justice Powell’s [diversity] argument in Bakke garnered only his own vote and has never represented the view of
a majority of the Court in Bakke or any other case.”), abrogated by Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
44 Id. at 946.
45 Indeed, Powell’s definition of diversity was broad, encompassing “unique work or
service experience” and “a history of overcoming disadvantage.” Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978).
46 See Daren Bakst, Race-Targeted Financial Aid: Untangling the Legal Web, STUDENT
AID TRANSCRIPT, Winter 2000, at 4, 7 (discussing the Texas Attorney General’s various
interpretations of Hopwood); see also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411,
2415 (2013) (explaining that the new program “was adopted to comply with the Hopwood
decision”).
47 Id. at 2415.
48 Id.
49 These efforts included an increase in the school’s annual recruitment budget and the
development of several scholarship programs aimed at recruiting first-generation students
42
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campus-wide.50 In the law school, black enrollment in the first-year
class dropped from thirty-eight students to only four students, while
enrollment of Mexican-American students dropped from sixty-four to
twenty-six.51 In response, the Texas Legislature adopted the “Texas
Top Ten Percent Plan” (TTP Plan), a policy guaranteeing admission to
the state’s flagship public universities for any Texas student who graduated in the top ten percent of their high school class.52
During the same year that Hopwood filed suit, the University of
Michigan Law School faculty unanimously approved a new admissions
policy. Under this policy, each application would undergo individual,
“whole-file review,” in which race could serve as one factor in a process that also considered standardized test scores, life experience, and
personal background.53 This review would focus on LSAT score and
undergraduate GPA as the general measure of predicted student performance.54 However, the policy also articulated a commitment to
diversity, specifically emphasizing “the inclusion of students from
groups which have been historically discriminated against, like
African Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans, who without
this commitment might not be represented in [the] student body in
meaningful numbers.”55 The policy described the law school’s goal of
achieving diversity in terms of attaining a “critical mass” of underrepresented minorities.56 The school did not specify what number of
minority students would constitute a “critical mass,” but it sought to
admit enough to create a diverse entering class.57 Ultimately, in
and applicants from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. Brief for Respondents at 7, Fisher,
133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11345), 2012 WL 3245488.
50 Id. at 7–8.
51 Gerald Torres, Fisher v. University of Texas: Living in the Dwindling Shadow of
LBJ’s America, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC. 97, 97 (2012).
52 TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (West 2012); see also Torres, supra note 51, at 98
(describing the creation of the TTP Plan).
53 THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, REAFFIRMING DIVERSITY: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES: A JOINT STATEMENT OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SCHOLARS 11 (2003), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/
legal-developments/legal-memos/reaffirming-diversity-a-legal-analysis-of-the-university-ofmichigan-affirmative-action-cases/law-scholars-reaffirming-diversity-2003.pdf.
54 Wendy Parker, The Story of Grutter v. Bollinger: Affirmative Action Wins, in
EDUCATION LAW STORIES 83, 86 (Michael A. Olivas & Ronna Greff Schneider eds., 2008).
55 Id. at 87 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316 (2003)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
56 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330. Defined by the law school as “meaningful numbers,”
“meaningful representation,” and enough so “that underrepresented minority students do
not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race,” Justice O’Connor understood “critical mass” by reference to the educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce,
including cross-racial understanding and the breakdown of racial stereotypes. Id. at
318–19.
57 THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 53, at 11.
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keeping with Justice Powell’s Bakke concurrence,58 the policy underscored the value of diversity in the classroom, eschewed numerical
goals or quotas, and endorsed individual review of each application.59
Barbara Grutter applied to the University of Michigan Law
School in April 1996, four years after the faculty adopted this new
admissions policy.60 She was placed on the waiting list and ultimately
rejected.61 Grutter concluded that her civil rights had been violated; in
her own words, she “truly believed there was discrimination in the
U-M process.”62 With the help of the Center for Individual Rights,
Barbara Grutter sued the law school, alleging that she had been
denied admission because she was white.63 She explained in a later
interview, “I think that I was discriminated against in the admission
process, very specifically, because I believe they have different criteria
based on race.”64
A working mother who owned a health care information technology consulting company, Grutter applied to the law school with a
3.81 GPA and high LSAT scores.65 Hailing from a blue-collar background,66 Grutter believed she would have added diversity to the
entering class and likened her rejection to her earlier encounters with
sexism in the workplace.67 In the complaint she filed in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Grutter
claimed that, as a result of the school’s racially discriminatory procedures, she had suffered “humiliation, emotional distress, and pain and
58 See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Powell’s concurrence identifying racial diversity as a compelling interest).
59 Parker, supra note 54, at 87.
60 Liz Cobbs, Woman in the U-M Bias Suit Holds on to Normalcy, GRAND RAPIDS
PRESS, Apr. 29, 2001, at A25.
61 Id. In May 1997, after being placed on the waitlist, Grutter read a Detroit newspaper
article about Republican Michigan state legislators who had been approached by constituents alleging reverse discrimination on account of affirmative action at the university. She
recalled this article after her rejection in June 1997, and thus decided to bring suit. Id.
62 Id.
63 Complaint at 8, Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (No. 9775928), 1997 WL 34642450.
64 Elizabeth Brackett, Admitting Diversity: University of Michigan’s Law School, PBS
NEWSHOUR (Aug. 21, 2001), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/education-july-dec01diversity_8-21.
65 See Parker, supra note 54, at 83 (noting that her LSAT score placed her in the
eighty-sixth percentile).
66 See June Kronholz, Does a White Mom Add Diversity?—Barbara Grutter Believed
She Was a Prime Candidate for Michigan’s Law School, WALL ST. J., June 25, 2003, at B.3
(“She is one of nine children, . . . worked in an inner-city clinic for two years to save money
for community college . . . [and] didn’t have a college counselor in high school.”).
67 Brackett, supra note 64.
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suffering,” as well as “economic damages resulting from her inability
to proceed with her planned career as a lawyer.”68
In deciding her case, Grutter v. Bollinger,69 the Supreme Court
formally acknowledged the significance of the academic freedoms that
Justice Powell had championed twenty-five years earlier in his Bakke
concurrence before moving on to assess the Michigan Law School’s
admissions policy.70 Writing for a five-to-four majority, Justice
O’Connor endorsed Justice Powell’s view that diversity is a compelling
state interest justifying the consideration of race in admissions decisions.71 The Grutter majority further determined that the law school’s
policy was acceptable because it was sufficiently narrowly tailored to
the purpose of seeking a diverse student body72: It allowed for individualized, holistic review of each applicant, considered both racial and
nonracial factors, and did not unduly burden nonminority students.73
The majority also deemed the school’s pursuit of a “critical mass”
unproblematic, characterizing it not as a quota, but instead as a goal
68

Complaint, supra note 63, at 8–9.
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
70 Id. at 330 (“We have long recognized that, given the important purpose of public
education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university
environment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition.”).
71 Id. at 325.
72 Under the equal protection framework, heightened scrutiny, in the form of strict
scrutiny, is reserved for government action that discriminates on the basis of protected
classifications like race and national origin. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007) (“[W]hen the government distributes burdens or
benefits on the basis of individual racial classifications, that action is reviewed under strict
scrutiny.”); Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505–07 (2005) (holding that both benign
and invidious uses of race are subject to strict scrutiny); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (observing
that all governmental classifications based on race are subject to strict scrutiny); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223–26 (1995) (same). Under strict scrutiny, governmental action must be narrowly tailored and necessary to achieve a compelling state
interest. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 725–31 (concluding that the school districts’
use of racial classifications in their school assignments was not narrowly tailored because it
was tied to racial demographics rather than a particular pedagogic principle); Grutter, 539
U.S. at 326 (upholding the pursuit of diversity in higher education as a compelling interest
that justifies the consideration of race in the admissions process).
73 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341 (explaining that race-conscious admissions programs
must not “unduly burden individuals who are not members of the favored racial and ethnic
groups” (quoting Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 546, 630 (1990) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting))). Individualized review proved instrumental to the law school’s success before
the Court. The same day that the Court found the law school’s policy sufficiently narrowly
tailored to its goal of promoting diversity, the Court heard a companion case, Gratz v.
Bollinger, in which a young woman named Jennifer Gratz challenged the University of
Michigan’s undergraduate admissions policy. 539 U.S. 244, 251–53 (2003). In Gratz, the
Court struck down the undergraduate admissions policy, which assigned twenty out of an
available 150 application points to every minority applicant. Id. at 272, 275. Chief Justice
Rehnquist explained that this automatic point allocation was inflexible and precluded individualized, holistic assessment. Id. at 271–72.
69
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related to the educational benefits of diversity.74 Finally, in dictum
that opponents have aggressively framed as a time-limit for the legitimacy of affirmative action policies in higher education,75 Justice
O’Connor wrote, “We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial
preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest
approved today.”76
Representatives from the education and business sectors had
filed numerous amicus briefs in Grutter encouraging the Court to find
a compelling state interest in diversity. Deemed the “[u]tilitarian
strand of the coalition” by Tomiko Brown-Nagin, professional and
educational institutions—including sixty-six Fortune 500 companies
and 3900 colleges and universities—filed briefs in support of the
University of Michigan’s use of race in pursuit of diversity.77 The coalition of amici also included prominent individuals, including twentynine retired military officers.78
These amici remained silent, however, on questions of discrimination or social justice and instead articulated their support for diversity
in light of its benefits for American society. General Motors, for
example, argued in its brief that the prosperity of the company and
American business in general depended on the development of a
diverse and well-educated workforce that could compete in a pluralistic and increasingly globalized marketplace.79 Amicus briefs filed by
retired military officers advanced similar claims, arguing that a diverse
officer corps served the national interest because diversity reduces
racial and ethnic hostilities among officers that otherwise undercut
morale and impede military preparedness and effectiveness.80
Colleges and universities filed briefs arguing that the use of race in
pursuit of diversity allowed them to better fulfill their missions.81
Selective institutions, in particular, argued that diversity allowed them
74

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
See, e.g., id. at 351 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I agree with the Court’s holding that
racial discrimination in higher education admissions will be illegal in 25 years.”); Adam
Liptak, Justices Take Up Race as a Factor in College Entry, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2012, at
A1 (noting that the Supreme Court expected Grutter to last for 25 years).
76 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
77 Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of
Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1463–64 (2005).
78 Id.
79 Id. at 1464 (citing Brief of General Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 12–19, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (Nos. 02-241, 02-516), 2003 WL 399096).
80 Id. at 1465 (citing Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 13–18, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (Nos. 02-241, 02-516),
2003 WL 1787554).
81 E.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Columbia University et al. in Support of Respondents at
2, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 399094.
75
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to train students to become productive members of a pluralist society
and multi-racial economy.82 The Association of American Law
Schools argued that a diverse student body produces lawyers who can
better serve their clients and the public.83
In embracing the diversity rationale and affirming diversity as a
compelling state interest, the Grutter Court relied heavily on the benefits touted by these amici. Justice O’Connor reasoned that diversity
in higher education promotes cross-racial understanding and improves
classroom discussions, while also enhancing preparation for work and
society, training for the nation’s leaders and military, and preparation
for citizenship.84 Yet Justice O’Connor ignored arguments advanced
by other amici: social justice intervenors whose briefs explained how
universities’ reliance on admissions criteria that disproportionately
disadvantage people of color necessitated race-conscious policies to
ensure that people of color were admitted to those institutions.85
82 E.g., Brief for Indiana University as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 7,
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241).
83 Brown-Nagin, supra note 77, at 1465 (citing Brief of Ass’n of American Law Schools
in Support of Respondents at 10–14, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (Nos. 02-241, 02-516), 2003 WL
399076).
84 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331.
85 A coalition of intervenors—including United for Equality and Affirmative Action
(UEAA), Law Students for Affirmative Action (LSAA), and the Coalition to Defend
Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights and Equality by Any Means
Necessary (BAMN)—argued that admissions officers’ excessive reliance on standardized
tests (like the ACT and the SAT) was the linchpin in a racial caste system that relegated
Blacks and Hispanics to inferior schools and jobs, and that perpetuated de facto segregation and discrimination in public schools and the workforce. See Brown-Nagin, supra note
77, at 1458–61 (citing Brief for Respondents Kimberly James et al. at 40–42, Grutter, 539
U.S. 306 (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 716302). The reason for Justice O’Connor’s failure to
respond to their arguments and instead remain silent on racial and social justice matters
remains unclear. Her silence, however, in the face of these concerns may have resulted
from her own white privilege and insulation from the effects of institutional racism and
discrimination. See, e.g., Herman Schwartz, O’Connor as a ‘Centrist’? Not When Minorities
Are Involved, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1998, at 2, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1998/
apr/12/opinion/op-38686 (noting that outside of cases decided unanimously, or by a margin
of eight to one or seven to two, between 1981 and 1998, O’Connor voted against the
minority litigant in all but two of the forty-one close cases implicating race). Indeed, the
only member of the Court to address social justice concerns in Grutter was Justice Thomas.
In his dissent, Thomas characterized the University of Michigan Law School’s admissions
system as “an exclusionary admissions system that it knows produces racially disproportionate results,” and noted that standardized tests are a “poor substitute for a system that
gives every applicant a chance to prove he can succeed in the study of law.” Grutter, 539
U.S. at 350, 367 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thomas further explained that universities realize
that Blacks as a group perform poorly on standardized tests and still insist on using them,
only to have to “correct” for black underrepresentation in the pool of applicants singled
out for high test scores via affirmative action policies. Id. at 369–70. He characterized merit
admission at the nation’s elite institutions as, ultimately, a lie. See id. at 367–68 (“The
rallying cry that in the absence of racial discrimination in admissions there would be a true
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Following Grutter, the state now has a compelling interest in pursuing diversity that justifies narrowly-tailored race-conscious remedies, at least in the context of public higher education. The Court’s
ruling in Grutter also seemed to insulate from judicial challenge
higher education admissions policies that consider race as just one
factor of many in reviewing applications for admission.86 Nevertheless, in 2012, just nine years after Grutter, Abigail Fisher filed her lawsuit directly challenging the consideration of race in admissions
decisions at the University of Texas, yielding the Court’s latest pronouncement on the diversity rationale. The University of Texas had
developed the admissions policy to which Fisher’s application was subject in the years following Cheryl Hopwood’s challenge and UT’s
adoption of the TTP Plan. Although the Plan had helped prevent
complete retrenchment in terms of diversity on campus, racial isolation still plagued the campus: A University study found that ninety
percent of classes with five to twenty-four students had one or zero
African American students enrolled.87
Accordingly, after the Grutter Court sanctioned the pursuit of
diversity as a compelling interest justifying the consideration of race in
admissions, UT adopted a new policy allowing consideration of race
for students not admitted under the TTP Plan.88 Like the University
of Michigan Law School policy upheld in Grutter, the UT policy maintained a commitment to individualized review—an applicant’s race
was only one of several factors considered.89 The policy also called for
periodic evaluation of this race-conscious admissions practice.90
This is where UT’s admissions policy stood when Abigail Fisher
entered her senior year of high school. Fisher applied to UT in 2008
with a 3.59 GPA (on a 4.0 scale) and a score of 1180 (out of 1600) on
the SAT.91 Based on Fisher’s profile, her application was given a PAI
score of less than six (out of six) and an Academic Index (AI) of 3.1
meritocracy ignores the fact that the entire process is poisoned by numerous exceptions to
‘merit.’”).
86 Grutter is also thought to extend to other policies in higher education, including
minority-targeted aid and college preparation programs, although the programs have nevertheless been subject to litigation alleging noncompliance with the dictates of Grutter. For
a more detailed discussion of the extension of the Grutter ruling to minority-targeted aid,
see generally Osamudia R. James, Dog Wags Tail: The Continuing Viability of MinorityTargeted Aid in Higher Education, 85 IND. L.J. 851 (2010).
87 Torres, supra note 51, at 98–99.
88 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2416 (2013).
89 Id.
90 Id. at 2434 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Torres, supra note 51, at 100 (noting
that UT subjected its admissions program to “systematic periodic review to ensure that it
was still fitted to the ends for which it was designed”).
91 Brief for Respondents, supra note 49, at 15.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\89-2\NYU201.txt

444

unknown

Seq: 20

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

25-APR-14

11:45

[Vol. 89:425

(on a 4.0 scale).92 Ultimately rejected by the University, and having
missed the cut-off for the TTP Plan,93 Fisher matriculated at
Louisiana State University.94 University of Texas officials noted that
Fisher would have been rejected even if race had played no role in the
process: Even if she had received a “perfect” PAI score of 6, her combined PAI/AI score was simply too low for admission.95
Fisher, however, argued that UT’s focus on diversity was not tied
to “enhanc[ing] the educational value” of the campus, but was instead
unconstitutionally focused on racial balancing.96 She also claimed that
UT’s pre-Grutter admissions policy had generated “substantial and
growing levels of Hispanic and African-American enrollment,”97 rendering a race-conscious policy unnecessary and thus violating the
Court’s strict-scrutiny standard.98
The Supreme Court could have used Fisher’s challenge to significantly curtail, or overrule altogether, the pursuit of diversity as a compelling interest that justifies the narrowly tailored use of race in
92 Id. at 15. Fisher’s actual PAI score is contained in a sealed brief. Id. The PAI score is
based on two essays and a Personal Achievement Score (PAS). Id. at 13. Trained readers
review the essays on a race-blind basis, but the PAS score “is based on holistic consideration of six equally-weighted factors: leadership potential, extracurricular activities, honors
and awards, work experience, community service, and special circumstances.” Id. The
“special circumstances” factor is measured by consideration of seven different attributes,
including the applicant’s socioeconomic status and race. Id. As articulated by the University, race is “a factor of a factor of a factor of a factor” in this holistic review. Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). The University does not assign any “automatic advantage or
value” to race or any other PAS factor. Id. at 14. Rather, “[e]ach applicant is considered as
a whole person,” and race, like all other factors considered, is examined contextually. Id.
(citations omitted).
93 See Second Amended Complaint For Declaratory, Injunctive, and Other Relief ¶ 10,
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 1:08-cv-00263SS), 2008 WL 7318510 (describing how Fisher ranked eighty-two out of 674 students, putting her approximately at the top twelve percent of her graduating high school class).
94 Tolson, supra note 2. Fisher noted that she was “devastated” by a rejection from the
university on which she had her heart set—the university that her father and sister had also
attended. Liptak, supra note 1. Although she successfully graduated from Louisiana State
University and currently works as a financial analyst, she nevertheless maintains that she
was injured by exclusion from the UT network of graduates, which “would have been a
really nice thing to be in.” Id.
95 Brief for Respondents, supra note 49, at 15–16 (noting that because of “stiff competition” in the admissions process and her “relatively low AI score,” Fisher “would not have
been admitted to the Fall 2008 freshman class even if she had received a perfect PAI score
of 6” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Liptak, supra note 1; Tolson,
supra note 2.
96 Brief for Petitioner at 27, Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013)
(No. 11-345), 2012 WL 1882759.
97 Id. at 35.
98 Id. at 35–36.
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admissions.99 The Court, however, left the diversity rationale undisturbed,100 and instead emphasized that courts should pay no deference
to universities’ assertions regarding their use of race in admissions
decisions.101 Rather, courts themselves must subject race-conscious
admissions policies to strict scrutiny and ensure that quota systems are
not used,102 that race is not the defining justification for a particular
applicant’s admission,103 that consideration of race is “necessary,”104
and that there are no “workable race-neutral alternatives” that could
“produce the educational benefits of diversity.”105
Uncertainty remains, however, about the extension of the diversity rationale to other educational settings. In the elementary and secondary school context, for example, it is unclear whether the diversity
rationale justifies race-conscious school assignments intended to integrate public schools. The Court circumvented this question in the 2008
case Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District
No. 1.106 At issue were the Seattle, Washington, and Louisville,
Kentucky, school districts’ decisions to implement controlled-choice
school assignment plans designed to maintain integrated schools and
promote equal access to the cities’ competitive schools.107
99 Indeed, it is arguable that a desire to overrule Grutter is what motivated the Court to
grant certiorari in Fisher, given how carefully the UT policy seemed to mirror the
University of Michigan’s admissions policy upheld in Grutter, and given the standing issues
in the case. See Torres, supra note 51, at 100 (“Viewed from a purely legal perspective, it is
difficult to understand why the Supreme Court decided to hear the [Fisher] case . . . . The
holistic review process put in place by the University of Texas is clearly within the
University of Michigan Law School admissions framework . . . approved . . . in Grutter v.
Bollinger.”). Not only had Fisher already graduated from another university, making
unavailable any type of redress from the University of Texas, but UT officials noted that
she was unlikely to have been granted admission, even if race were not considered. See
supra note 92 and accompanying text (discussing the limited influence of race in the admissions process). Although the standing question remains unresolved (the Court declined to
address it at all in its opinion), the Court may have been concerned with the university’s
use of a race-conscious initiative in addition to the TTP Plan (which had yielded high levels
of diversity) on the grounds that it was unnecessary and thus ran afoul of the narrow tailoring requirements. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2416 (describing the change to the university’s
admissions program leading to the decision); see also id. at 2419–20 (discussing the requirement of narrow tailoring set forth in Bakke).
100 See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2418 (“‘To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions
program’ . . . must ‘remain flexible enough to ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an
individual and not in a way that makes an applicant’s race or ethnicity the defining feature
of his or her application.’” (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334, 337 (2003)).
101 Id. at 2420.
102 Id. at 2418.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 2420 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
105 Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
106 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
107 Id. at 710, 715–16, 725. Once schools became oversubscribed by a particular race, the
school districts considered race, along with other factors—such as sibling attendance and
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In an opinion striking down both plans as unconstitutional, the
Court declined to directly address the presence of a compelling
interest in pursuing diversity, holding instead that—given the goals
and details of the controlled choice plans—the case was not actually
governed by Grutter.108 Moreover, the Court carefully qualified its
description of the Grutter holding, noting that “[t]he specific interest
found compelling in Grutter was student body diversity ‘in the context
of higher education.’”109
B. The Importance of Diversity
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s failure to recognize the
remediation of societal discrimination or the pursuit of social justice
as compelling interests that justify race-conscious admissions policies,
its commendation of diversity is not entirely misplaced. To the contrary, the pursuit of diversity not only benefits the students for whom
it expands access to institutions of higher education, but also has the
potential to improve classroom interactions on college and university
campuses.
It is undeniable that the diversity rationale benefits the minorities
who, as a result of its deployment and legitimacy, enjoy broadened
access to elite institutions. In The Shape of the River, William Bowen
distance from home—when making final school assignments. See id. at 711–12 (describing
how the Seattle school district uses these factors as “tiebreakers”); see also Goodwin Liu,
Seattle and Louisville, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 278 (2007) (same).
108 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 723, 725 (“The present cases are not governed by
Grutter.”). A plurality of the Court, consisting of Justices Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito, also declined to consider whether reducing racial isolation in the K–12 context is a
compelling interest that can justify race-conscious school assignment plans, explaining that
even if states had a compelling interest in combatting isolation, the controlled choice plans
were an insufficiently narrowly tailored response. Id. at 723, 727 (plurality opinion).
109 Id. at 722 (emphasis added) (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003)).
Justice Kennedy, however, wrote separately in Parents Involved to note that it was permissible for state and local school authorities to “consider the racial makeup of schools and to
adopt general policies to encourage a diverse student body, one aspect of which is its racial
composition.” Id. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
In doing so, he agreed with four dissenting justices who recognized diversity as a compelling interest in the K–12 context. Id. at 842 (Breyer, J., dissenting). This position was followed by the U.S. Department of Justice, which has provided guidelines for school districts
attempting to achieve diversity and decrease racial isolation in schools. See U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., GUIDANCE ON THE VOLUNTARY USE OF RACE TO
ACHIEVE DIVERSITY AND AVOID RACIAL ISOLATION IN ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY
SCHOOLS 6 (2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/edu/documents/
guidanceelem.pdf (outlining approaches to diversity that do not rely on racial classification, including strategic school site selection, grade realignment and feeder patterns,
zoning, and inter- and intra-district transfers). Whether Kennedy and the four dissenting
justices, however, will ever produce a unified majority opinion on this question remains to
be seen.
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and Derek Bok documented the benefit to minorities of access to academically selective colleges and universities as facilitated by raceconscious admission policies.110 Their list of such benefits includes
high graduation rates;111 the emergence of a black and Hispanic
middle class that has not only diversified major businesses, but also
improved services and representation for traditionally underserved
communities;112 higher employment rates and representation in professions such as law and medicine;113 an earnings premium in
whatever sector of employment they have chosen;114 and a high
degree of satisfaction with their college experiences.115 Bowen and
Bok’s research demonstrates that the Grutter amici were right to conclude that racial diversity in the military, in police forces, and in federal, state, and local leadership is in the public interest because it
helps ensure the right of minorities to participate in, and be served by,
their democracy.116
Furthermore, in education, as in other contexts, minority students
are not the sole beneficiaries of diversity. As Justice O’Connor
explained in Grutter, racial diversity improves the overall atmosphere
of a college campus, positively impacting classroom interactions and
academic outcomes for all students.117 Similarly, in an amicus brief
filed in Fisher, the American Educational Research Association
(AERA), a sociological research group, explained that diversity in the
student body promotes cross-racial understanding and reduces
prejudice; leads to improvements in students’ cognitive abilities, critical thinking, and self-confidence; promotes civic engagement and
leadership; and improves classroom discussion.118 Not surprisingly,
110 BOWEN & BOK, supra note 23. The Shape of the River draws on a forty-year longitudinal study of more than “eighty thousand undergraduate students who matriculated at
twenty-eight academically selective colleges and universities in the fall of 1951, the fall of
1976, and the fall of 1989.” Id. at xxvii–xxviii. The book, which is empirical in nature, has
been described as “perhaps the most influential volume on the subject” and has been
lauded for “the standards of breadth and statistical professionalism . . . achieved.” Charles
R. Lawrence III, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative
Action, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 928, 935 & n.26, 940 (2001) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
111 BOWEN & BOK, supra note 23, at 88.
112 Id. at 116.
113 Id. at 152–53.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 216.
116 See supra notes 79–83 (citing amici in Grutter who outlined the positive impacts of
racial diversity).
117 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330–31 (2003).
118 Brief of the American Educational Research Association et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 6–17, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013)
(No. 11-345), 2003 WL 398292 [hereinafter AERA Brief].
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“[s]tudents in diverse classrooms . . . benefit from the experience of
incongruity or dissonance, which . . . [encourages] them to seek new
information and create new thought patterns in order to make sense
of their surroundings. This experience leads to enhanced intellectual
stimulation and increases cognitive growth.”119
In the absence of racial diversity, people of color on predominantly white campuses often experience racial isolation,120 which typically results in both overt discrimination and “microaggressions”—the
“brief and commonplace daily verbal, behavioral, and environmental
indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, that communicate
hostile, derogatory, or negative . . . slights and insults to [a minority]
person or group.”121 Indeed, there is a distinct benefit to combating
racial isolation by enrolling a “critical mass” of minority students.
Black and Latino students enrolled in institutions where they are not
significantly underrepresented and do not feel alone are more likely
to feel welcome and respected as members of the school
community.122
119 UNIV. OF N.C. CTR. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, THE SOCIOECONOMIC COMPOSITION OF THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS: A CRUCIAL CONSIDERATION IN STUDENT ASSIGNMENT POLICY 14
(2005).
120 As defined by the American Educational Research Association in their amicus briefs
to the Supreme Court in the Fisher case, racial isolation occurs when universities have
“large numbers of classes in which there are no students—or only a single student—of a
given underrepresented race or ethnicity.” AERA Brief, supra note 118, at 18.
121 Id. at 20–21 (alteration in original) (quoting D ERALD W ING S UE ,
MICROAGGRESSIONS IN EVERYDAY LIFE: RACE, GENDER, AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION 5
(2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Janice McCabe, Racial and Gender
Microaggressions on a Predominantly-White Campus: Experiences of Black, Latina/o and
White Undergraduates, 16 RACE, GENDER & CLASS J. 133, 134–35 (2009) (explaining
“microagressions” as “brief, subtle and stunning encounters that are a frequent occurrence
in the lives of subordinated groups and that impact views of the self” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Take, for example, a video produced by black students at UCLA School
of Law in February of 2014. Titled “33,” the video describes the racial hostility and isolation black students experience in being one of only thirty-three black students out of a law
school population of 1100. One student noted that she was “so tired of being on . . . campus
everyday and having to plead [for her] humanity.” Rhonesha Byng, Video Shines Light on
the ‘Disturbing Emotional Toll’ of Being Black at UCLA Law School, HUFFINGTON POST
(Feb. 14, 2014, 12:20 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/14/ucla-law-schooldiversity_n_4789763.html. Similarly, in March 2014, students of color at Harvard presented
a play titled I, Too, Am Harvard, detailing the often difficult experience of being a person
of color on Harvard’s campus. Promotional images for the play included students pictured
with the racially insensitive and humiliating remarks often made to them by their peers,
including, “Don’t you wish you were white like the rest of us?” and, “Can you read?”
Bethonie Butler, ‘I, Too, Am Harvard’: Black Students Show They Belong, WASH. POST
(Mar. 5, 2014, 4:00 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/she-the-people/wp/2014/03/
05/i-too-am-harvard-black-students-show-they-belong/.
122 See William C. Kidder, Misshaping the River: Proposition 209 and Lessons for the
Fisher Case, 39 J.C. & U.L. 53, 55–56 (2013) (analyzing data from the University of
California to show that lesser diversity causes African American and Latino students to
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Of course, as the Grutter amici made clear, the benefits from
diversity extend beyond just students123: The diversity rationale has
great utility for institutions as well. To the extent that institutions
implement remedial efforts to address underrepresentation based on
demographics, the diversity rationale’s focus on inclusion potentially
frees institutions from the demographic caps that can accompany
remedial interests.124 Accordingly, an institution is not forced to suspend focus on a minority group just because proportional representation of that group in an institution implies that prior discrimination
has been remedied.125 In addition, the diversity rationale does allow—
indeed it encourages—institutions not only to consider racial minorities, but any historically disadvantaged group in the admissions process; these broader policies are politically palatable to the public.
feel less respected by their peers, and observing that the threat of racial isolation should
not be minimized or overlooked). Interestingly, diversity can also decrease intragroup
minority bias, which cultivates social equality not because it challenges the attitudes of
Whites, but because it enhances solidarity and cohesion among minority groups. See
Nicholas A. Bowman & Tiffany M. Griffin, Secondary Transfer Effects of Interracial
Contact: The Moderating Role of Social Status, 18 CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC
MINORITY PSYCHOL. 35, 42 (2012) (positing that, while more research is necessary,
minority group cohesion most likely stems from in-group pride rather than from out-group
bias).
123 See supra notes 79–83 and accompanying text (describing the positive professional
and societal benefits that stem from the diversity rationale).
124 As illustrated by oral argument before the Supreme Court in Fisher, however, diversity has subjected institutions to entirely new lines of challenges and questioning regarding
the empirical parameters of “critical mass,” and how, if not by demographic caps, an institution concludes it has enrolled a critical mass of minorities at its campus. Transcript of
Oral Argument at 34–46, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-345) (documenting questions
posed by the Justices about the idea of a critical mass, including: “How do they figure out
that particular classes don’t have enough?”; “What is that number? What is the critical
mass of African Americans and Hispanics at the University that you are working toward?”;
“Does critical mass vary from group to group? Does it vary from state to state?”; “[M]y
job . . . [is] to determine if your use of race is narrowly tailored to a compelling interest.
The compelling interest . . . is attaining a critical mass of minority students at [UT], but you
won’t tell me what the critical mass is. How am I supposed to do the job . . . ?”; “What is
the logical end point? When will I know that you’ve reached a critical mass?”).
125 Nevertheless, the Fisher challenge centered in part on the very question of whether
“enough” minorities had already been admitted under UT’s race-neutral admissions policy
such that the policy was no longer significantly narrowly-tailored. See supra note 97 and
accompanying text (claiming the race-neutral policy had created “substantial and growing
levels of” minority enrollment). Similarly, finding that voter turnout and registration rates
were approaching “parity,” that blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are
rare, and that “minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels,” the Supreme
Court in 2013 struck down Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act as unconstitutional because
the formula used as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to preclearance did not adequately
reflect changes in state voting procedures. Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612,
2625–28 (2013) (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193
(2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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C. Critiques of the Diversity Rationale
Even though diversity does provide such clear benefits for students, schools, and society, the diversity rationale, rightly, has not
been immune to criticism. It has been challenged for failing to genuinely advance racial justice, for primarily benefiting white institutions
instead of students of color, for legitimizing admissions policies that
favor the privileged, and for potentially pitting minority groups
against each other.
Consider, for example, what the Court ignored in Grutter and its
companion case, Gratz,126 by sanctioning diversity as a compelling
state interest while failing to recognize the remediation of societal and
de facto discrimination as similarly compelling. In those cases, the
Court eschewed remedial interests in an attempt to mitigate the
burden that remedial policies might impose on a white majority,127
while ignoring the continuing societal bias faced by minorities.128 This
failure prompted the late Professor Derrick Bell to note that a focus
on diversity allows courts and policymakers to avoid truths about past
and enduring racial discrimination. As Bell explained, rather than
accept these truths as justification for a remedial interest in affirmative action that would benefit minorities, policymakers tout and courts
uphold diversity as a compelling interest because of diversity’s benefit
to Whites.129 As such, minorities are merely “fortuitous beneficiaries”
of a policy goal that is subject to change when the majority asserts
different priorities.130
A related but distinct critique of the diversity rationale questions
who the ultimate beneficiaries of diversity actually are. Although
General Motors, in its amicus brief in Grutter, based its interest in
126 See supra note 73 (discussing Gratz v. Bollinger, which found that the University of
Michigan undergraduate admissions policy was not narrowly tailored enough in promoting
the compelling state interest in diversity).
127 See infra notes 279–88 and accompanying text. The Court has repeatedly characterized remedial remedies as unfair, given their impact on “innocent” Whites. E.g., Regents
of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 294 n.34 (1978).
128 This willful ignorance is well illustrated by the fact that only two Justices were willing
to concur with Justice Ginsburg’s account of enduring societal racial bias in Gratz. See
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298–302 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing the
racial disparities in poverty, employment, education, and healthcare).
129 Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1625 (2003).
130 Id. Bell describes the rationale underlying Justice O’Connor’s vote as a “prime
example” of his interest-convergence theory, which posits that, regardless of the harm
Blacks suffer due to racial hostility and discrimination, they will not obtain meaningful
relief until the consequences or the interests served by that relief furthers the interests of
the dominant sector of society—that is, until the interests of the minority and the majority
align. Id.; see also Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the InterestConvergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (describing InterestConvergence theory).
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diversity in part on the purchasing powers of the minority populations
to which it needed to be responsive, the continuing existence of workplace discrimination and segregation131 make it arguable that the economic benefits of diversity inure primarily to Whites in the United
States.132 That is, diversity brings minorities into predominantly white
institutions primarily for white benefit and not necessarily for the benefit of minorities themselves.133 In the education context, others have
similarly argued that diversity is heralded primarily to benefit white
institutions so that white institutions can be successfully promoted as
131 See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a
Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 92–93
(2003) (laying the groundwork for a legal theory that accounts for discrimination in the
modern workplace, where discrimination is no longer overt racism and segregation, but
rather takes the form of social interaction, perception, evaluation, and disbursement of
opportunity); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 460–61 (2001) (documenting the existence of overt as
well as subtle forms of workplace inequity and proposing a structural regulatory solution to
address the problems of the latter).
132 Like institutions of higher education, companies that adopt diversity policies often
enjoy enhanced institutional reputation, social capital, and cultural capital. See Nancy
Levit, Megacases, Diversity, and the Elusive Goal of Workplace Reform, 49 B.C. L. REV.
367, 425–27 (2008) (noting, in addition to the social argument in favor of diversity, that
“[t]he market arguments in favor of diversity are compelling,” including improved stock
performance, corporate reputation, employee recruitment, and employee retention);
Patrick S. Shin & Mitu Gulati, Showcasing Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1017, 1053 (2011)
(documenting how diversity has become a matter of corporate strategy, even as negative
attitudes toward minority groups remain pervasive and persistent); Kathleen B. Nalty,
Achieving Sustainable Diversity: Colorado’s Approach to the Inclusion Dilemma, LAW
PRAC., June 2008, at 50, 51 (considering the benefits of inclusiveness, including increased
productivity and enhanced competitiveness, more competitive client development and
retention, and enhanced reputation in the market). Ultimately, workplace diversity and
inclusiveness are important and worthy labor goals. Given, however, the continuing psychological and economic toll of workplace segregation and discrimination on minorities, it
is reasonable to wonder whether companies ultimately enjoy the better end of the bargain.
133 In this sense, corporate support for diversity is reminiscent of corporate support for
Blacks in The Space Traders, Derrick Bell’s science-fiction fable in which extraterrestrial
visitors to the United States offer to solve the country’s economic, energy, and environmental problems in exchange for the country’s black population. In Bell’s story, America’s
corporate leaders publicly oppose the trade because Blacks represent a disproportionate
segment of the market relative to their income and because businesses that profit from the
incarceration of Blacks would lose money. These corporate leaders also oppose the trade
because Blacks were crucial to stabilizing the economy in spite of continued economic
disparities: Potential opposition from those on the bottom was deflected by the continuing
efforts of poor Whites to ensure that they at least remained ahead of Blacks. Although
Blacks in Bell’s fable surely benefitted from corporate advocacy in their favor, their longterm interests were nevertheless discounted. DERRICK BELL, The Space Traders, in FACES
AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL 158 (1992); Werocknetwork, Space Traders (Derrick Bell’s
Movie), YOUTUBE (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K0BtFWwHOmQ;
see also Adrien Katherine Wing, Space Traders for the Twenty-First Century, 11 BERKELEY
J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 49 (2009) (examining Derrick Bell’s parable and using a similar
framework to assess contemporary race relations and Barack Obama’s election).
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diverse, thus enhancing their institutional reputation, social capital,
and cultural capital.134
Critiques of the diversity rationale also focus on the standardized
testing regime to which the pursuit of diversity, at least in part, is
meant to be responsive. As Justice Thomas has observed, diversitybased affirmative action policies allow colleges and universities to mitigate the exclusionary impact that standardized tests have on minority
applicants.135 Accordingly, focusing on diversity permits these institutions to broaden access to minority students while continuing to
bestow undeserved legitimacy on grades and test scores that favor the
privileged, instead of considering novel, fairer alternative standards by
which to universally screen applicants.136 As long as admissions criteria like standardized tests are legitimized despite their disparate
negative impact on minority applicants,137 the diversity rationale
cannot completely justify institutional admissions programs that
deviate from standard patterns of selection in order to compensate for
the disparate impact.138
Finally, the diversity rationale potentially undermines collaborative efforts among minority groups. By placing value on students’
backgrounds, the diversity rationale is made politically unpalatable to
groups like Jews and Asians who may eventually be rejected because
they are overrepresented at institutions of higher education.139 This
134

Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151, 2155, 2175–83 (2013).
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 367–70 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Equal Protection Clause allows for legacy preference in admissions but does not allow
for the use of race as a means to get around standardized tests that hurt minorities).
136 Bell, supra note 129, at 1629–30 (criticizing the reliance on standardized tests as
“notoriously poor predictors of performance either in school or after, but they measure
quite accurately the incomes of the applicants’ parents”). In recent years, more and more
institutions of higher education, acknowledging that “test scores do not equal merit,” have
either begun making admissions decisions without considering the SAT or ACT, or making
the submission of standardized test scores optional for applicants. CHARLES ROONEY &
BOB SCHAEFFER, FAIRTEST, TEST SCORES DO NOT EQUAL MERIT: ENHANCING EQUITY
& EXCELLENCE IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS BY DEEMPHASIZING SAT AND ACT RESULTS 3
(1998), available at http://www.fairtest.org/sites/default/files/optrept.pdf; Test Scores Do
Not Equal Merit: Executive Summary, FAIRTEST (Aug. 22, 2007, 2:32 PM),
http://www.fairtest.org/test-scores-do-not-equal-merit-executive-summary (listing over 815
four-year colleges that admit a substantial number of applicants without regard to their
SAT or ACT scores).
137 See William C. Kidder & Jay Rosner, How the SAT Creates “Built-In Headwinds”:
An Educational and Legal Analysis of Disparate Impact, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 131
(2002) (analyzing the SAT’s disparate impact on African American and Chicano testtakers).
138 Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle Class, 68
U. COLO. L. REV. 939, 961 (1997).
139 See id. at 965 (detailing the problem of instituting preferences against “overachieving” or “model” minorities like Jews and Asians).
135
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outcome is antithetical to genuine social justice movements, which
should encourage minority groups to support one another regardless
of their varying levels of societal success, thereby creating broader and
more effective coalitions.140
II
THE IMPACT

DIVERSITY RATIONALE
WHITE IDENTITY

OF THE

ON

Assessments of the diversity rationale that solely address political
or doctrinal inadequacies tell only part of the story. Judicial decisionmaking is constitutive: Court opinions—particularly when answering
controversial and far-reaching legal questions—often create social
narratives that accompany legal mandates and have the power to
shape identities as well as the relationships among those individuals
whose identities are impacted.
Now ubiquitous in American legal, political, and popular culture,
the diversity rationale is one such judicial doctrine that warrants
scholarly exploration of its impact on individual identity formation.
As part of a broader progressive effort to address inequality by examining social structures that fuel racial bias and discrimination, this Part
considers the impact of the diversity rationale on identity formation
and performance. Ultimately, the diversity rationale as currently
deployed stunts the development of antiracist white identities—illustrated by case studies of the lead plaintiffs in landmark cases involving
race and diversity in public education, including Hopwood v. Texas,141
Grutter v. Bollinger,142 Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 1,143 and Fisher v. University of Texas at
Austin.144
140 See id. at 966 (arguing that the diversity-based rationale has negative consequences
for interminority relations). Of course, minority groups do not all have the same exact
interests by virtue of their minority status. Rather, interests diverge not just between different minority groups but also within minority groups, as marginalization is contextual
and often exacerbated or mitigated by other factors like class or education. See Kimberle
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against
Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242–44 (1991) (considering the intersectional
identities of women of color to explore both race and gender dimensions of violence
against women of color). That said, differences among minority groups based on race,
ethnicity, and language consistently trigger discrimination and bias, forming a commonality
of experience that would ideally form the basis for broad-based social justice movements
and coalitions.
141 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
142 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
143 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
144 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
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A. How Law Shapes Identity
In all litigation, parties seek particular outcomes. Yet it is not
always clear whether or how these outcomes impact the identities of
individual litigants, as well as those who merely observe these cases.
The Supreme Court decides dozens of cases each year, most of which
go unnoticed by the general public.145 Nevertheless, as many scholars
have described, law does have the potential to create and shape identities, as well as to influence the way individuals understand their
identities in relation to others in society.146 Critical race scholars have
long noted that racial identity is socially constructed,147 and the law
certainly impacts that construction.
Moreover, constitutive theories of law have encouraged study of
the ways in which laws and legal rationales operate in daily life by
“shaping interpersonal relations, influencing daily habits, and helping
define civic identity,”148 while also acknowledging that “law interacts
with other forms of discourse and sources of cultural meaning to construct and to contest identities, communities, and authorities.”149
Accordingly, the law not only shapes identities, but also has the potential to empower or disempower its subjects.150
145 See Frequently Asked Questions, SUPREME CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/
faq.aspx#faqgi9 (last visited Mar. 13, 2014) (explaining that the Court grants certiorari and
hears oral arguments in about seventy-five to eighty cases each year).
146 See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 9
(1987) (arguing that laws influence the ways citizens generally “perceive reality”);
TAMARA METZ, UNTYING THE KNOT: MARRIAGE, THE STATE, AND THE CASE FOR THEIR
DIVORCE 92 (2010) (describing how the state, through marriage laws, “influence[s] the selfunderstandings of individuals and the political community”). Moreover, participation or
exclusion from participation in particular legal institutions like marriage also shapes identity (for example, in the case of gays and lesbians who are denied marriage equality in
many states). E.g., Robert Leckey, Harmonizing Family Law’s Identities, 28 QUEEN’S L.J.
221, 249 (2002).
147 See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race
Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1759 (2003) (presenting critical race theory as “committed to
the idea of race as a social construction”).
148 Ryan Goodman, Beyond the Enforcement Principle: Sodomy Laws, Social Norms,
and Social Panoptics, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 643, 666 (2001); see also id. (building on constitutive theories of law to examine—in the context of sodomy laws—how patterns of behavior
and individual expectations are consciously and unconsciously influenced by the sanction
of law in the background).
149 Rosemary J. Coombe, The Cultural Life of Things: Anthropological Approaches to
Law and Society in Conditions of Globalization, 10 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 793, 794
(1995); see also id. at 793 n.6 (citing scholarship considering constitutive theories of law).
150 See, e.g., Wendy Espeland, Legally Mediated Identity: The National Environmental
Policy Act and the Bureaucratic Construction of Interests, 28 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1149
(1994) (chronicling how an attempt by the EPA to comply with the NEPA while representing the interests of the Yavapai Indians resulted in Yavapai resistance that inspired a
new understanding of their collective identity, a new sense of their history, and a sense of
empowerment); John Tehranian, Parchment, Pixels, & Personhood: User Rights and the IP
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Cases implicating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment are no exception. The Amendment’s guarantee of “equal
protection of the laws”151 resonates in a country where freedom, liberty, choice, and autonomy—however unattainable152—are idealized.153 Indeed, equality before the law seems like a prerequisite to
the ability to make true choices. In legal challenges to race-conscious
policies that impact the distribution of valuable goods, like employment154 or access to elite education,155 equal protection cases also
implicate American beliefs about meritocracy and bias, as well as lingering resentments and anxieties about racial remediation.
Resentments and anxieties only intensify in the context of public
education. Even though public schools no longer serve as visible manifestations of racist “separate but equal” government policies, they
(Identity Politics) of IP (Intellectual Property), 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 18 (2011) (recognizing how patent laws “shape identity development [of users] through their regulation,
propertization, and monopolization of cultural content,” before going on to advance a
theory of intellectual property that recognizes the link between identity actualization and
intellectual property legal regimes).
151 The Equal Protection Clause provides: “[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
152 See KENT GREENFIELD, THE MYTH OF CHOICE: PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN A
WORLD OF LIMITS 1–3 (2011) (describing the tension between the celebration of choice in
“our political and legal rhetoric” and “the reality of pervasive constraints” that narrow
“the scope of our choices”). In response to this tendency of Americans to idealize contract
and reify individual choice in ways that mask inequality, Professor Martha Fineman advocates for an understanding of vulnerability: “[T]he realization that many [mildly adverse to
catastrophically devastating] events are ultimately beyond human control.” Martha
Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition,
20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 9 (2008).
153 See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, Choice and Freedom: Elusive Issues in the Search for
Gender Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 914, 915 (1987) (reviewing DAVID KIRP ET AL., GENDER
JUSTICE (1986)) (discussing the authors’ individual-centric, process-oriented approach to
freedom of choice and how this approach values self-determination of gender roles while
rejecting the idea that government should be active in this area); Joan Williams, Gender
Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1562–63 (1991)
(discussing the central role of individual freedom of choice in modern legal discourse). The
role of exercising “rational” choice is also central to economic analysis of law, and is
defined by law and economics scholars as “choosing the best means to the chooser’s ends.”
Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1551, 1551 (1998).
154 See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (equal protection challenge to promotion procedures with racially disparate impact); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976) (equal protection challenge to recruiting procedures with racially disparate impact).
155 See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (plaintiff challenged
university’s undergraduate admission policy involving minority quota); Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (plaintiff challenged law school’s admission policy on equal
protection grounds); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (plaintiff challenged university’s undergraduate admission policy); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978) (plaintiff challenged medical school’s admission policy); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d
932 (5th Cir. 1996) (plaintiff challenged law school’s admission policy).
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continue to have significant political and social meaning because of
the function they perform.156 For many citizens, public schools serve
as one of few interfaces with government and operate as a primary
site for regular community interaction.157 In the K–12 context, raceconscious policies tend to provoke particularly passionate reactions,
perhaps because parents and caregivers are invested in ensuring the
best possible educational outcomes for their children. As a result,
public schools remain the site of intense social, political, and legal conflict,158 triggering anxieties about race and racism whenever affirmative action policies are employed.
The same is true in public institutions of higher education. Bakke
and Grutter, for example, not only spawned case law on how raceconscious policies may be used at such public institutions, but also
helped transform the concept of diversity into a social phenomenon.159 Still, today, college and university affirmative action policies
are among the most contested legal frameworks in the United States.
The pursuit of diversity as a justification for affirmative action policies
has captured the imagination of Americans—instigating both fierce
156 Cf. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 350–51 (1987) (noting that segregation of
Blacks in schools “generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community”
(quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
157 See Charles R. Lawrence III, Forbidden Conversations: On Race, Privacy, and
Community (A Continuing Conversation with John Ely on Racism and Democracy), 114
YALE L.J. 1353, 1376–78 (2005) (arguing that public education both defines and creates
community).
158 Consider, for example, the strong and passionate opposition to race-conscious busing
policies during the 1960s and 70s, or the support for affirmative action galvanized in
response to the Grutter and Gratz challenges to affirmative action. See Milliken v. Bradley,
418 U.S. 717, 744–45 (1974) (holding that school districts could not be held responsible for
de facto segregation across district lines); DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW 3 (1995) (noting that, despite the absence of “riots, bus
burnings, and school boycotts” like those in opposition to busing that received national
attention in earlier decades, school segregation and the methods used to achieve it remain
unresolved dilemmas); Brown-Nagin, supra note 77, at 1513–14 (describing protests staged
at pivotal points in the Michigan Grutter and Gratz litigation, organized by By Any Means
Necessary—a political coalition formed in response to the affirmative action challenges);
James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111 YALE L.J.
2043, 2052–55 (2002) (detailing opposition to busing policies implemented to promote integration, including President Nixon’s antibusing statements on the campaign trail, legislation proposed to prohibit cross-district busing, “unprecedented” antibusing protests in
middle-class communities, and poll results revealing consistent, strong opposition to busing
in both white and black communities).
159 See infra notes 170–74 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of diversity
policies in educational and other social institutions and how they have impacted the racial
identities of both white and nonwhite individuals).
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opposition and fierce support—since this rationale was first articulated in Bakke, and later affirmed in Grutter.
For example, college students are frequently surveyed about their
opinions on their institutions’ affirmative action programs; they are
consistently capable of and interested in discussing the pros and cons
of these programs, with white students often concluding that their
schools’ affirmative action policies should be abolished.160 Adding to
this public debate, prominent scholars—such as Douglas Massey,
Camille Charles, Garvey Lundy, William Bowen, and Derek Bok—
have penned books that chronicle the justifications and benefits of
race-conscious admissions policies in American colleges and
universities.161
When affirmative action was challenged in Grutter and Gratz,
public galvanization in support of the policies was impressive.162 Yet
more than a decade after the Court decided those cases, affirmative
action policies still encounter opposition, not only through litigation,
but also via state ballot initiatives—like the successful Proposition 209
in California163 and Proposition 2 in Michigan,164 both of which
banned consideration of race and gender in public university admissions and government hiring. As recently as November 2012, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit deemed the
Michigan ban unconstitutional in a case brought by By Any Means
Necessary (BAMN), one of the most visible student interveners in

160 See Mark A. Chesler, Melissa Peet & Todd Sevig, Blinded by Whiteness: The
Development of White College Students’ Racial Awareness, in WHITE OUT: THE
CONTINUING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACISM 215, 228 (Ashley “Woody” Doane & Eduardo
Bonilla-Silva eds., 2003) (canvassing surveys on the topic of affirmative action, which
reveal that 52.4% of students feel that affirmative action should be abolished and 21.8%
feel that “[r]acial discrimination is no longer a problem in America” (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Research suggests that these issues loom large for
white college students, many of whom are not only confronted with their own racial identity for the first time when away from home, but who are also in a developmental stage in
which their “identities as racial beings, as well as their racial attitudes, are subject to challenge and change.” Id. at 216.
161 For a sample of this literature, see BOWEN & BOK, supra note 23, and DOUGLAS S.
MASSEY ET AL., THE SOURCE OF THE RIVER: THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF FRESHMEN AT
AMERICA’S SELECTIVE COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (2003).
162 See supra notes 77–83 and accompanying text (describing how nearly 4000 colleges
and universities, sixty-six Fortune 500 companies, and dozens of prominent individuals
filed amicus briefs in support of the University of Michigan’s admissions policies).
163 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31 (codifying Proposition 209).
164 MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26 (codifying California Civil Rights Initiative), invalidated by
Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466 (6th
Cir. 2012), cert granted sub nom. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 133 S. Ct.
1633 (2013).
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Grutter.165 Debate persists about whether minority groups are helped
or harmed by race-conscious admissions policies in higher education,166 and, at a time in United States history increasingly characterized as post-racial,167 some have contested affirmative action policies
as “reverse-discrimination.”168
Debate notwithstanding, colleges and universities have aggressively employed the diversity rationale in service of creating more heterogeneous student bodies. Diversity programs and policies at
educational institutions are numerous and varied, including policies
that consider race in admissions (like those challenged in Grutter,
Gratz, and Fisher),169 minority prospective/admit weekends to
165 Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 483–85; Tamar Lewin, Affirmative
Action Ban in Michigan Is Rejected, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2012, at A25. The court ruled
that the ban “unfairly placed a special burden on supporters of race-conscious admissions
policies” in the political process. Id.
166 See, e.g., ELIZABETH ARIES, RACE AND CLASS MATTERS AT AN ELITE COLLEGE
(2008) (researching and cataloguing Amherst College’s return on its upfront investment in
diversity and emphasizing the need for further progress); BOWEN & BOK, supra note 23
(chronicling the long-term positive consequences of race-conscious admission policies for
Whites and minorities); D’SOUZA, supra note 24, at 21 (arguing that American universities’
pursuit of diversity, proportional representation, and multicultural progress ultimately falls
short when it comes to the very groups they seek to protect).
167 Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1594–96 & n.13 (2009) (providing
a detailed sampling of the “racial transcendence” narrative in mainstream media, including
editorial columns featured in the Philadelphia Daily News, the Boston Globe, USA Today,
the Chicago Tribune, and the New York Times); Gregory S. Parks & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Implicit Bias, Election ’08, and the Myth of a Post-Racial America, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
659, 659–60 & n.1 (2010) (canvassing analysis by politicians, policymakers, and media outlets like Ward Connerly, Abigail Thernstrom, and The American Prospect suggesting that
the Obama presidency signals a “post-racial country,” before concluding that unconscious
racism is nevertheless “alive and well”).
168 Chesler et al., supra note 160, at 229 (“[S]ome white students feel their personal or
group self-interest challenged and themselves systematically placed at a disadvantage
because of the presence of students of color. . . . [This view] articulates the emerging white
‘victim’ identity that is supported and reified through the discourse of ‘reverse discrimination’ in the affirmative action debate.”); Woody Doane, Rethinking Whiteness Studies, in
WHITE OUT: THE CONTINUING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACISM, supra note 160, at 3, 16 (“[I]f
white privilege is invisible and racial barriers are claimed to be a relic of the past, then
race-based claims or challenges to the existing system of racial stratification . . . can be
framed as ‘reverse discrimination’ or racism against whites.”).
169 Considered just one element of a “holistic” evaluation, it can be difficult to locate an
admissions policy that explicitly references race or ethnicity as a factor for consideration.
Such consideration may, however, fall under “personal background.” See, e.g., What Does
Columbia Look For?, COLUMBIA U., https://undergrad.admissions.columbia.edu/apply/
first-year/holistic (last visited Mar. 3, 2014) (listing factors Columbia University uses to
evaluate undergraduate applicants, including “context of a particular candidate”); Lee
Bollinger, Seven Myths About Affirmative Action in Universities, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
535, 542–44 (2002) (describing the consideration of race and ethnicity in university admissions procedures).
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encourage minority students to apply and enroll,170 housing programs
that celebrate minority culture,171 and the dissemination of statistics
and data signaling the diversity of student bodies and faculties.172
Pursuit of diversity, however, is not limited to higher education.
Rather, K–12 public schools, corporations, government agencies, nonprofits, and countless other institutions increasingly promote and tout
diversity programs at their institutions as well.173 The cultivation and
170 For example, Amherst College hosts “diversity open houses” during which the office
of admissions invites prospective applicants to Amherst’s campus. Although the open
houses are available to all prospective students, the selection committee “prioritizes the
invitation of students from traditionally under-represented groups, such as AfricanAmerican, Hispanic/Latino American, Native American, and Asian-American backgrounds, as well as first-generation students.” Diversity Open Houses (DIVOH), AMHERST
C., https://www.amherst.edu/admission/diversity/divoh (last visited Oct. 21, 2013); see also
Christina M. Hand Gonzalez, Diversity Fly-In Visit Program List: Seniors to Visit This
Fall!, COLLEGE-PATH.COM (Sept. 3, 2013, 3:51 AM), http://www.college-path.com/2011diversity-flyin-list-colleges-pay-seniors-visit-fall (listing colleges that host diversity college
fly-in programs, some of which are provided at no cost to the student); Multicultural Open
House, COLO. C., http://www.coloradocollege.edu/admission/introduceyourself/visit/
multiculturalopenhouse/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2014) (encouraging “members of American
Ethnic Minority groups, students who are the first in their families to attend college and
students from low income families to apply”).
171 Take, for example, the W.E.B. DuBois College House at the University of
Pennsylvania, which was “[c]reated in response to the needs voiced by African American
students” and provides programming “based upon the history and culture of people of the
African diaspora.” W.E.B. DuBois College House, U. PA., http://dubois.house.upenn.edu/
frontpage (last visited Mar. 13, 2014); see also Glass/Lenox House, COLO. C.,
http://www.coloradocollege.edu/offices/residentiallife/housing-facilities-information/smallhouses/lennox.dot (last visited Mar. 13, 2014) (promoting a residence hall focused on providing an environment for “multi-cultural awareness, support, and programming”); Special
Interest Housing Program: Multicultural Learning Experience Floors, BOS. C., http://www.
bc.edu/offices/reslife/lifeinhalls/programs/specialinterest.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2014)
(describing a residential experience through which students will work to “further define
and promote diversity . . . throughout the University through programmatic methods”).
172 See, e.g., Consumer Information for Prospective and Current Georgetown University
Students (HEOA Disclosures), GEORGETOWN U., http://compliance.georgetown.edu/
student-consumer-information/heoa (last visited Mar. 26, 2014) (providing diversity statistics for students enrolled as of Fall 2012); Multicultural Open House, supra note 170 (providing demographic data for the percentage of students who identify as American Ethnic
Minorities).
173 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701
(2007) (lawsuit brought, in part, as a challenge to the measures used by the Seattle,
Washington, and Louisville, Kentucky, school districts to maximize racial diversity in the
cities’ public schools); Anjali Chavan, The “Charles Morgan Letter” and Beyond: The
Impact of Diversity Initiatives on Big Law, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 521, 525 (2010) (discussing supplier diversity initiatives in which corporations set diversity and inclusion criteria even for the companies with which they do business); Stacy L. Hawkins, A
Deliberative Defense of Diversity: Moving Beyond the Affirmative Action Debate to
Embrace a 21st Century View of Equality, 2 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 75, 87–88 (2012)
(describing the embrace of diversity iniatives among federal agencies, as well as among
hospitals, not-for-profit agencies, and even professional associations); Levit, supra note 132
(describing the proliferation of diversity initiatives at large corporations after the
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maintenance of diversity has become an industry of its own and, as
one scholar noted, Americans “have internalized the idea that racial
diversity is a social good, and . . . assign value to the inclusion of nonwhite individuals in our social milieu, our educational institutions, and
our workplaces.”174 It is likely that the diversity rationale has not only
shaped race-conscious policies at public institutions, but also impacted
the racial identities of and relationships among white and nonwhite
individuals—and not necessarily in positive ways.
Focusing on individuals and identity formation can be risky.
Indeed, scholars have raised important concerns about the manner in
which America’s struggle to eradicate racism has focused too much on
individual actors rather than on larger social structures.175 Examining
societal structures rather than individual racists is essential: If segregation is understood to be a collective social responsibility rather than
the aggregation of private transgressions, it can be recognized as official policy and ultimately remedied through collective action. Because
racism arises not only in isolated interactions, but also in wider social,
political, and cultural fora, we must examine the ways in which racial
segregation and privilege are embedded in and perpetuated by the
social and political construction of racially identifiable space.176
Accordingly, there is some tension inherent in acknowledging the
structural and societal manifestations of racism and discrimination
while also inquiring into the impact of the diversity rationale on the
identity development and performance of white individuals.
Yet examining identity in this context is crucial precisely because
Whites often engage in identity formation and performance that may
preclude them from understanding structural impediments to racial
equality. In this way, problematic white identity formation—marked
by a belief in white racial transparency and ignorance about white
privilege—presents a structural barrier in and of itself. Moreover, as a
settlement of law suits alleging employment discrimination); David B. Wilkins, From “Separate Is Inherently Unequal” to “Diversity Is Good for Business”: The Rise of Market-Based
Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548,
1556 (2004) (documenting the proliferation of diversity initiatives at law firms).
174 Leong, supra note 134, at 2155; see also WALTER BENN MICHAELS, THE TROUBLE
WITH DIVERSITY: HOW WE LEARNED TO LOVE IDENTITY AND IGNORE INEQUALITY 12
(2006) (“[D]iversity has become virtually a sacred concept in American life today.”).
175 For an example of this argument, see Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of
Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1845 (1994)
(arguing, in the context of housing segregation and discrimination, that “racially identified
space results from public policy and legal sanctions—in short, from state action—rather
than being the unfortunate but irremediable consequences of purely private or individual
choices”).
176 See id. at 1849–52 (explaining how racial segregation can occur despite a lack of
intentional racism or legally condoned racial discrimination).
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public policy goal with social and political consequences, diversity
entrenches this problematic and obstructionist white identity, ultimately undermining, if not totally blocking, progress toward racial justice. As such, critiques of diversity rationale deployments are justified
as explorations of how the diversity rationale warps identity formation
and performance, which ultimately results in the creation of laws and
public policies that undermine the antisubordination goals animating
the Fourteenth Amendment.177
B. Racial Identity Formation
For purposes of this exploration, “identity” can be understood as
a person’s internal sense of self as well as an association of that self
with a particular group or groups.178 Although there is no biological
basis for race,179 race exists as a social construct and has been developed according to both social meanings and physical attributes.180 In
addition to being signaled through phenotypic characteristics like skin
color, facial features, or hair texture, race can be signaled by an individual’s social characteristics like class, geography, or politics.181
177 See Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 1074–76 (noting that the current equal
protection framework undermines the goals of antisubordination and true integration); see
also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds Other than Race”: The
Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REV. 615, 622–23, 637–55 (discussing first the antisubordination approach to equal protection, in which “a law unlawfully discriminates if it reinforces the marginalized social, economic, or political status of historically disadvantaged classes,” and then arguing, through
analysis of equal protection jurisprudence, that “courts now reserve their most exacting
level of scrutiny for laws that ‘burden’ historically privileged groups but assume the constitutionality of enactments that harm historically disadvantaged groups”); Jessica Knouse,
From Identity Politics to Ideology Politics, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 749, 770 (noting the
Supreme Court’s focus on the intent to abolish subordinating institutions such as the Black
Codes and correspondent refusal to institute an “equal-birth principle,” resulting in its
failure to “address any inequities operating outside the context of identity groups”).
178 See Karst, supra note 18, at 266, 282–83 (examining how peoples’ identities—metaphors that reflect social groupings in life—are often determined as an issue of “fact,”
reflecting the status ordering of social groups and reinforcing that social order).
179 See Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on
Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 11 (1994) (explaining that
“[t]here are no genetic characteristics possessed by all Blacks but not by non-Blacks; similarly, there is no gene or cluster of genes common to all Whites but not to non-Whites”).
180 Cf. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Undercover Other, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 873, 883 (2006)
(“[R]ace, while often signaled by phenotype, is not biologically defined. . . . Instead, race is
socially constructed; it is formed through human interactions and commonly held notions
of what it means to be a person of a certain race.”).
181 See Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being
“Regarded as” Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal Are
White, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283, 1296 (proposing a new method for recognizing discrimination claims based on the use of proxies for race, even when those proxies mistakenly identify someone as belonging to a particular race).
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Racial categories yield racial identities. Externally, society
imposes identities on people, often through positive or negative stereotypes that attach to them as a result of their physical appearance or
the ways in which they “choose to perform” their identities.182 For
example, the “Good Black Man,” who distances himself from blackness and embraces white norms, and the “Bad Black Man,” who is
crime-prone and hypersexual, are two stereotypical racial identities
imposed on black men.183 Internally, racial identity is navigated by
people with varying levels of freedom184 or choice185 about identity,
and is socially constructed through negotiations and renegotiations
with the people with whom one interacts.186 Middle-class status, for
example, might give black males more freedom to adopt a “Good
Black Man” racial identity based on the virtues automatically assigned
to people with means.187 Similarly, researchers have found that
182 See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 180, at 883 (juxtaposing the costs for Blacks of
“passing” to the costs for gays, lesbians, and bisexuals to illustrate the similarities between
interracial marriage and same-sex marriage).
183 See Frank Rudy Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity: Intersectionality,
Assimilation, Identity Performance, and Hierarchy, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 853, 875–85
(2006) (describing the historical origins and social implications of being a “Bad Black
Man” versus a “Good Black Man” and arguing that the bipolar representations of heterosexual black men as either crime-prone and hypersexual or “good” are used to help resolve
the white mainstream’s post–civil rights anxiety about inclusion and exclusion of black
men).
184 See Mary Coombs, Interrogating Identity, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 222, 223
(1996) (describing how context informs the degrees of freedom that individuals have to
negotiate their racial identity and reviewing JUDY SCALES-TRENT, NOTES OF A WHITE
BLACK WOMAN (1995), a book exploring the process of understanding and defining individual and collective identities).
185 See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, The Law and Economics of Identity, 32 QUEEN’S L.J. 389,
393 (2007) (noting that the law and economics perspective on identity focuses on “people
choosing . . . particular identities or particular aspects of those identities, or making other
choices based in part on identity, or other people influencing the choice, including by creating and defining particular identities”); Haney López, supra note 179, at 47 (advancing a
theory of race as a social complex of meanings continually replicated in daily life).
186 An example of this process of negotiation and interaction from a domain analogous
to racial identity is “working identity,” which describes the negotiations between an
employee’s sense of self and his or her sense of institutional values promoted in the workplace. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259,
1264 (2000) (citing JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER (1993), Cheryl I. Harris,
Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1763–64 (1993), and Karst, supra note 18,
at 287, for the proposition that creating and maintaining social identity is a process of
negotiation between oneself and others).
187 It is also possible that middle-class status might give black males more freedom to
adopt a “Bad Black Man” identity. The cultural capital that often accompanies middle-toupper class experiences might allow a black male to embrace a “bad” identity, but be more
readily forgiven for that identity given access to middle-class resources, language patterns,
or social networks, which help frame the bad identity in a less threatening manner. Similarly, to the extent that people might perceive black men as physically threatening, signifiers of middle-class status, including dress, may ameliorate that threat. One might imagine,
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although there are components of African American racial identity
that remain relatively stable, situations can influence the centrality of
race in an individual’s conception of identity, making race more or
less salient to an African American’s self-concept at a particular
time.188
Scholars have also noted that racial identity is performed, in both
a strategic and social constructivist manner.189 Judith Butler’s concept
of performativity, developed in the context of gender, is particularly
instructive on this point, explaining that identity maintenance requires
the repetition of symbolic acts.190 In the context of race, this means
that racial identity performance must correspond to symbolic representations that are culturally understood as evocative of a particular
racial identity.191 Accordingly, a black male wishing to express
“authentic” black identity might subscribe to progressive or liberal
political ideology, live in a black neighborhood, and marry a black
person.192 By contrast, a black male wishing to perform as a “Good
Black Man” might downplay his race, insisting on identifying himself
first and foremost as “a human being” or refusing to discuss race or
racism with Whites.193

for instance, that fearful reactions to black men walking down the street are less intense if
the male is wearing a high-end suit.
188 See J. Nicole Shelton & Robert M. Sellers, Situational Stability and Variability in
African American Racial Identity, 26 J. BLACK PSYCHOL. 27, 46 (2000) (describing the
results of two experiments demonstrating that when situations make race more salient for
African Americans, it can temporarily move race to the forefront of selfconceptualization).
189 See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 186, at 1265 n.11 (explaining that there is a distinction between identity performed as a result of social construction and identity performed
as a strategic decision given the constraints linked to a particular context).
190 See Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by
Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1176–82 (2004) (applying
Butler’s performativity concept to the performance of race and ethnicity).
191 Id. at 1180.
192 Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 180, at 887–92.
193 See Cooper, supra note 183, at 880–81 (describing the naturean example of “The
Good Black,” as described in PAUL M. BARRETT, THE GOOD BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF
RACE IN AMERICA (1999): “Barrett’s message that blacks should try to transcend race is
the predominant alternative to the image of the Bad Black Man. In other words, the way to
be a Good Black Man is to downplay one’s race.”). This insistence on the recognition of
oneself as a person, rather than as a member of a specific racial group, parallels the “transparency phenomenon” subscribed to by Whites; that is, Whites typically do not think of
themselves as belonging to a particular race, but instead see themselves solely as part of
the larger human race. See infra notes 220–23, 243 and accompanying text (describing the
impact of this phenomenon on the discussion of race and racism).
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No matter how identity is conceptualized, racial identity development—or lack thereof, as is often the case with Whites194—exerts a
significant influence on how individuals navigate their lives. For
people of color, much attention has been paid to minority-specific
models of racial identity performance and development. For example,
the Black Identity Development (BID) model is a tool used by
teachers, counselors, and group leaders who seek an understanding of
black identity based on positive models, rather than on cultural-deficit
models.195 Two major themes underlying the BID model are the
turning away from white values and standards and the affirmation of
nonwhite reference points.196 Alternately, black identity development
can be conceptualized as a transformative process that serves as the
stimulus for liberation. According to this theory, the black protests,
social movements, and political activism of the 1960s are considered
integral to emerging self-identity.197
194 See infra Part II.C.1 (explaining that Whites typically do not have a sense of racial
identity and tend not to think about the norms, behaviors, experiences, or perspectives that
are specific to being white).
195 Maurianne Adams, Core Processes of Racial Identity Development, in NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON RACIAL IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT 209, 214–15 (Charmaine L.
Wijeyesinghe & Bailey W. Jackson III eds., 2001). Cultural-deficit theorists characterize a
child’s social, cultural, or economic environment as being deprived of the elements necessary to learn the behavior rules that are necessary to succeed. In the academic context,
these theories advance the idea that social and emotional deficiencies within students
themselves negatively affect student performance. In contrast, cultural-difference theories
characterize academic underachievement as teachers and students playing into each other’s
blind spots, while cultural-ecological theorists conclude that certain structural variables
create barriers to success for some underachieving groups. Donna Bolima, Contexts for
Understanding: Educational Learning Theories, U. WASH., http://staff.washington.edu/saki/
strategies/101/new_page_5.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2014) (discussing theoretical
frameworks that attempt to explain academic disparity among ethnic groups); see also
Augustine F. Romero & Marin Sean Arce, Culture as a Resource: Critically Compassionate
Intellectualism and Its Struggle Against Racism, Fascism, and Intellectual Apartheid in
Arizona, 31 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 179, 183–86 (2009) (considering whether diversity should be seen as an obstacle or a resource in the learning process). Ultimately, cultural deficit models have been criticized for incorrectly perpetuating the idea that poor and
minority groups do not value education in the same way as middle- and upper-class people
and/or Whites. See Margaret Beale Spencer & Vinay Harpalani, What Does “Acting
White” Actually Mean? Racial Identity, Adolescent Development, and Academic
Achievement Among African American Youth, in MINORITY STATUS, OPPOSITIONAL
CULTURE, AND SCHOOLING 222 (John U. Ogbu ed., 2008) (examing Ogbu’s “acting white”
theory and concluding that the claim lacked empirical verification, was informed by a cultural-deficit model, and ignored the long history of African American valuing of, and
investment in, education).
196 See Adams, supra note 195, at 215.
197 See id. at 214–15 (citing the BID and Nigrescence—a development theory that also
characterizes minority racial identity formation as a liberatory sequence—as models of
identity development that might serve as the stimulus for a psychology of liberation). For a
discussion of the critiques of both the Nigrescence and BID models, see Rich, supra note
190, at 1174–82 (suggesting that this area of identity studies might benefit from a new
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Given the relevance of social context and construction to identity,
judicial decisions and popular understandings of those decisions can
certainly impact identity formation. In the context of equal protection,
then, it is no surprise that attention has been paid to how affirmative
action has impacted racial identity formation among minorities. For
example, Stephen Carter, in his 1991 book Reflections of an
Affirmative Action Baby, argues that affirmative action ultimately
vests “black people who gain positions of authority or influence . . .
with a special responsibility to articulate the presumed views of other
people who are black—in effect, to think and act and speak in a particular way, the black way—and [suggests] that there is something
peculiar about black people who insist on doing anything else.”198
More recently, Nancy Leong, going further, suggested that the
diversity rationale has encouraged white institutions of higher education to commodify and trade on the racial identities of nonwhite students in pursuit of the socially desirable goal of having a diverse
campus.199 The commodification of race and racial identity results in a
more alienated racial identity. Individuals are distanced from an integral aspect of their personhood when the racial aspect of their identity
is effectively bought and sold in the racial market of higher education.200 As a result, identities are fractured, and the efforts individuals
put into creating cohesive racial identities are undermined.201 For
people of color, this disassociation results in a loss of control and of
the integrity of their identity; it also cultivates resentment among this
population, as these students come to feel that their presence at their
institution is ultimately subject to the whims of the institution’s
administration.202
C. The Diversity Rationale and White Racial Identity Formation
Compared with these contemplations of how the diversity rationale impacts non-Whites, little has been said about how the diversity
paradigm for understanding racial and ethnic identity development that is designed to be
generalizable across groups and that draws on Judith Butler’s model of performativity).
198 CARTER, supra note 23, at 31.
199 See Leong, supra note 134, at 2155, 2169–72 (“Efforts to create racial diversity usually begin—and often end—with increasing the number of nonwhite people within a group
or institution. As a result, nonwhiteness has acquired a unique value because, in many
contexts, it signals the presence of the prized characteristic of diversity.”).
200 See id. at 2205 (explaining that, “[g]iven the fundamental role that racial identity in
fact plays in our lives, whole personhood requires integration of racial identity with one’s
concept of self”).
201 See id. (“If identity resides in a self that is integrated and continuous over time, then
commodification interrupts that continuity, causing a loss of control of identity.”).
202 Id. at 2215–17.
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rationale impacts white identity formation. Of course, just like black
racial identity, white racial identity is socially constructed and subject
to external and internal influence.203 Additionally, white racial identity is not a constant: Socially stigmatized identity features such as
gender, sexual orientation, and working-class status can qualify the
experience of white privilege.204 Nevertheless, because whiteness
operates as a cultural baseline in the United States,205 white identity
adoption and performance—however context-specific—is typically
unacknowledged.206
203 For example, Jewish and Irish people only “became white” over a period of time.
See, e.g., Charles W. Mills, White Supremacy as Sociopolitical System: A Philosophical
Perspective, in WHITE OUT: THE CONTINUING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACISM, supra note 160,
at 35, 39 (providing a general overview of the anthropological, sociological, and historical
research documenting how various ethnic groups that are currently described as white, and
that were previously the targets of quasi-racial discrimination and prejudice, were incorporated over time into the construction of whiteness). Rules in the United States regarding
who can be counted as white have changed, with some scholars theorizing that U.S. whiteness can be divided into three periods: from the 1790 law limiting naturalization to free
white persons to the influx of Irish immigrants in the 1840s; from the 1840s to the more
restrictive immigration legislation in 1924, aimed at limiting immigration overall, and
targeting the Irish and Italians in particular; and from the 1920s to the present. See id. at 39
(describing the views of Matthew Frye Jacobson and others). Similarly, during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Eastern Europeans generally, and European
Jews in particular, were considered by “real” white Americans—those of the Nordic or
Anglo-Saxon origin—to be members of nonwhite, “inferior European races” whose immigration threatened to “destroy[ ] the fabric of the nation.” Karen Brodkin Sacks, How Did
Jews Become White Folks?, in CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR,
supra note 7, at 395, 395. Changes in immigration policies, as well as social practices and
beliefs—including the willingness of some members of these groups to be complicit in discrimination against African Americans and other immigrants—eventually led to the inclusion of groups like the Irish, the Italians, and Jews in America’s white racial group. For a
detailed account of this process as applied to Irish immigrants to the United States, see
NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE (2008).
204 See Camille Gear Rich, Marginal Whiteness, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1497, 1519–20 (2010)
(describing several factors, including female gender, homosexuality, and working-class
status, that disrupt the ability of white persons to fully experience white privilege); see also
Lisa R. Pruitt, The Geography of the Class Culture Wars, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 767,
794–800, 802–03, 812–14 (2011) (identifying rural origin as another factor qualifying white
privilege, and calling for liberal elites to recognize the structural and cultural obstacles to
education and advancement facing working-class Whites). A failure to draw more complex
narratives about whiteness, particularly in terms of class, has led to culture wars and class
conflict that undermine the coalitions between the white working-class and liberals needed
to advance progressive legislation. See JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY
DEBATE: WHY MEN AND CLASS MATTER 213–14 (2010) (outlining steps to bridge the gap
between reform-minded elites and the white working-class, including “accept[ing] the fact
that class is a key axis of social disadvantage in American life”).
205 See infra notes 220–26 and accompanying text (describing how white racial identity
encourages Whites to consider their experience as normative, and demonstrating how privilege affords middle-class Whites a different experience than middle-class minorities).
206 See Flagg, supra note 20, at 957, 970–76 (describing the transparency phenomenon
and using it to challenge the discriminatory intent requirement under equal protection).
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In an attempt, however, to dismantle white privilege and racial
dominance, a few researchers have explored and offered frameworks
for understanding the process of white identity formation, conceptualizing white identity formation as a series of developmental tasks akin
to the BID model.
Psychologists Janet Helms and Rita Hardiman were two of the
first scholars to develop models of white identity based on the development of an antiracist identity. Helms identified six stages of white
racial identity development that occur in the context of black-white
relations: (1) contact, (2) disintegration, (3) reintegration, (4) pseudoindependence, (5) immersion/emersion, and (6) autonomy.207 In this
model, after an encounter with the idea or actuality of black people
(contact), Whites begin to acknowledge their whiteness and its social
implications (disintegration), which triggers recognition of moral
dilemmas. Stage three (reintegration) requires the individual to consciously acknowledge a white identity, and then, in stage four
(pseudo-independence) the individual develops an identity capable of
questioning the proposition that Blacks are inferior to Whites. In
stage five (immersion/emersion) Whites replace problematic myths
and negative stereotypes about Blacks with a sense of the reality of
being white or black in America. Finally, stage six (autonomy)—the
ultimate development of an antiracist white identity—is defined by
the absence of a desire to denigrate, oppress, or idealize people on the
basis of their racial identity.208
Similarly, Hardiman’s model of white identity theorizes identity
development as a process in which a person moves through five stages
to create an antiracist white identity: (1) naı̈veté, (2) acceptance, (3)
resistance, (4) redefinition, and (5) internalization.209 Naı̈veté is
marked by a lack of awareness about race, racism, or racial identity.
Once Whites discover and begin to internalize racism, they enter
acceptance, marked by a belief in the “meritocracy myth,” white
supremacy, and the innate inferiority of people of color.210 These
207

Janet E. Helms, Toward a Model of White Racial Identity Development, in BLACK
WHITE RACIAL IDENTITY: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 51–52 tbl. 4.1 (Janet
E. Helms ed., 1990).
208 Id. at 54–66.
209 Rita Hardiman & Molly Keehn, White Identity Development Revisited: Listening to
White Students, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON RACIAL IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT:
INTEGRATING EMERGING FRAMEWORKS 123–24 (Charmaine L. Wijeyesinghe & Bailey W.
Jackson III eds., 2d ed. 2012).
210 The myth of meritocracy, as I employ this term, is a dominant American cultural
assumption that generally attributes political, economic, educational, or employment success strictly to merit, thus dismissing the discrimination claims of members of marginalized
groups, including racial minorities, women, and the working-class. See Anne Lawton, The
Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of Equal Employment Opportunity, 85 MINN. L. REV.
AND
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beliefs are exhibited both consciously, as in the expression of racist
beliefs, and passively, as in collusion with a racialized system.211 Akin
to Helms’s pseudo-independence stage, Hardiman’s resistance stage is
sometimes triggered by a racialized incident or event that leads
Whites to question their prior beliefs. As Whites enter the resistance
stage, the unlearning of racism begins. This stage is often accompanied
by feelings of guilt and shame.212 In the next stage, redefinition,
Whites begin to honestly acknowledge and examine their privilege
and the ways that it perpetuates racism. Finally—similar to Helms’s
autonomy stage—in the internalization stage, Whites integrate their
new nonoppressive identity into their entire being, committing to
antiracist beliefs and conduct.213
Neither model assumes that Whites will necessarily move through
all of the outlined stages, but—according to both models—the development of an antiracist white identity requires that individuals recognize and acknowledge white privilege and the myths of merit. As
belief in those myths are shed, so too is the psychological investment
in white privilege and its justifications. Unfortunately, for many
Americans, white identity formation is often stalled in the early stages
of development that characterize affirmative action as inimical to true
meritocracy.214 After all, only a belief in the meritocracy myth—a
hallmark of the acceptance phase of Hardiman’s model—can justify
conclusions that affirmative action unfairly benefits minority students
at the expense of innocent Whites. Indeed, Hardiman and Helms
found few Whites in their interviews prepared to consider affirmative
action as an appropriate response to institutional or societal racism,215
587, 590 (2000) (describing the meritocracy myth in the employment context as resting on
two interconnected beliefs: (1) “an assumption that employment discrimination is an
anomaly” and (2) “a belief that merit alone determines employment success”); Deborah L.
Rhode, Myths of Meritocracy, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 585, 586 (1996) (describing the myth
of meritocracy in the context of gender disparities in the law as resting on two dominant
assumptions: that female lawyers are close to achieving proportionate representation and
that lingering disparities are attributable to women’s own “choices” and differing capabilities). In the context of higher education, the meritocracy myth is informed by: (1) a belief
that admissions criteria are objective, neutral, and can adequately account for talents
deserving of university admission or accurately predict academic and career success; and
(2) a belief that all students who are willing to work hard enough can achieve the grade
point average, standardized test score, and extracurricular activities standards set by admissions criteria.
211 Hardiman & Keehn, supra note 209, at 123.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 123–24.
214 See supra note 168 and accompanying text (discussing the characterization of affirmative action as “reverse discrimination”).
215 Unless, of course, Whites are the beneficiaries. Recent experimental studies suggest
that Whites are more willing to give advantages to white university applicants when Whites
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or to even acknowledge the social implications of white identity at
all.216 Both their models also suggest, however, that movement toward
an antiracist identity can be triggered by external events, such as
cross-racial friendships, racialized incidents, and culturally significant
events.217
The introduction and affirmation of the diversity rationale are
culturally significant events for which identity development theories
prove useful in considering the impact of the diversity rationale on
white identity. The judicial and popular justification for affirmative
action—particularly as grounded in the diversity rationale—is that
diversity will improve white identity development as Whites are
exposed to non-Whites, introduced to a diversity of viewpoints, and
prepared for work in an increasingly pluralistic society and globalized
marketplace. By this thinking, diversity pays dividends not just to beneficiaries of affirmative action, but also to the other students in the
classroom.218
This conclusion, however, must be retested in light of critical
examinations of and theories about white identity development.
White racial identity is typically rooted in privilege and subordinaappear to be losing their dominant share of higher educational opportunity. Frank L.
Samson, Altering Public University Admission Standards to Preserve White Group Position
in the United States: Results from a Laboratory Experiment, 57 COMP. EDUC. REV. 369
(2013) (finding that in response to data that suggests a freshman enrollment trend toward
an Asian-American plurality, white student evaluators lower their minimum class rank
standard for admitting white applicants); Frank Samson, Multiple Group Threat and
Malleable White Attitudes Towards Academic Merit, 10 DU BOIS REV.: SOC. SCI. RES. ON
RACE 233 (2013) (finding that white Californians decrease the importance of grade point
average in public university admissions when Asian group threat is primed, but finding that
white Californians increase the importance of grade point average when thinking about
group threat from Blacks or Blacks and Asians simultaneously).
216 See, e.g., Hardiman & Keehn, supra note 209, at 131–33 (discussing the lack of
awareness of racial oppression and white privilege among most of the study’s participants).
For example, Hardiman and Keehn used the WID model to review interview responses of
white students and concluded that most were in the “early stages of White identity development.” Id. at 131. “Their understanding of racism was primarily described as the attitudes and behaviors of individuals acting upon race prejudice, with little mention of
political or economic power structures affecting . . . people of color. Similarly, their views
of the privileges and advantages conferred on White people are quite limited.” Id. at 131;
see also Helms, supra note 207, at 50 (“Except for hard-core racial supremacists, the
meaning of being White is having the choice of attending to or ignoring one’s own Whiteness . . . . [I]t appears that most Whites may have no consistent conception of a positive
White identity or consciousness.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 54 (“One
result of this [dominant White] racial status is that . . . even if one has few resources oneself, as long as one has White skin in America, one is entitled to feel superior to Blacks.
This sense of entitlement seems to be a basic norm of White society.”).
217 See supra notes 208, 212 and accompanying text (noting the outcome of these
models).
218 See supra Part I.B (discussing arguments for the diversity rationale).
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tion,219 and development of an antiracist white identity requires overcoming both conscious and unconscious beliefs in the myth that merit
justifies privilege. The diversity rationale as currently deployed, however, does not undermine this myth. Rather, it lends credence to
notions of white innocence, affirms belief in a false meritocracy, promotes individualism inimical to understanding power differentials
between racial groups, perpetuates the idea of white racial transparency, and reinforces a relationship of subordination between
Whites and non-Whites. Ultimately, white identity—whether conceptualized as a social construction, a sense of self, or a strategic performance—is negatively impacted by the diversity rationale in ways that
retard social justice.
1. The Problem with Transparency: White Identity as No Identity
The first problem with the diversity rationale is the way in which
its deployment encourages transparency—a failure of Whites to recognize their own racial identity—as well as a tendency to assume that
the experiences of privileged Whites are normative. Unlike nonwhite
groups that form racial identities around shared cultural norms, histories of immigration, or racial oppression,220 white Americans typically
219 As explored and explained by many scholars, white identity typically confers on
those who successfully claim it greater economic, political, and social security in society,
often without any awareness on the part of the beneficiary. See Eduardo Bonilla-Silva,
“New Racism,” Color-Blind Racism, and the Future of Whiteness in America, in WHITE
OUT: THE CONTINUING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACISM, supra note 160, at 271, 271 (explaining
that, whether expressed in militant or tranquil fashion, whiteness is embodied racial power,
the uniform of a dominant racial group that receives systematic privileges while denying
the same to non-Whites); Doane, supra note 168, at 7 (explaining that “the ‘hidden’ nature
of Whiteness is grounded in the dynamics of dominant group status,” with Whites successfully having used their political and cultural hegemony to “shape the racial order and racial
understandings of American society,” as well as to promote white interests masquerading
as those of American society more generally); Peter Halewood, Laying Down the Law:
Post-Racialism and the De-Racination Project, 72 ALB. L. REV. 1047, 1049–50 (2009)
(describing a “post-white society” as one in which Whites develop a critical self-awareness
of white privilege and white racial identity that “challenge[s] the epistemic and interpretive
pillars of whiteness . . . that have guaranteed the massive material subsidies that have
accompanied whiteness from slavery forward—wealth, power, and control of the means of
reproduction of those assets”); Harris, supra note 186, at 1731–37 (arguing that following a
period of slavery and conquest, white identity in the United States became the basis of
racialized privilege, of which a right to exclude non-Whites is a key feature); McIntosh,
supra note 7, at 293–94 (compiling a list of white skin privileges, which include the ability
to rent or purchase housing in a desirable and affordable area, seeing white people widely
represented in media, and being sure that skin color will not work against an appearance of
financial reliability).
220 Adrienne D. Davis, Identity Notes Part One: Playing in the Light, 45 AM. U. L. REV.
695, 701 (1996). Latinos, for example, might form a racial identity informed by histories of
immigration to the United States from Latin America, while Blacks might form racial identities informed by shared struggle against racial oppression in the United States.
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do not have a sense of racial identity unless it is juxtaposed against
those of other, nonwhite racial groups, such as Blacks, Latinos, or
Asians.221 Indeed, the most salient aspect of white identity is perhaps
its “transparency,” or the tendency of Whites not to think about the
norms, behaviors, experiences, or perspectives that are specific to
being white.222 As Peggy McIntosh explained, many white students
believe that “racism doesn’t affect them because they are not people
of color; they do not see ‘whiteness’ as a racial identity.”223
This ignorance about white identity and its attendant privileges
tacitly requires assimilation on the part of nonwhite people, as Whites
fail to appreciate that their behaviors and cultural norms are not the
naturally occurring standards against which to assess all other
behavior, but rather are informed by their distinct racial identity and
shared experiences. Transparency, therefore, remains a mechanism
through which Whites can, whether intentionally or inadvertently, disavow white racial supremacy while still imposing white norms on
people of color.224 Having failed to acknowledge those impositions as
expressions of racial prerogatives or customs, Whites can ultimately
deny claims of racial subordination.
Accordingly, many Whites are unable to realize that their experiences neither necessarily form “the norm” nor set cultural baselines,
but are actually behaviors and experiences more common among
Whites. Abigail Fisher’s complaints that she had worked harder than
others for admission into college exemplify this type of obliviousness:
Fisher ignored the privileges she had been afforded in undertaking
these efforts in the first place.225 Ultimately, the experiences of minor221 See id. at 701–02 (focusing on the social construction of whiteness that drives the
process of legally classifying groups of color, including Blacks, Asian Americans, and
Latinos).
222 See Flagg, supra note 20, at 969–73 (defining and describing the transparency
phenomenon).
223 McIntosh, supra note 7, at 297.
224 See Flagg, supra note 20, at 957 (observing that the transparency phenomenon often
has this effect).
225 See supra notes 6–10 and accompanying text (noting Fisher’s lack of awareness
regarding the privileges her background afforded her and observing that, in reality, opportunities to participate in extracurricular activities, learn to play musical instruments, and
enroll in AP classes are all markers of privilege that are sometimes denied even to middleclass minorities). Moreover, it is a misconception that extracurricular activities in public
schools are typically free and open to everyone. Rather, income constraints can limit
access, as can teachers, who serve as gatekeepers to many activities and whose decisions
about the students to whom they extend invitations can be imbued with conscious and
unconscious bias like other decisions in the school setting. See Pamela Anne Quiroz et al.,
Carving a Niche in the High School Social Structure: Formal and Informal Constraints on
Participation in the Extra Curriculum, 11 RES. SOC. EDUC. & SOCIALIZATION 93, 95–97,
100, 109–14 (1996) (challenging the idea that extracurricular activities are open to all stu-
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ities, even those who are similarly situated to Abigail Fisher in terms
of economic and social status, cannot be assumed to be the same as
Ms. Fisher’s—these minority students do not live the white experience.226 The experience of encountering racism and discrimination, a
lack of intergenerational assets, limited resources even in middle-class
majority-minority schools, and proximity to economically marginalized communities all call into question the transferability of experience that Abigail Fisher seemed to perceive and endorse.
When white racial understanding does progress beyond transparency and its attendant assumptions about normative white experiences, such “progress” often entails invocations of ethnic identity.227
dents and participation is wholly voluntary, and exploring formal and informal constraints
on student participation such as attendance, grades, teacher recruitment, differential access
to information, self-selection, culture, and student status).
226 Minority middle-class status is tenuous and unstable, particularly when compared to
white middle-class status. See MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK
WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 7–8 (2d ed.
2006) (explaining that minority middle-class status often depends on the precarious flow of
income, while white middle-class status is supported by assets that provide economic stability and security); id. at 94–97 (explaining that to sustain a middle-class living standard in
1988, two-thirds of white and close to three-quarters of all black households needed more
than one worker, and that it took two full-time workers in sixty percent of black homes to
earn between $25,000 and $50,000 yearly, while the same was true for only thirty-seven
percent of white homes); Malamud, supra note 138, at 976–78 (noting that not only is a
black family’s high income at a particular point in time less predictive of permanent high
earnings than that of a white middle-class family, but also that middle-class black families
are more likely to be dependent on the income of two working spouses than middle-class
white families). Furthermore, middle-class minorities are more likely than their white
counterparts to live in less affluent neighborhoods in close proximity to poor black
enclaves. See id. at 972 (observing that suburban middle-class black families are exposed to
more poverty than other middle-class groups, including in their children’s public schools).
It is unsurprising, then, that even minority students hailing from middle-class backgrounds
are more likely to be subject to the inferior educational and extracurricular opportunities
that poorer schools provide. See JOE R. FEAGIN & MELVIN P. SIKES, LIVING WITH RACISM:
THE BLACK MIDDLE-CLASS EXPERIENCE 80 (1994) (noting that although black middleclass communities can provide social support to black children, “the public schools available [in these neighborhoods] may not be as well equipped or staffed as those in white
suburban areas”); Elizabeth Stearns & Elizabeth J. Glennie, Opportunities to Participate:
Extracurricular Activities’ Distribution Across and Academic Correlates in High Schools, 39
SOC. SCI. RES. 296, 307 (2010) (finding that school size and poverty levels significantly
influence the number and types of activities available, with larger schools and schools with
more affluent student bodies offering more activities).
227 Ethnic identity and racial identity are not the same. Ethnicity was a concept initially
developed to refer to differences in national and cultural patterns and practices among
Europeans who were nevertheless still united by a white racial identity. Although it was a
step toward racial egalitarianism because it erased racial hierarchy among persons of European descent, it did not transcend race. IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS:
HOW CODED RACIAL APPEALS HAVE REINVENTED RACISM & WRECKED THE MIDDLE
CLASS 93–94 (2014). Ultimately, “racial identity is a matter . . . of social understandings,
although those may give great weight to purportedly salient differences in morphology and
ancestry.” Ian F. Haney Lopez, Colorblind to the Reality of Race in America, CHRON.
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These ethnic narratives allow white privilege to be discounted and
white race-based grievances to be aired without seeming racist.228 For
example, young Whites selectively resurrect ethnicity through immigrant tales that detail the hardships their ancestors endured as newly
arrived immigrants to the United States. The genuine but temporary
discrimination faced by these relatives “becomes analogous to and
indistinguishable from three centuries of slavery, Jim Crow, legal segregation, and state-sanctioned ‘benign neglect.’”229 Despite the incongruence of these experiences, given the privilege that has since
accrued to ethnic Whites, this analogy allows Whites to maintain the
fiction that every group has been equally victimized and to tap into
the “mythologized narrative” of hardship that has become a part of
the American experience for many citizens.230
This narrative, of course, is not based in reality. Scholars have
long associated whiteness with racialized privilege, regardless of
ethnic background. W.E.B. Du Bois detailed the “public and psychological” benefits that a claim to whiteness provides.231 Ruth
Frankenberg, considered the pioneer of “whiteness studies,”
explained that the very term “‘whiteness’ signals the production and
reproduction of dominance rather than subordination, normativity
rather than marginality, and privilege rather than disadvantage.”232
Cheryl Harris has conceptualized whiteness as racialized privilege in
the form of a property interest, providing its owners with benefits such
as higher wages, racially exclusive access to public facilities, and the
affirmation of self-identity and liberty that Blacks have been
denied.233 As an identity and property interest, whiteness provides
HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 3, 2006, at B6. A Latino person, for example, can have a black racial
identity while also having a Puerto Rican cultural and national identity. See, e.g., Rosa
Clemente, Who Is Black?, 1NEDROP (Oct. 30, 2011), http://1nedrop.com/who-is-black-byrosa-clemente/ (explaining that while she has a black racial identity, she also has a Latino
political identity and a Puerto Rican cultural and national identity).
228 Charles A. Gallagher, Playing the White Ethnic Card: Using Ethnic Identity to Deny
Contemporary Racism, in WHITE OUT: THE CONTINUING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACISM, supra
note 160, at 145, 146.
229 Id.
230 See Charles A. Gallagher, White Racial Formation: Into the Twenty-First Century, in
CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR, supra note 7, at 6, 8 (exploring
whiteness and mythologized immigrant tales that allow Whites to share with other racial
groups “a historical common denominator of passage, victimization, and assimilation”).
231 W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 700–01 (Touchstone 1995)
(1935).
232 R UTH F RANKENBERG , W HITE W OMEN , R ACE M ATTERS : T HE S OCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF WHITENESS 236–37 (1993).
233 See Harris, supra note 186, at 1724–28, 1741–44 (explaining how and why whiteness
may be characterized as a property interest and describing some of the benefits it has
yielded to its owners).
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social and psychological benefits to Whites, who are buoyed by the
sense of superiority that whiteness confers by virtue of its monopoly
on political, legal, financial, and social power.234 This sense of racial
superiority encourages even “the most economically and culturally
deprived” Whites to feel superior to any black person.235
So high is the value of whiteness that some have felt the need to
lay claim to it even at personal cost. The value of whiteness, for
example, has historically undermined the ability of Whites and Blacks
to form cooperative labor movements in pursuit of economic justice.236 Similarly, even though ethnic white immigrants to the United
States in the latter half of the nineteenth century were exploited in
mines and factories under unsafe conditions for substandard wages,
they nevertheless assimilated to a white identity founded on disparagement of Blacks rather than crossing the color line to join forces in
resisting their mutual exploitation.237 More recently, the value of
whiteness was identified as one obstacle to white working-class support for President Barack Obama’s arguably more populist 2008 election campaign.238 The black comedian Chris Rock astutely noted the
worth of whiteness when he joked that, despite his wealth and success,
poor Whites would never trade places with him, preferring instead to
“ride this white thing out.”239 Ultimately, white identity is a distinctive
racial identity defined in part by its inherent value and attendant
privileges.

234 See Thomas Ross, The Unbearable Whiteness of Being, in CROSSROADS,
DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 251, 253–54 (Francisco Valdes et al.
eds., 2002) (noting that being white is particularly valuable when “Whites hold most of the
power,” and arguing that “[c]ontemporary racism . . . provides Whites with an intangible
but powerful sense of racial superiority,” as well as “a presumptive sense of worthiness and
belonging”).
235 Derrick Bell, Racism as the Ultimate Deception, 86 N.C. L. REV. 621, 623 (2008).
236 Cf. David R. Roediger, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF
THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS 12–13 (3d ed. 2007) (summarizing W.E.B. Du Bois’s
argument that claims to whiteness became so important to working-class Whites that to
them, in effect, the benefits of whiteness functioned as a wage that compensated for the
exploitation inherent in labor-capital relationships, but that these “wages of whiteness
often turned out to be spurious”).
237 Derrick Bell, Getting Beyond a Property in Race, 1 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 27, 32
(1999).
238 See Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Osamudia James, The Declining Significance of
Presidential Races?, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 95–100 (2009) (discussing the Obama
campaign’s struggle to win approval from and connect with white working-class voters and
observing that white candidates did not face such difficulty).
239 “There’s a white, one-legged busboy in here right now that won’t change places with
my black ass. He’s going, ‘No, man, I don’t wanna switch. I wanna ride this white thing out.
See where it takes me.’” CHRIS ROCK: BIGGER AND BLACKER (HBO 1999).
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Nonetheless, whether by refusing to acknowledge it or by resurrecting stories of immigrant hardship,240 many Whites discount their
race-based privilege. Indeed, white privilege includes the very ability
to ignore white privilege by disregarding whiteness altogether. Consequently, benefits and advantages afforded to Whites are justified as
the result of merit, hard work, and thrift. This uncritical perception of
whiteness and racial inequity only perpetuates “culturally sanctioned
assumptions, myths, and beliefs that justify the social and economic
advantages white people have as a result of subordinating others.”241
The unfortunate result is that Whites develop a view of self that
depends on their perceived racial superiority.242 Anything that undermines or questions the racial order “inevitably challenges the selfidentity of white people who have internalized these ideological justifications.”243 As such, white racial identity is consciously and unconsciously rooted in privilege and subordination. As Eduardo BonillaSilva noted, “Whiteness . . . in all of its manifestations, is embodied
racial power,” and white identity is the “foundational category of
white supremacy.”244
Legal challenges to affirmative action in higher education provide
ideal examples of the problematic transparency and normativity phenomena. These lawsuits are often grounded in complaints based on
the merit, as indicated by higher grade point averages and standardized test scores, of white students denied admission.245 Implicit in
these challenges is the assumption that those measures are objective
and bias-free, unaffected by historical, economic, political, and educational advantages for Whites and corresponding disadvantages for
non-Whites.246
The plaintiffs in these lawsuits—Hopwood, Grutter, Gratz,
Fisher, and the parents in Louisville and Seattle—similarly exemplify
240 See Gallagher, supra note 228, at 149–52 (excerpting interviews in which white interviewees invoked the work ethic of their ancestors to refute minority claims regarding
racism).
241 Joyce E. King, Dysconscious Racism: Ideology, Identity, and Miseducation, in
CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR, supra note 7, at 128, 128.
242 See Flagg, supra note 20, at 957 & n.20 (citing Helms, supra note 207, at 49) (advocating the development of an alternative white racial identity that no longer depends on
“the implicit acceptance of white racial domination”).
243 King, supra note 241, at 128.
244 Bonilla-Silva, supra note 219, at 271 (internal quotation marks omitted); id. at
271–72 (explaining how white identity has persisted and generated a “new racism” more
subtle than previous forms).
245 See supra notes 33–40, 53–68, 88–98 and accompanying text (detailing the basis for
lawsuits brought by Cheryl Hopwood, Barbara Grutter, and Abigail Fisher, respectively).
246 See infra notes 254–62 and accompanying text (highlighting Abigail Fisher, Barbara
Grutter, and Cheryl Hopwood’s claims that hard work alone was responsible for their academic success and standardized test scores, thus justifying their admission).
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the transparency and normativity phenomena. When they spoke publicly about their lawsuits, these plaintiffs acknowledged white racial
identity only as the basis for victimization vis-á-vis non-Whites.247 For
example, on the day before oral arguments in her case, Jennifer
Gratz248 explained, “We are taught in our schools and in our homes
and in our churches that you should never judge another person based
on her skin color,”249 thus evoking her white identity in the context of
her victimization. Similarly, when Grutter invoked identity, it was to
compare her victimization as a white law school applicant to the discrimination she had suffered as a working woman;250 her comparison
resembles the manner in which Whites sometimes invoke ethnic identity to insulate themselves from accusations of racial insensitivity.251
Grutter also invoked her own victimization when she explained that
she had decided to bring suit because she believed “it was the right
thing to do,”252 saying: “I had always taught (my kids) discrimination
was wrong and the law protects them from that. I could have been
angry and bitter—or whined about it—or I could do something positive. I viewed filing a lawsuit as a positive thing.”253 In these statements, Gratz and Grutter reference their whiteness as the basis of a
wrong done unto them: They feel victimized because of their race.
None of the plaintiffs (Hopwood, Grutter, Gratz, or Fisher) made
statements demonstrating awareness of the privileges and benefits
they had enjoyed by virtue of their white identity. Their silence on the
topic might be read as a failure to recognize that the uniqueness of the
minority experience may merit consideration, or as ignorance of how
247 Admittedly, these examples draw from articles and literature that featured only limited quotes or brief excerpts from interviews with the plaintiffs as their cases went before
the Court, perhaps produced as part of litigation or public relations strategies. Therefore,
conclusions drawn from their statements are speculative and cannot be considered definitive analyses of what these plaintiffs believed. To the extent, however, that the available
information and quotations reflect the genuine thinking animating the plaintiffs’ considerable expenditures of financial and emotional resources in their lawsuits, they illustrate the
problematic aspects of white identity perpetuated by the diversity rationale.
248 See supra note 73 (describing Jennifer Gratz’s lawsuit against the University of
Michigan, which successfully persuaded the Court that the school’s undergraduate admissions policy was unconstitutional).
249 Tomislav Ladika, Plaintiffs Discuss Goals in Bringing Their Cases Before Supreme
Court, MICH. DAILY (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.michigandaily.com/content/plaintiffsdiscuss-goals-bringing-their-cases-supreme-court (internal quotation marks omitted).
250 See Brackett, supra note 64 (discussing Grutter’s thoughts on being one of the only
women in her workplace).
251 See supra notes 227–30 and accompanying text (discussing how white privilege is
discounted through invocations of ethnic narratives).
252 Brackett, supra note 64.
253 Mark Clayton, The Woman Behind the Law-School Admissions Suit, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Apr. 3, 2001, at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://www.
csmonitor.com/2001/0403/p14s1.html.
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the benefits of whiteness accrue even to the white working class—that
white identity always includes white privilege.254
When discussing, for example, her initial rejection from UT,
Hopwood maintained that if the school had considered overcoming
hardship as a plus factor, she would have been one of the more qualified candidates. She further asserted that “[r]ace should just not be a
determining factor in admissions policy at the level of law school . . . .
At that level I’m competing with others who have B.A. degrees and
they’re not people who necessarily have more disadvantaged backgrounds than I have.”255 She also argued, “The fact that I have one
severely handicapped child and another one died is an injustice. But
nobody’s helping me.”256 Faced with an affirmative action program
justified by a compelling state interest in diversity, Hopwood com254 See supra notes 231–41 and accompanying text (exploring the privileges of whiteness, including benefits felt by working-class Whites and the ability to disregard whiteness
altogether).
255 Richard Bernstein, Racial Discrimination or Righting Past Wrongs?, N.Y. TIMES,
July 13, 1994, at B8.
256 Sam Howe Verhovek, For 4 Whites Who Sued University, Race Is the Common
Thread, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1996, at 6 (quoting William M. Adler, Evening the Score,
ROLLING STONE, Aug. 10, 1995, at 35, 69) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although
raising a differently-abled child can most certainly present unique and significant challenges, government-provided aid and services are rightly available in helping parents care
for children with disabilities and were likely available to Hopwood as she responded to her
own child’s medical needs. The Individual with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), for
example, is a federal law that governs how state and public agencies educate children with
disabilities. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2012). Moreover, several services, including
Children’s Health Insurance Plans (CHIP), Medicare, Medicaid, and Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) are potentially available to the caregivers of children with cerebral
palsy, the disease afflicting Hopwood’s daughter. See generally Government Assistance:
Getting Started with Government Assistance, CEREBRALPALSY.ORG, http://cerebralpalsy
.org/popular/%20government-assistance/getting-started/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2014) (providing links to information about various government assistance programs); Jonathon
Reid, Affirmative Action, the Debate Continues, Part I, POLITICOLE (Jan. 30, 2013), http://
thepoliticole.com/2013/01/30/affirmative-action-the-debate-continues-part-1/ (describing
Cheryl Hopwood’s background and noting that she had to spend much of her time caring
for her child with cerebral palsy). Moreover, even controlling for socioeconomic status, by
mere virtue of being a white child, Hopwood’s daughter would be more likely to receive
higher-quality medical and educational services than the treatment afforded to the disabled who are part of a racial minority group. Rene Bowser, Racial Profiling in Health
Care: An Institutional Analysis of Medical Treatment Disparities, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 79,
83–91 (2001) (presenting research findings concluding that even after controlling for socioeconomic status, racial disparities in health care exist across a spectrum of settings and
diseases). See generally UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC
DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE (Brian D. Smedley et al. eds., 2003) (exploring why and
how race and ethnicity continue to serve as significant predictors for quality of healthcare
received). My point here is not to dismiss the difficulty of caring for a disabled child, but
rather to challenge Hopwood’s suggestion that there is no state support for that care—
however limited it might be—and to highlight that white privilege can mitigate even the
difficult experience of raising and supporting a child with special needs.
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pared her own legitimate life obstacles with the obstacles she saw UT
attributing to nonwhite applicants, and did not understand how the
latter could merit greater consideration than the former. Discounting
race, she summarily concluded that students of color who had
achieved a degree comparable to hers were likely to have been no
more disadvantaged than she was. She believed, instead, that students
of color who failed to achieve her grades and test results did not work
hard, a sentiment also expressed by Abigail Fisher.257
By ignoring white privilege and presenting their own experiences
as normative, the affirmative action plaintiffs seemed to believe that
only a particular brand of merit should count in the admissions process. Grutter arguably would have contributed viewpoint diversity to
the classroom,258 but she seemed unaware that presenting an alternate
viewpoint might not guarantee her a spot in the classroom or that the
high value she placed on her perspective might not be the norm. The
same was true of Hopwood, who seemed to set her hardship as the
standard by which other students should have been judged, and
Fisher, who—in light of her own accomplishments—could not understand her rejection from UT.259 Fisher could think of no reason for her
257

See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text (quoting Fisher on the subject).
Hailing from working-class backgrounds, Grutter, as well as Hopwood, might have
increased class diversity at the elite institutions to which they applied. However, if we are
to use current equal protection jurisprudence as an analytical framework for assessing
diversity, it is relevant that the Court, regrettably, failed to recognize wealth as a suspect
classification in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18–28
(1973). In the case, the Court declined to recognize a suspect class of poor people for an
equal protection challenge to unequal school financing structures. Questions remain about
the extent to which class can or should supplant race in diversity initiatives. See, e.g.,
RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 80,
83 (1996) (arguing that the focus on race in affirmative action has only undermined the
moral legitimacy of the policies, and arguing for class-based affirmative action); Angela
Onwuachi-Willig & Amber Fricke, Class, Classes, and Classic Race-Baiting: What’s in a
Definition?, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 807 (2011) (demonstrating why class-based affirmative
action is an inadequate substitute for race, and explaining why race-based affirmative
action, in addition to class-based affirmative action, is still needed); Onwuachi-Willig &
James, supra note 238 (exploring the salience of race in the 2008 Presidential election to
conclude that even the most upwardly mobile Blacks still encounter obstacles on account
of their race); Richard H. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENV. U. L.
REV. 631 (2011) (detailing the flaws with race-based affirmative action, and advocating for
class-based preferences); Jonathan D. Glater & Alan Finder, Diversity Plans Based on
Income Leave Some Schools Segregated, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2007, at A24 (discussing the
racial effects of a schooling system implementing class-based affirmative action); Sophie
Quinton, What if Colleges Embraced Affirmative Action for Class Instead of Race?,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 21, 2013, 12:10 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2013/
10/what-if-colleges-embraced-affirmative-action-for-class-instead-of-race/280733/.
259 See Tolson, supra note 2 (“I took a ton of AP classes, I studied hard and did my
homework—and I made the honor roll. . . . I was in extracurricular activities. I played the
cello and was in the math club, and I volunteered. I put in the work I thought was necessary to get into UT.”).
258
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rejection, even though UT made it clear that her composite score was
just too low.260 Maintaining that her accomplishments should have
guaranteed her admission, she dismissed the possibility that nonwhite
applicants with scores lower than hers could have had application
profiles that made them more desirable for admission.261 She showed
no understanding that, given the racialized and often negative experiences of minorities in the school system, successfully preparing for
higher education as a person of color is often an accomplishment that
demonstrates character, dedication, and perseverance of a sort more
impressive than Fisher’s commitment to playing the cello or completing AP classes.262 In Fisher’s mind, her experience set the norm,
and students with backgrounds that deviated from hers and resulted in
a different set of accomplishments were not worthy of acceptance
over her.
In the context of K–12 education, the remarks of Kathleen Brose
and Meredith Crystal, plaintiffs in Parents Involved,263 further illustrate the problematic phenomena of transparency and normativity.
Brose, who founded the organization Parents Involved in Community
Schools (PICS) after her daughter was denied her first choice in
Seattle’s controlled-choice school assignment program264 and ultimately used the organization to sue the Seattle school district,
lamented:
260

Supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 4–10 and accompanying text.
262 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (observing that assessments of minority students’ intellectual and emotional capabilities are interpreted negatively and that they are
disproportionately selected for special education programs); Osamudia R. James, Opt-Out
Education: School Choice as Racial Subordination, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1083, 1114–19 (2014)
(detailing the negative and racialized schooling experience of minorities in the United
States to explain the appeal of charter schools and other exits from the public school
system); cf. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Why My Pride Is Not Prejudice and Other Tales
About the Souls of Black Folks: What Gabby Douglas and President Barack Obama Teach
Us About Hope and Vision 11–25 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the New York
University Law Review) (explaining how ignoring race discounts the greatness of the
achievement of African American “firsts” because of the race-related obstacles they had to
overcome).
263 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
264 See Kathleen’s Story, PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, http://piics.org/
page9.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2014) (describing Brose’s increasing frustration after her
daughter did not get into her first, second, or third choice high school and explaining how
after receiving no concern or response from the school board, she turned to a group of
parents, who then turned to a local law firm to file their suit against the Seattle School
Board). In an attempt to provide minority students living on the south side of Seattle
access to the city’s wealthier and higher-performing public K–12 schools on the north side,
the Seattle, Washington school district implemented a controlled-choice plan in which it
used race as a factor when assigning children to schools. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at
711–13 (describing the Seattle school assignment system).
261

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\89-2\NYU201.txt

480

unknown

Seq: 56

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

25-APR-14

11:45

[Vol. 89:425

After volunteering hundreds of hours over 9 years in many capacities such as PTA President, field-trip driver, volunteer music
teacher, coordinator of the wiring project, auction coordinator, bake
sales and room mother, and a great supporter of the school levy
campaign, I felt absolutely betrayed that my child was denied access
to three schools because of her race and the community where she
resided.265

Even though she invoked her daughter’s whiteness as the basis of
her victimization, Brose did not recognize the disadvantages faced by
non-Whites, and instead, suggested that people “move beyond
race.”266 Crystal Meredith, who successfully challenged school assignment plans in Louisville, Kentucky designed to maintain racial integration,267 similarly refused to acknowledge the salience of racial
identity for non-Whites, explaining that the case was never about race
for her. Indeed, she was “shocked that people think it is a race
issue.”268
Again, white racial identity in both cases was invoked only as the
basis for white victimization. Neither Meredith nor Brose addressed
how minority identity has impacted students of color in their school
districts through racial isolation and the denial of access to more competitive schools.269 Moreover, neither vocalized awareness of the privileges they had been afforded, privileges that necessarily made their
decisions to bring suit an expression of racial dominance. When Brose
detailed her exhaustive list of ways in which she served her commu265

Kathleen’s Story, supra note 264.
Mike Lewis, Q&A: Woman Who Fought School District, SEATTLE POST
INTELLIGENCER (June 28, 2007, 10:00 PM), http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Q-AWoman-who-fought-school-district-1242209.php.
267 The Jefferson County School District in Louisville, Kentucky, also implemented a
similar controlled-choice plan in an attempt to avoid resegregation of its public schools. See
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 716–17 (describing the district’s plan).
268 Janelle MacDonald, Local Mom Makes National Headlines with Lawsuit Against
JCPS, WAVE3 NEWS (Oct. 10, 2006, 3:05 PM), http://www.wave3.com/global/Story.asp?s=
5522206.
269 See Mickelson, supra note 21, at 1547 (finding that as the percentage of black students in a school increased, the percentage of the school’s teachers with master’s degrees
or more teaching experience decreased); John A. Powell, A New Theory of Integrated
Education, in SCHOOL RESEGREGATION: MUST THE SOUTH TURN BACK? 281, 285–86
(John Charles Boger & Gary Orfield eds., 2005) (noting racially isolated schools’ “devastating implications for the educational environment,” including greater reliance on transitory teachers, larger class sizes, higher rates of tardiness and absence, lower rates of
extracurricular involvement, and less access to technology, as well as contribution to the
achievement gap between black and white students). See generally SCHOOL
RESEGREGATION: MUST THE SOUTH TURN BACK?, supra (canvassing a broad array of
social science literature explaining how racially isolated schools negatively impact both
white and nonwhite students).
266
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nity,270 she did not acknowledge the privilege inherent in her ability to
commit so much time to volunteer work for her child’s school, a privilege more likely to be enjoyed by white women.271 Instead, she
presented the list as evidence of injustice in her daughter’s denial from
her first-choice school.
The diversity rationale, unfortunately, magnifies this problematic
identity performance. Even as institutions use this doctrine to advance
a narrative and value structures that esteem different perspectives in
the classroom, the diversity rationale gives the appearance of placing
greater value in admissions on the experience of racial minorities than
that of other groups without providing a justification for why.272 This
unexplained preference may help explain the plaintiffs’ indignation.
The diversity rationale, as deployed, encourages Whites to think of
themselves as having no racial identity, which reinforces the idea that
white racial identity and white racial privilege need not be
acknowledged.
Although the presence of racial and ethnic minorities in higher
education is certainly desirable, diversity initiatives that are not
candid about why white racial identity is not given (additional) weight
in the admissions process are troublesome. Instead of contextualizing
minority racial identity relative to white identity, diversity focuses
solely on minority identity, implying to Whites that racial identity is
something they do not have. Divorced from any critical understanding
of the advantage white identity provides in achieving social, political,
and economic success, a white racial identity grounded in superiority
is perpetuated.
2. The Problem with Innocent White Identity
In addition to encouraging Whites to think of their experiences as
normative, even as they fail to recognize their own racial identity, the
diversity rationale advances a narrative of white racial innocence.
Darren Hutchinson, in his scholarship about racial egalitarian measures in the United States, explains that social narratives play a crucial
role in public life, “allow[ing] groups of individuals to unify around a
270

Kathleen’s Story, supra note 264.
Black middle-class families, for example, are more likely than white middle-class
families to be dependent on the income of two working spouses. Malamud, supra note 138,
at 976–77. Since white middle-class families are more likely to be dependent on the earnings of one spouse, the income potential of the second spouse tends to be untapped and on
reserve in case of a financial emergency. Id. at 977.
272 In stating that diversity focuses on racial minorities, I mean that discussions of diversity, particularly in institutions of higher education, lack any discussion of Whites as a
racial group. The focus is on the minority population of the school, not on the presence (or
absence) of Whites.
271
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set of shared experiences and beliefs.”273 In particular, social movements “rely on rhetoric and narratives to articulate shared social and
political perspectives.”274 And, to the extent that dominant group narratives attempt to explain social events and conditions, the dominant
group “legitimize[s] inequality by attributing group disparities to individual shortcomings instead of domination or bias.”275 Given a belief
in the innate shortcomings of non-Whites, it is not surprising that
many Whites have contested racial justice measures attempting to further equality as “unfair to Whites.”276
Labeling racial measures as “unfair” implies white innocence; this
rhetorical leap is consistently employed to challenge affirmative
action277 by presenting Whites as victims of race-conscious admissions
policies.278 Moreover, the innocence narrative reaffirms blindness to
white privilege because it suggests that Whites have not received
273 Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Racial Exhaustion, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 917, 924
(2008).
274 Id. at 925.
275 Id. at 924–25.
276 Id. at 926 (noting also that such measures have been characterized as “redundant,
unnecessary, vexatious, [and] futile”).
277 See, e.g., Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming
the Innovative Ideal, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 960–61 (1996) (discussing the narrative of an
archetypal challenger to affirmative action in the employment context, who argues that he
lost out on the job he deserved to an unqualified minority on account of that minority’s
gender or race); Richard C. Paddock, Affirmative Action Era Over, Foe Says; Fresh from a
Victory in Michigan, Former UC Regent Ward Connerly Is Eyeing New Crusades, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 26, 2006, at B1 (describing how Ward Connerly, a former member of the
University of California Board of Regents and a key figure behind Proposition 209’s ban of
racial preferences in California higher education, has argued that affirmative action programs are misguided and unfair); Stuart Silverstein, Pepperdine Defends Its Minority
Scholarships; Successful Elsewhere, Anti-Affirmative Action Activists Seek to Force College
to Revise Awards, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2004, at B1 (quoting Roger Clegg, general counsel
for the Center for Equal Opportunity, opining that scholarship programs that exclusively
benefit minorities are “bad policy . . . [and] unfair for the students who are excluded”);
Rebecca Trounson, His Tenure’s at the Finish Line, but for Connerly, Race Goes On, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2005, at A1 (quoting Ward Connerly’s characterization of the University of
California’s race-conscious admissions as unfair to many applicants and “a lawsuit just
ready and waiting to happen”); supra note 256 and accompanying text (quoting Cheryl
Hopwood’s suggestion that others are unfairly receiving admissions assistance while she is
not, although she is raising a disabled child).
278 I thank Professor Brent White for thoughtful exchanges about whether white victimhood narratives predated the diversity rationale and were triggered in the first instance
by affirmative action programs more generally. I agree that the phenomenon of white victimhood emerged before the Supreme Court first endorsed the diversity rationale in Bakke
or affirmed it in Grutter. Yet the diversity rationale has served to intensify the phenomenon, particularly because it is untethered to notions of social justice and therefore does
virtually nothing to help educate would-be white plaintiffs on the nature and legacy of
racial bias and discrimination in the United States. Ultimately, this is a primary problem
with the diversity rationale: Devoid of context or understanding as to the enduring racial
bias and discrimination—intentional or not—that justify attempts to broaden access to
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unearned benefits. The image of an innocent white victim draws
power from its implicit contrast with a person of color who unfairly
benefits from affirmative action, a contrast that is buttressed by stereotypes regarding lazy and undeserving minorities.279
The narrative of white innocence repeatedly surfaces in Supreme
Court cases and doctrine regarding racial measures and remedies. In
Bakke, for example, the Court highlighted the unfairness of asking
“innocent persons . . . to endure . . . [deprivation as] the price of membership in the dominant majority,”280 and then went on to note that it
had “never approved a classification that aids persons perceived as
members of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial, legislative, or administrative
findings of constitutional or statutory violations.”281 A few years later,
in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, the Court rejected a collective bargaining agreement that extended preferential treatment to
minority employees, writing: “No one doubts that there has been
serious racial discrimination in this country. But as the basis for
imposing discriminatory legal remedies that work against innocent
people, societal discrimination is insufficient and over-expansive.”282
In Grutter, the Court echoed this innocence narrative, acknowledging that there are “serious problems of justice connected with the
idea of preference itself,” and that “[e]ven remedial race-based government action generally ‘remains subject to continuing oversight to
assure that it will work the least harm possible to other innocent persons competing for the benefit.’”283 Finally, the Court noted that “[t]o
be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program must not
unduly burden individuals who are not members of the favored racial
and ethnic groups.”284 Notably absent from the justifications for diversity recognized in Grutter were any corrective or distributive justice
claims, claims that implicitly demand that people acknowledge and
assume responsibility for (or admit complicity in) racial oppression. In
higher education for non-Whites, the diversity rationale, and really any race-conscious
remedy, will always trigger problematic deployments of white innocence and victimhood.
279 See Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297, 314–15
(1990) (“The assertion of the innocent white victim draws power from the implicit contrast
with the ‘defiled taker.’ The defiled taker is the black person who undeservedly reaps the
advantages of affirmative action.”).
280 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 294 n.34 (1978) (emphasis
added).
281 Id. at 307 (emphasis added).
282 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (emphasis added).
283 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003) (emphasis added) (quoting Bakke, 438
U.S. at 298, 308).
284 Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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demanding such acknowledgement, these claims potentially trigger
white guilt and defensiveness.285
The most recent iteration of the innocence narrative in the context of education came in Parents Involved.286 There, the Supreme
Court equated consideration of race in pursuit of diverse public school
enrollment to Jim Crow segregation policies and concluded that,
absent intentional discrimination by school districts, Whites could not
be asked to bear any burden in the attempt to diversify public
schools.287 Accordingly, Whites—who had previously benefited from
their whiteness, but now do not directly benefit from diversity initiatives intended to broaden minority access to better public schools—
were analogous to Blacks who were excluded from public accommodations on account of their race. In making this argument, the
majority of the Court implicitly dismissed the disadvantage suffered
by minorities in the school system who were denied access to more
competitive schools by residential segregation and complicit school
assignment policies.288
Like other destructive elements of white identity I describe, the
innocence narrative is reflected in the words of the affirmative action
plaintiffs. Fisher, for example, condemned UT’s admissions policies,
casting herself as an innocent victim: “I was taught from the time I
285 See Trina Jones, The Diversity Rationale: A Problematic Solution, 1 STAN. J. C.R. &
C.L. 171, 174 (2005) (noting that the corrective justice rationale’s focus on a “history of
racial oppression” may arouse “fatigue, guilt, defensiveness, and anger” and be met with
resistance by those who feel they “have done nothing wrong”).
286 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
287 See id. at 720–25, 746–47 (holding that school districts’ race-conscious integration
policies failed strict scrutiny because there was no unremedied intentional discrimination
and Grutter’s diversity rationale did not apply, and also comparing the schools’ policies to
the segregation regimes ruled unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954)).
288 Cf. Ross, supra note 279, at 305–06 (noting that by characterizing claims as “generalized” and “amorphous,” the Court denies the actual victimization of black beneficiaries of
affirmative action policies). The innocence narrative also persists outside of the education
context. In Fullilove v. Klutznick, for example, the Court noted: “When effectuating a limited and properly tailored remedy to cure the effects of prior discrimination . . . a sharing of
the burden by innocent parties is not impermissible.” 448 U.S. 448, 484 (1980) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Ricci v. DeStefano, the Court again implicitly challenged the victimization of minorities, who suffered a disparate impact from the
use of an employment test, by emphasizing the white firefighters’ merits and qualifications,
noting that “some of the firefighters here invested substantial time, money, and personal
commitment in preparing for the tests. . . . [H]owever, the firefighters saw their efforts
invalidated by the City in sole reliance upon race-based statistics.” 557 U.S. 557, 583–84
(2009). Again, the point is not that white candidates did not invest time, money, and personal commitment into preparing, but that by focusing on these virtues the Court—perhaps unwittingly—contrasts the virtuous, innocent plaintiff to the guilty affirmative action
beneficiaries.
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was a little girl that any kind of discrimination was wrong.”289 Grutter
similarly claimed to be an innocent victim of discriminatory policies,
going so far as to present herself as a hero who proactively filed a
lawsuit instead of being complacent with the unjust hand she was
dealt.290 Like Fisher, she noted that she had learned that racial discrimination was wrong.291 While Grutter suggested that her problem
was with the university itself, and not with other admitted students,292
the implication is that accepted minorities with lower grades or tests
scores obtained something that they didn’t deserve: Their acceptances
were ill-gotten. Finally, the parent-plaintiffs in Parents Involved
expressed similar sentiments. Explaining why Whites had been victimized in the Seattle controlled-choice plan, Brose explained: “Only
7.5% of students from Blaine School who are white were assigned to
their first-choice school. . . . It is clear that we were really treated
unfairly.”293 In challenging the Louisville integration plan, Crystal
Meredith accused the school board of wanting her to “sacrifice [her
son’s] learning in order to maintain the status quo,” and declared that
“each child’s education is more important than [the school district’s]
plan.”294
This innocence narrative has significant implications for the
development of antiracist white identity. As advanced by the diversity
rationale, this narrative traps Whites in the acceptance stage of
Hardiman’s White Identity Development (WID) model, a stage
defined by a belief in meritocracy and the inferiority of people of
color.295 By focusing on the virtues of diverse viewpoints in the classroom and the common good inherent in exposure to people of different backgrounds, the diversity rationale avoids consideration of
active white participation and complicity in larger patterns and structures of subordination that result in the exclusion of alternate viewpoints in the first place.
Quality K–12 public education, for example, is a necessary prerequisite for higher education. Having acquiesced to the dismantling
of formal segregation, many Whites fail to see the role they play in
289

Tolson, supra note 2.
See supra notes 250–53 and accompanying text (describing Grutter’s view of herself
as a victim).
291 Supra note 5, 253 and accompanying text.
292 Grutter stated that her “issue has always been with the university; it’s not been with
any students or anyone personally.” Cobbs, supra note 60.
293 Kathleen’s Story, supra note 264.
294 Crystal Meredith, Statement at Press Conference (June 28, 2007), available at http://
www.courier-journal.com/assets/B278019628.pdf.
295 For more information on Hardiman’s WID model, see supra notes 209–13 and
accompanying text.
290
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undermining quality education for children of color. White flight from
urban centers has led not only to deeply entrenched residential segregation296 but also to rapid and intense resegregation of public
schools.297 Academic outcomes at majority-minority schools are hindered by the social and economic isolation of their students, as well as
the broader discrimination faced by these schools within the educational system.298 Moreover, tracking perpetuates second-generation
segregation even in “integrated” schools: Students of color are disproportionately placed in lower tracks staffed by less qualified teachers or
296 See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 9, at 44–45, 52–54 (describing white flight and
chronicling how the federal government perpetuated and supported it); Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public Education, in
SCHOOL RESEGREGATION: MUST THE SOUTH TURN BACK?, supra note 269, at 29, 33–35
(describing the relationship between white flight and school segregation); Gary Orfield,
Segregated Housing and School Resegregation, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE
QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 314–15 (Gary Orfield & Susan E.
Eaton eds., 1996) (same).
297 Public schools are more segregated now than they were at the time of Brown v.
Board of Education. School resegregation of black students is increasing most dramatically
in the South, while segregation has increased most seriously across the country for Latino
students. GARY ORFIELD ET AL., THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, E PLURIBUS . . .
SEPARATION: DEEPENING DOUBLE SEGREGATION FOR MORE STUDENTS 7 (2012); see also
Sarah Garland, Was ‘Brown v. Board’ a Failure?, ATLANTIC (Dec. 5, 2012, 12:42 PM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/12/was-brown-v-board-a-failure/265939/
(discussing studies finding a resegregation of public schools, particularly at the elementary
level). Supreme Court jurisprudence has perpetuated school segregation by limiting the
ability of school districts and states to address racial segregation and isolation in public
schools. For example, Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), limited the ability of the
states to include suburban school districts in desegregation plans, even though failure to do
so virtually guaranteed that state-sponsored segregation would go unremediated. See
Chemerinsky, supra note 296, at 29, 34 (describing Milliken’s holding and effects).
Similarly, in Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701 (2007), the Court struck down attempts by the
Seattle and Jefferson County School Districts to undermine racial isolation and guarantee
broadened access for minorities to all city schools. See supra notes 106–09 and accompanying text (explaining the Parents Involved decision).
298 Majority-minority schools often have limited access to educational resources and
materials, including experienced and credentialed teachers, media centers, and new technology. See Mickelson, supra note 21, at 1546–48 (noting that segregated black schools
offer fewer “material and human resources,” including less-credentialed teachers and less
access to technology); see also Gary Orfield, The Growth of Segregation: African
Americans, Latinos, and Unequal Education, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE
QUIET REVERSAL OF Brown v. Board of Education, supra note 296, at 53, 67–68 (1996)
(finding that majority-minority schools offer curricula that are inferior to those offered at
low-minority and wealthier schools); C.E. ESCH ET AL., CTR. FOR THE FUTURE OF
TEACHING AND LEARNING, TEACHING AND CALIFORNIA’S FUTURE: THE STATUS OF THE
TEACHING PROFESSION 2005, at 70 (2005) (finding that in the 2004–2005 school year,
twenty percent of teachers serving in schools with between ninety-one and one hunded
percent minority populations were underprepared or novice, compared to only eleven percent of teachers serving schools with few or no minority students); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2004, at 73 (2004) (finding that high schools with at least
seventy-five percent low-income students employed three times as many uncertified or outof-field teachers in both English and science than schools with low poverty rates).
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over-identified for stigmatizing special education curricula,299 while
white students are disproportionately placed in higher tracks.300
White complicity is manifested in the urgency with which Whites
abandoned public schools and later failed to support school assignment plans that sought to maintain integration once desegregation
orders were lifted,301 as well as Whites’ allegiance to discriminatory
tracking policies, racialized school assignment plans, and high-stakes
testing regimes (until, of course, Whites are negatively impacted).302
This complicity is unexamined and unacknowledged by the affirmative
action plaintiffs. Take, for example, Brose, for whom only her experience of being denied access to a particular school registers as victimization. She does not articulate any awareness of the racialized
injustices that minority students have been continually subjected to in
the United States (or in Seattle particularly). To her, discrimination
describes what her family and others like it experienced, even though
discrimination more readily describes the city’s minority students’ limited access to the high-quality schools in Brose’s neighborhood. The
299 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (describing how racial minorities are disproportionately identified for special education and as mentally retarded or emotionally disturbed). Nor are the disparities explained by poverty rates or exposure to environmental
hazards, as both factors normally result in increased identification among the “hard” disability categories, categories in which black school children are consistently underrepresented. Although the incidence of educably mentally retarded (EMR) classifications
generally increases with poverty, black children are more likely to be identified as EMR in
wealthier school districts. See Daniel J. Losen & Gary Orfield, Introduction to RACIAL
INEQUITY IN SPECIAL EDUCATION, at xv, xxii–xxiv (Daniel J. Losen & Gary Orfield eds.,
2002) (“The effects of poverty cannot satisfactorily explain racial disparities in identification for mental retardation or emotional disturbance.” (emphasis omitted)).
300 See Mickelson, supra note 21, at 1531–32, 1560 (explaining that tracking maintains
white privilege by disproportionately placing Whites into higher levels than their comparably abled black peers and by disproportionately assigning black students to racially identifiable lower tracks with diminished access to superior learning opportunities); see also
Angela Onwuachi-Willig, For Whom Does the Bell Toll: The Bell Tolls for Brown?, 103
MICH. L. REV. 1507, 1522 (2004) (reviewing DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: Brown v.
Board of Education and the Unfulfilled Hopes for Racial Reform (2004)) (noting that,
post-Brown, tracking was used to segregate minority and white children in the classroom,
with white children admitted to accelerated or advanced programs and Blacks and Latinos
relegated to inferior tracks).
301 In spite of the suburbanization of non-White families, eighty percent of Latino students and seventy-four percent of black students attend majority-minority schools, due in
part to both increases in the majority population relative to Whites and the dismantling of
desegregation plans which quickly led to resegregation of American schools. ORFIELD ET
AL., supra note 297, at 7–9.
302 Opposition to high-stakes testing regimes in Florida, for example, was initially dismissed as a “minority issue” until the consequences of the regime started to also impact
white students. See Peter Whoriskey, Political Backlash Builds over High-Stakes Testing;
Public Support Wanes for Tests Seen as Punitive, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2006, at A3
(reporting that early opposition against the FCAT standardized test consisted of mostly
African American and Hispanic students).
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irony of her position, however, was lost on Brose, who declared that
she did not “want other parents to go through what [her family] went
through.”303
Scholarship on education law and policy unhelpfully avoids analyzing white privilege as facilitated by the subordination of people of
color.304 Blame is instead placed on parents of color, or on the state
for mismanaging its public schools.305 By disregarding race as a barrier
to educational advancement, material inequalities between Whites
and non-Whites can be dismissed as derivative of nonracial factors,
such as individual effort and merit. Unsurprisingly, then, hostility to
remedial affirmative action initiatives is due in part to the ways that
these initiatives delegitimize assumptions regarding inequality, merit,
and the privileges afforded to Whites as a result of past and present
racial inequality.306
By contrast, the diversity rationale does not engender the same
hostility, premised as it is on notions of improved citizenship and
intellectual engagement.307 This more palatable version of affirmative
action, however, ultimately perpetuates white racial identity rooted in
innocence. Even as diversity initiatives are celebrated as tools to
decrease racial bias and balkanization, the narrative surrounding the
diversity rationale does just the opposite. Having moved away from
considerations of race as a remedial measure that corrects for bias
against people of color, and for the privileges generally afforded
303 Jessica Blanchard, Supreme Court to Hear Seattle Schools Race Case, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER (June 5, 2006, 10:00 PM), http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/SupremeCourt-to-hear-Seattle-schools-race-case-1205411.php. Brose is apparently unaware that
parents of color did, indeed, experience ongoing discrimination when they were consistently denied access to the more competitive city schools in which her own children were
enrolled as a matter of course.
304 See Margaret L. Andersen, Whitewashing Race: A Critical Perspective on Whiteness,
in WHITE OUT: THE CONTINUING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACISM, supra note 160, at 21, 28–29
(cautioning that whiteness must be analyzed in relation to people of color, and calling for
examination of whiteness in the context of other forces and institutions, including global
capitalism, labor markets, residential segregation, and school tracking).
305 See James, supra note 262, at 1109–14 (detailing how cultural-deficit theories, which
blame minority parents for the underachievement of their children, inform education law
and policy).
306 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 186, at 1778 (explaining how the Court’s resistance to
affirmative action is rooted in ideologies and structures supporting white supremacy);
Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative Inaction, 50 HOW. L.J. 611, 664 (2007) (describing the
Court’s general hostility to affirmative action).
307 For some scholars this is ultimately a benefit, given the politically charged landscape
of the discourse surrounding affirmative action. See, e.g., Daniel Ibsen Morales, A Matter
of Rhetoric: The Diversity Rationale in Political Context, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 187, 189 (2006)
(“[T]he diversity rationale is the most effective means of securing the interests of racial
minorities in the face of limited political and economic clout, as well as continuing racial
prejudice.”).
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Whites by the sheer virtue of being white, the diversity rationale can
be justified as beneficial for all students. The diversity rationale is
popular precisely because it fails to address structural and societal bias
and at the same time placates Whites: Whites believe either that they
are bearing an unjust burden for the good of all, or are benefiting
from the presence, experience, and perspective of non-Whites, or
both.
This narrative not only advances notions of unjust and unmeritorious minority enrichment, but also furthers notions of Whites as
martyrs whose hands are clean of involvement in those systems and
processes that result in racial subordination. This is perhaps best
exemplified by research demonstrating that Whites today consider
antiwhite bias to be more prevalent and problematic than discrimination against Blacks.308 The diversity rationale, then, helps establish a
new racism “as effective as slavery and Jim Crow in maintaining a
racial status quo.”309 Further, the diversity rationale may be even
more problematic because of the absence of clear and intentional
instances of discrimination that Jim Crow and slavery once permitted—obvious expressions of the subordination of particular groups
of people by race. Subordination today, however, is less likely to take
the form of intentional discrimination, operating instead as less visible
systematic and structural racism. Working against the backdrop of
white complicity in discrimination that is harder to recognize, the
innocence narrative advanced by the diversity rationale more effectively casts Whites as righteous actors in the system.
3. The Problem with Individualism
In contrast with the values and understandings promoted by the
diversity rationale, the pseudoindependent and redefinition phases of
Helms’s and Hardiman’s white identity models require an understanding of larger structural imbalances that perpetuate inequality.310
Whites, however, often ignore—or are unaware of—institutional and
structural racism. As such, the processes of favoritism and inclusion
that help Whites, even if they do not explicitly harm Blacks, are made
invisible. These advantages inoculate Whites from the vagaries of the
308 See Michael I. Norton & Samuel R. Sommers, Whites See Racism as a Zero-Sum
Game That They Are Now Losing, 6 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 215 (2011) (describing the
results of an empirical study with responses from a nationally representative sample of
Whites who believed that in the last decade there has been more antiwhite than antiblack
racial discrimination).
309 Bonilla-Silva, supra note 219, at 272.
310 See supra notes 207–13 and accompanying text (detailing Helms’s and Hardiman’s
models).
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market while permitting Whites to promote market solutions to inequality for non-Whites.311 This ignorance allows Whites to attribute
their success to individual achievement or hard work while minimizing
the systemic advantages conferred by whiteness as a basis for their
successful life outcomes.312
This focus on individual achievement instead of inequality and
intergroup power differentials is only further promoted by the use of
the diversity rationale in higher education. Sanctioned by the
Supreme Court, college admissions administrators engage in individualized, holistic reviews of applicants that consider race as one factor in
a person’s individual application profile. Schools attempt to assuage
discomfort with the use of race by maintaining that individualized
review means that race is never directly outcome determinative, and
that applicants are assessed by a series of metrics of which race is just
one component.313
The admissions process is inherently individualized. Long before
race became an explicit component of assessment, multiple aspects of
applicant profiles—including race—were scrutinized and assessed for
strengths, weaknesses, and distinctive characteristics. When colleges
and universities, however, justify the consideration of race with
promises of individualized review, the positive or negative impact of
individual membership in one racial group or another is rendered
unjustifiably opaque. Although decisions are made about any one particular applicant, that applicant’s race is considered because of the
experience of the racial group to which the applicant belongs in
society.314 Colleges and universities are prohibited from considering
race in order to remediate larger societal inequality, but that should
311 Nancy DiTomaso et al., White Views of Civil Rights: Color Blindness and Equal
Opportunity, in WHITE OUT: THE CONTINUING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACISM, supra note 160,
at 189, 190 (arguing that naı̈veté or ignorance about racial favoritism allows Whites to
believe that market forces will eliminate racial inequality).
312 Id. at 191.
313 Brief for Respondents at 3, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241),
2003 WL 402236.
314 Even if institutions wanted to, it is unlikely that they could completely excise the
consideration of race from the admissions process, given the likelihood that any one student’s application contains both explicit and implicit racial signifiers, including the student’s name, geographical connections, and any possible discussions of race in the student’s
personal statement. Admissions officers, primed by prohibitions on explicit considerations
of race, will be unable to avoid thoughts about race and will, at a minimum, operate under
the default assumption that each applicant is white. See Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I.
Harris, The New Racial Preferences, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1139, 1146–47 (2008) (finding that
antipreference initiatives, like Proposition 209 and Proposal 2, produce race preference,
whereas race-conscious regimes better achieve race neutrality). As such, preventing the
explicit consideration of race does not necessarily mean preventing any consideration of
race, nor, for the reasons articulated above, should it.
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not prohibit a diversity narrative that is more explicit about broader
societal racial dynamics and power differentials that make racial
diversity on campuses, and the accompanying consideration of race in
college admissions, so important.
Such a narrative might have discouraged challengers to the diversity rationale. The diversity rationale as explained, however—with its
focus on the value of perspectives in the classroom—seems neither to
have challenged Hopwood, Grutter and Fisher’s understanding of
merit, nor to have invited their consideration of how persistent and
structural racial bias might depress the standardized test scores of otherwise deserving applicants. Nor do any of the plaintiffs appear to
move past their individual grievances. Instead, these plaintiffs directly
challenge the use of the diversity rationale itself. The consideration of
race, for them, is about their individual achievements and applications, with no reflection on larger inequalities in social power that provide advantages to some—including themselves—and necessitate
consideration of the racial composition of an entering class at an institution of higher education. The adherence of the challenged universities to individualized review as a legal defense315 only aggravates
plaintiffs’ tendencies, as it enables their unwillingness, or inability, to
consider the larger societal and historical context in which admissions
operate.
Ultimately, the focus on individualized review eclipses both
awareness of larger structural inequities that impact life outcomes and
any understanding of racism as a pervasive phenomenon.316 As
315 “[W]e look at people as individuals. We look at all of their life experience and we’re
making individual judgments in order to assemble the best class that we can.” Brackett,
supra note 64 (transcript of an interview with Liz Barry, Deputy General Counsel of the
University of Michigan). Given the rulings in Grutter and Gratz, universities have little
choice but to broadcast their commitment to an admissions process that gives consideration to multiple facets of each individual application. Unfortunately, the individual review
mantra obscures substantive discussions of the larger social dynamics impacting race and
privilege.
316 These issues are implicated in questions about the benefits a “black doctor’s son or
daughter” would unfairly receive through affirmative action—an oft-repeated challenge to
affirmative action. See Delgado, supra note 24, at 140–41 (responding to the argument that
affirmative action helps “the proverbial son or daughter of a black neurosurgeon who got
into Stanford or Harvard under an affirmative action program” by asserting that “race is
probably the best measure of social disadvantage that we have”); Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Op-Ed.,
Race vs. Class: The False Dichotomy, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2013, at A27 (arguing that the
charge that affirmative action benefits only middle- and upper-class students is untrue as a
general matter and mostly reflective of overreliance on standardized testing); Negassi
Tesfamichael, Op-Ed., Is Affirmative Action for Me?, WASH. POST, June 25, 2013, at A15
(considering whether affirmative action should apply to well-off students and concluding
that it should due to the benefits of diversity). Even middle-class minorities, however,
continue to be impacted by the influence of race and ethnicity on life outcomes. See James,
supra note 86, at 872–74 (detailing the tenuous financial status of middle-class Blacks, as
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employed in this manner, diversity diverts attention away from power
differentials and from an understanding of racism as a function of
group relations.
4. Return of the Subordination Narrative
Finally, the diversity rationale helps to entrench a problematic
relationship between Whites and non-Whites, further undermining the
realization of an antiracist white identity. Both autonomy in the
Helms model and internalization in the Hardiman model require a
relationship that is not based on subordination and control. Yet the
diversity rationale as deployed reaffirms both.
To the extent that the diversity rationale fails to undermine white
privilege, challenge assumptions about merit and inequality, or consider larger structural forces that perpetuate inequality, it perpetuates
beliefs about white industriousness relative to the unearned and unfair
advantages enjoyed by non-Whites. As such, Whites are congratulated
for their self-sacrifices when allowing a small number of unmeritorious non-Whites to access the world of elite education. This is very
different from remedial considerations of race that force Whites to
confront the nature not just of individual racism, but of societal discrimination and white privilege. Rather, the diversity rationale
encourages Whites to develop paternalistic relationships with the
people of color around them—relationships that are ultimately
informed by a disdain for their less-deserving counterparts.317
well as the impact of their racialized life experiences on their willingness to borrow for
higher education).
317 For example, Richard Sander’s mismatch theory, discussed in Richard H. Sander, A
Systematic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367
(2004), has been consistently critiqued as not only methodologically unsound, but as also
paternalistic regarding the beneficiaries of affirmative action. See, e.g., Ian Ayres &
Richard Brooks, Does Affirmative Action Reduce the Number of Black Lawyers?, 57 STAN.
L. REV. 1807, 1818–40 (2005) (reviewing Sander’s analysis to find no persuasive evidence
that affirmative action has reduced the probability that black students will become lawyers,
and calling instead for better distribution of applicants’ likelihood of success at any school);
David L. Chambers et al., The Real Impact of Eliminating Affirmative Action in American
Law Schools: An Empirical Critique of Richard Sander’s Study, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1855,
1857 (2005) (stating that Sander’s analysis not only overestimates the cost of affirmative
action while failing to demonstrate the benefit from ending it, but that the conclusions of
his analysis “rest on a series of statistical errors, oversights, and implausible assumptions”);
and é douglas pond cummings, “Open Water”: Affirmative Action, Mismatch Theory and
Swarming Predators—A Response to Richard Sander, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 795, 824–29 (2006)
(critiquing Sander for telling African Americans to rely on his empirical research and
select less competitive schools that will supposedly lead to better bar passage and stronger
law school grades, rather than rely on their own determination regarding which admission
offer is best). Sander’s analysis is informed by the same paternalistic tropes of “lesser qualified” minorities and the “unfair” burden of affirmative action that go unchallenged by the
diversity rationale. These tropes are ultimately justified as beneficial for primarily white
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More perniciously, however, the diversity rationale further
entrenches the role of non-Whites as subordinate to Whites. Consider
the example, discussed by Danielle Allen, of the infamous photograph
depicting a white high school student in Little Rock, Arkansas, named
Hazel Bryan screaming curse words at Elizabeth Eckford, one of her
new black classmates, in front of Central High School in protest of the
Supreme Court’s 1954 desegregation orders. Professor Allen explains
that Whites were able to “insist[ ] on [their] habitual prerogatives
(with power behind [them] to back up [their] demand[s]).”318 By outlawing legally enforced segregation in America’s public schools, however, Brown v. Board of Education 319 gave Bryan’s action a new
frame: Old habits were no longer legally permissible in the public
sphere. As a result, United States citizenship was reconstituted, and
“citizens of the United States . . . reorganized their basic plan for
assigning and protecting political rights and powers, this time to protect the rights of minorities.”320 In rebalancing the protection of political rights and powers, Brown v. Board of Education insisted on a new
narrative about relationships between Whites and Blacks, a narrative
insisting on political and social parity even if not perfectly achieved.321
The diversity rationale affirmed in Grutter, however, disrupted
the quest for parity required by Brown 322 and re-established noninstitutions and their students. This deployment of the diversity rationale, uninformed by
the reality of larger structural and institutional patterns of racial inequality, disturbs
neither the innocent white identity narrative nor the myth of meritocracy. In a wide variety
of contexts, social dominance theory has demonstrated that these meritocratic myths justify individuals’ beliefs in social inequality and resistance to affirmative action. See generally JIM SIDANIUS & FELICIA PRATTO, SOCIAL DOMINANCE: AN INTERGROUP THEORY OF
SOCIAL HIERARCHY AND OPPRESSION (1999) (discussing social dominance theory).
318 ALLEN, supra note 21, at 5.
319 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
320 ALLEN, supra note 21, at 7.
321 The legacy of Brown has itself been critiqued and challenged. See, e.g., Bell, supra
note 130, at 524–25 (arguing that the Court’s decision in Brown was only made possible
because the interests of Whites—namely, providing credibility in America’s struggle with
Communism, stemming black resentment, and removing segregation as a barrier to economic advancement—and the interests of Blacks happened to align at the time of the
case); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Comments at the Southeastern Association of Law
Schools Sixty-Second Annual Meeting: Retaliation and Whistleblowers in the Workplace
After Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville (Aug. 6, 2009) (on file with the
New York University Law Review) (noting that when identifying the harms imposed upon
minority schoolchildren by discrimination, the Brown opinion also failed to identify the
associated harms experienced by the dominant group, such as a feeling of superiority
among white children, and potential uneasiness with participation in a system of racial
subordination).
322 Arguably, Supreme Court cases prior to Grutter that addressed diversity and integration also established people of color as subordinate to Whites by marginalizing the concerns of people of color relative to Whites. In Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189
(1973), for example, the Court refused to characterize de facto segregation as an equal
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Whites as subordinate to Whites.323 No longer deserving of inclusion
at elite institutions based on their own merit—as informed, in part, by
the ways in which minorities experience and nevertheless overcome
individual and societal discrimination—minorities are instead
admitted in service of Whites. In this capacity, non-Whites are allowed
into elite educational institutions to “diversify” them, and to enhance
classroom engagement such that Whites can be better trained for an
increasingly globalized and multicultural workplace. This framing of
the diversity rationale legitimizes the tendency of such institutions to
place burdens on minority candidates (without similarly burdening
white candidates),324 while quietly, but dangerously, encouraging
Whites to use and control non-Whites.325
protection violation, even though the harm to students of color isolated in segregated
schools was the same. Id. at 208 (holding that a finding of intentionally segregative school
board actions in a meaningful portion of the school system creates a presumption that
other segregated schooling within the system is not advantageous). One year later, in
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), the Court relied on its preference for local control
to justify its refusal to order an interdistrict desegregation remedy, even though racial integration was not possible without it. Id. at 741 (“No single tradition in public education is
more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools . . . .”). Similarly, the
Court’s series of integration cases in the early 1990s, including Board of Education v.
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249 (1991) (holding that “[t]he test espoused by the Court of
Appeals would condemn a school district . . . to judicial tutelage for the indefinite future”
when determining whether the dissolution of a decree imposing desegregation was appropriate), Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490 (1992), and Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70
(1995), was responsive not to the harms of segregation for people of color, but rather to the
fatigue experienced by white school districts still under desegregation orders. In Parents
Involved, 551 U.S. 701 (2007), the Court ignored the racial equity concerns informing controlled-choice plans in Seattle and Louisville, insisting that race could not be a factor in
school assignment plans meant to integrate by race. For a more detailed discussion of the
Court’s neglect of equity issues in American public education, see Osamudia R. James,
Business as Usual: The Roberts Court’s Continued Neglect of Adequacy and Equity
Concerns in American Education, 59 S.C. L. REV. 793, 816–24 (2008) (discussing the
Supreme Court’s treatment of equal protection doctrine with regard to desegregation cases
leading up to, and including, Parents Involved).
323 Consider, for example, Justice O’Connor’s reasoning in Grutter, which relied heavily
on the arguments made by more than 100 amici from the business sector while ignoring
arguments presented by social justice-oriented interveners. See supra notes 77–85 and
accompanying text (describing the arguments articulated by various amici in Grutter and
the Court’s receptiveness to those positions).
324 See Malamud, supra note 138, at 962–64 (arguing that the utilitarian justification for
diversity is problematic because it implies that, beyond the typical duties that would be
required of similarly positioned white individuals at an institution, minorities must also
perform the additional job of specializing in white-minority relations).
325 Control of non-Whites is made all the more apparent when one considers the ways in
which non-Whites, in service of the narrative of the diversity rationale, are expected to
perform and present their racial identity in ways that benefit white institutions. See supra
notes 198–201 and accompanying text (discussing how affirmative action encourages the
commodification and performance of race and racial identity).
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Emboldened, for example, by a diversity rationale that does not
challenge merit as defined almost exclusively by standardized test
scores, Grutter and Fisher exercised privilege and power by defining
merit in ways favorable to themselves, and then characterized minorities as unmeritorious, despite the fact that minorities play the admissions game at a disadvantage.326 Moreover, despite Grutter’s assertion
that her problem is not with other admitted students, the lawsuits are,
ultimately, about controlling—and, by extension, subordinating—nonwhite individuals. Although they do not explicitly acknowledge it in
their public remarks, the plaintiffs’ ultimate goal in bringing these
suits seems, based on the manner in which they structured their challenges, to have the Court affirm their desire for admission in place of
persons of color. Cheryl Hopwood did not challenge an application
process that granted admission to 140 white students with Texas Index
scores lower than hers; rather, she focused on the sixty-six black and
Mexican-American students with lower scores than hers.327 Similarly,
Barbara Grutter did not challenge the admission of the thirty-five
white applicants with lower profile scores who were admitted instead
of her, choosing instead to challenge a policy that admitted students of
color with lower profile scores.328 Finally, Abigail Fisher failed to challenge the admission of forty-two Caucasian applicants with combined
Academic Index and Personal Achievement Index scores identical or
lower than hers,329 choosing instead to challenge the admission of
minority students with application scores equal to or lower than her
own.
Technicalities regarding the constitutional basis for these lawsuits
aside, this strange elision is a consistent feature of the discussion and

326 See GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 21, at 110–13 (delineating three dimensions of
power: (1) power observed by simply watching who wins and loses in a conflict; (2) understanding how the underlying rules and structures that play to the strengths of the winners
are created; and (3) exploring the cultural narrative that the powerful develop to “sell”
those rules and structures to the powerless); supra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing how admissions criteria like standardized tests have a negative disparate impact on
minority students).
327 Lani Guinier, Reframing the Affirmative Action Debate, 86 KY. L.J. 505, 510–11
(1997).
328 See Brief for Respondents, supra note 313, at 47 n.78 (stating that thirty-five white
students were admitted from “lower cells” than Grutter).
329 Moreover, Fisher failed to challenge the denial of summer program admission for
168 African American and Hispanic applicants with combined AI/PAI scores identical to
or higher than hers. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 49, at 15–16 (explaining that the
school offered provisional admission to certain students who were denied fall class admission but completed summer academic requirements).
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narrative of challenges to affirmative action.330 The plaintiffs’ exclusive focus on a process that granted non-Whites admission that they
believed rightfully and naturally belonged to them is the very expression of white “habitual prerogatives” of power and dominance—prerogatives for which the plaintiffs sought judicial endorsement.331
D. The Diversity Rationale and White Citizenship
Discussions of these plaintiffs are not presented to determine
which identity group has been more victimized. Rather, they are
presented to illustrate how the diversity rationale helps produce
Whites who are unprepared to engage in a democratic process and
citizenship practice332 that considers the whole polity even if it means
that white interests cannot come first. This is ultimately the crux of
white supremacy and is a significant obstacle to the development of an
antiracist white identity.
The diversity rationale as currently advanced by the courts is both
ahistorical and acontextual. It ignores issues of racial or social justice,
and is silent on the privilege typically afforded to Whites in the public
school system, from elementary school to higher education. As such,
even as diversity opens up doors to elite education for non-Whites, it
also cultivates white identities grounded in racial innocence—hyperfocused on individualism to the exclusion of an understanding of
broader racial imbalances, and quick to jettison diversity initiatives
when they no longer suit white purposes.
This development of white racial identity is particularly problematic in a society plagued by enduring racial inequality. As Professor
Allen explains, citizenship consists not just of duties to institutions—
like jury or military service—that protect citizens’ rights, but of “long330 See Guinier, supra note 327, at 510–11 (arguing that the conceptual frame limiting
the ambit of affirmative action to racial minorities and women draws attention away from
those social systems that also engage and involve Whites).
331 ALLEN, supra note 21, at 5. Consider, also, the decisions of Kathleen Brose and
Crystal Meredith to challenge school district attempts to maintain racial integration,
reduce racial isolation, and guarantee more equal access for nonwhite students to competitive schools. Unable to move beyond their individual circumstances, both Meredith and
Brose are stuck in Hardiman’s acceptance stage, unwilling—or unable—to understand that
decisions to bring lawsuits, similar to school enrollment decisions, cannot be divorced from
power and privilege.
332 See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing how diversity in educational
settings fosters commitment to genuine racial equality and shared decisionmaking). I use
the term “democratic process” broadly to encompass the participation of residents and
citizens in the creation, promulgation, and social acceptance of law and policy, as well as
the discourse that provides the context for law and policy. In the context of race-conscious
policies in higher education, and for purposes of the behavior critiqued in this Article,
problematic democratic practices range from physical protests and written work opposing
diversity initiatives to legal suits filed to frustrate these policies.
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enduring habits of interaction [that] give form to public space and so
to our political life.”333 Equal citizenship has been further described
as:
the dignity of full membership in [a] society. Thus, the principle not
only demands a measure of equality of legal status, but also promotes a greater equality of that other kind of status which is a social
fact—namely, one’s rank on a scale defined by degrees of deference
or regard. The principle embodies an “ethic of mutual respect and
self-esteem.”334

In a society like ours, genuine equality can only be achieved by a
commitment to citizenship that bestows the dignity of full societal
membership to everyone therein. Citizenship, then, also requires a
commitment to bringing everyone into the franchise, even as it
requires recognition that privilege cannot be maintained for particular
groups.
For white identity development, this requires honest assessments
of white privilege; understandings of how that privilege perpetuates
racism, including differential societal status and regard; and a willingness to release that privilege. The current deployment of the diversity
rationale, however, helps render many Whites unfit for this sort of
citizenship. At the same time, the diversity rationale perpetuates both
conscious and unconscious beliefs that genuine citizenship (and access
to the benefits of citizenship) is limited and that some members of the
citizenry have more legitimate access to these benefits than others. As
concluded by Hardiman and Keehn after interviewing young white
students regarding race, identity, and privilege in America, “[T]hese
young White people [are] ill-equipped to understand or fully participate in an increasingly multicultural society. They [have] a limited
understanding of how the politics of race continue to shape U.S.
society and their privilege as White people.”335
Unfortunately, current deployment of the diversity rationale
encourages a form of white identity performance that does not realize
that collective democratic action necessarily involves communal decisions that will “inevitably benefit some citizens at the expense of
others, even when the whole community generally benefits.”336 This
form of white identity performance fails to understand that “democracy [does not achieve] the common good by assuring the same bene333

ALLEN, supra note 21, at 10.
Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term—Foreword: Equal Citizenship
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1977) (footnotes omitted)
(quoting JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 256 (1971)).
335 Hardiman & Keehn, supra note 209, at 135.
336 ALLEN, supra note 21, at 28.
334
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fits . . . to everyone, but [is] rather a political practice by which the
diverse negative effects of collective political action . . . can be distributed equally . . . on the basis of consensual interactions.”337 Instead,
this current form of white identity performance is unprepared to incur
any cost if the ultimate benefit inures to people of color.338 This zerosum view of dominance and power makes impossible the sort of transformative democracy that undermines the problematic distribution of
power, privilege, and political representation by race.
E. From Diversity to the End of Racial Identity
To be clear, the goal of diversity is not the problem. Rather, the
problem identified by this Article is the way in which Whites react to
that goal, as informed by the stunted racial identity formation that the
diversity rationale, as currently deployed, encourages. One such reaction is “exhaustion.” Professor Hutchinson has written about “racial
exhaustion,” or the attempts by opponents to racial egalitarian measures to contest the policies as “redundant, unnecessary, or too burdensome or taxing.”339 While affirming, for example, the compelling
interest of diversity in higher education, Justice O’Connor also seemingly imposed a time limit of twenty-five years on affirmative
action,340 thereby reflecting the Court’s own exhaustion with raceconscious state action.341
Exhaustion rhetoric can lead to legitimate policy explorations,
like the need to reconsider factual bases for legislation or the need to
place substantive resource and time limits around regulatory measures.342 The diversity rationale, however, does not implicate such
considerations. It is not a pathway to legislation or regulation; rather,
the diversity rationale is a conceptual justification for the considera337

Id. at 29.
For a description of a zero-sum conception of power in the United States in which
one group’s benefit necessarily comes at another’s expense, see GUINIER &TORRES, supra
note 21, at 111. Guinier and Torres, however, also conceptualize a more transformative
understanding of power that allows groups to discover that “the hierarchy of power itself is
their common antagonist, rather than one another.” Id. at 130.
339 Hutchinson, supra note 273, at 922.
340 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (observing that, in the twenty-five
years since the Court first approved the use of race-conscious measures aimed at diversifying public higher education, “the number of minority applicants with high grades and test
scores has indeed increased,” and predicting that, within another twenty-five years, “the
use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved
today”).
341 See Hutchinson, supra note 273, at 955–56 (noting that the Court’s discomfort and
skepticism toward affirmative action inspired Justice O’Connor’s dictum calling for an end
to affirmative action within a specified term of years).
342 See id. at 968 (considering the legitimate policy concerns that can be raised by
exhaustion rhetoric).
338
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tion of race in government policies. Diversity, recognized as a compelling state interest, represents a normative ideal for society. Moreover,
the use of diversity challenged in Grutter was affirmed as serving the
compelling state interest of ensuring a diverse student body. Affirmative action that uses diversity in pursuit of a critical mass of students is
nonremedial in nature, and as such does not demand the type of time
limits that remedial measures, adopted to address particular grievances, require.343
Nevertheless, the Court’s response to Fisher’s attack on diversity
could be taken as evidence of another wave of racial exhaustion. It
seemed, initially, that the Court might allow the discrete use of race in
higher education because it would ameliorate isolation of minorities
without stoking racial hostilities.344 As initially permitted, the Court
was less concerned about the burdens that race-conscious remedies
might impose, perhaps because individualized consideration eased the
impact of the burden.345 Over time, however, it has become clearer
that key votes on the Court have been upholding but restricting raceconscious remedies with an increased focus on the balkanizing impact
of the remedies on Whites.346 This shift was made apparent by Justice
Kennedy’s insistence in Fisher that the UT plan be sent back to the
district court and again subject to strict scrutiny to ensure that the
school’s use of race was both “necessary” and a response to the
absence of “workable race-neutral alternatives.”347 This increased
focus on individual burdens for Whites comes at the cost of minority
interests, and is only perpetuated by the diversity rationale.
The diversity rationale has even influenced the development of
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. The spirit and purpose animating the Fourteenth Amendment might be understood in one of
several ways. As informed by an antisubordination ideal, approaches
to equal protection focus more on the discriminatory effects of state
343 See Kevin R. Johnson, The Last Twenty Five Years of Affirmative Action?, 21 CONST.
COMMENT. 171, 183–85 (2004) (arguing that if a diverse student body, and not racial
remedy, is the justification for affirmative action, it is unclear why the law would require a
time limit). Like imposing time limits on other normative ideals (such as state attempts to
maximize the best interests of children within its borders or state interests in protecting
unborn life), time limits on the normative ideal of diversity are inappropriate.
344 See Siegel, supra note 16, at 806 (suggesting that the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence reflects a pattern of concern regarding the potential impact of race consideration
on balkanization).
345 Id. at 806–07.
346 See Siegel, supra note 24, at 1307–08, 1325–37 (demonstrating Justice Kennedy’s reliance on equal protection doctrine as a means of promoting social cohesion and shared
community).
347 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420–22 (2013) (quoting Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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action, rather than on the explicit intent of policymakers. As such,
laws and policies subject to equal protection challenges might be
assessed for the extent to which they reinforce or impart political,
social, or economic marginalization of historically disadvantaged
classes.348 Alternately, a distributive justice framework for applying
equal protection imposes on the state an affirmative duty to “dismantle the unequal conditions created by historical systems of domination or inequities that deny to poor individuals access to important
societal resources.”349 Like an antisubordination framework, a distributive justice framework operates without regard to intent, focusing
instead on impact and effects.350
In contrast, the Court has sanctioned the “colorblind” approach
to equal protection, which finds a potential equal protection violation
whenever the state differentiates between similarly situated groups.351
In the context of race, this has led to the preservation of facially neutral laws that have a disparate impact on minority groups.352 Courts
348 See Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 1066–76 (analyzing the Reconstruction
Amendments and finding that, although we cannot know precisely what “equality” meant
in a society that simultaneously freed slaves and socially subordinated Blacks, we can conclude that: (1) the conflicted nature of the history of the Amendments requires a shift
toward a moral or normative standard and (2) the Amendments not only undid the
Constitution’s previous textual acceptance of slavery, but redefined Blacks as citizens for
whom substantive, and not just formal, equality is needed); Hutchinson, supra note 177, at
637–40 (arguing that in contemporary equal protection analysis, the highest level of scrutiny is reserved for historically privileged groups, while the constitutionality of enactments
that harm historically disadvantaged groups is determined by a far less demanding standard); see also Lawrence, supra note 157, at 1382 (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause does
more than require that every individual have equal access to the democratic process and
grant blacks the right to treatment free of . . . racial motives. Rather, it creates a new
substantive value of ‘nonslavery’ and antisubordination to replace the old values of slavery
and white supremacy.”); cf. Knouse, supra note 177, at 767–85 (suggesting that current
equal protection doctrine is harmful rather than helpful, as it merely reinforces identity
politics without achieving the constitutional goals of the Fourteenth Amendment).
349 Hutchinson, supra note 177, at 623.
350 See Lawrence, supra note 156, at 345 n.115 (explaining that under this substanative
theory of equal protection, a prima facie case for relief is established wherever one racial
or ethnic group is substantively worse off than another).
351 See Hutchinson, supra note 177, at 637–55 (using the Court’s colorblindness jurisprudence, including Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), in
the context of affirmative action to illustrate how this framework treats Whites with racial
privilege as politically vulnerable, while treating socially subordinate persons of color as
privileged).
352 The doctrine of discriminatory purpose was first established in 1976 through Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Requiring plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality
of facially neutral laws to prove a racially discriminatory purpose, the Davis Court upheld
Washington, D.C. police department hiring procedures that had a disparate impact on
African American applicants. Id. at 238–40, 245–48. The doctrine has since been applied in
many other cases challenging disparate impact, including Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), which upheld the city’s
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uphold these laws so long as they do not find an intentional discriminatory purpose.353 At the same time, race-conscious government policies that are implemented with the specific intent to ameliorate racial
inequality are prohibited.354 This understanding of equal protection
operates alongside what Jed Rubenfeld has termed the “anti-antidiscrimination agenda,” which argues that the “liberal” antidiscrimination movement has gone too far down a path that erodes meritocracy,
creates a sense of entitlement among undeserving people, and
foments a victimization culture. Indeed, the Supreme Court has failed
to extend antidiscrimination law to traditionally unprotected groups
and refused to expand equal protection beyond the principle of formal
legal equality.355
To counter these problematic approaches to equal protection,
scholars have advanced more universal post-identitarian equality
frameworks.356 Kenji Yoshino, for example, has advanced a new
understanding of equal protection that furthers liberty, rather than
equality.357 In response to “pluralism anxiety”—the social backlash to
increased recognition of identity groups in the United States—this
new understanding accelerates the move away from group-based
equality claims under the guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. It instead aligns equal protection with individual liberty
zoning decisions even though they had racially discriminatory effects. For analysis suggesting that the doctrine fails to capture unconscious, but equally damaging, racism, see
Lawrence, supra note 156, at 318–20.
353 See Ga. State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1409,
1412–13 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that groupings of students by ability is not per se unconstitutional as violative of the Equal Protection Clause even when it results in racial disparity); Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397, 402, 406 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that absent a
failure to teach all materials covered in the tests, functional literacy tests required for high
school graduation did not violate equal protection even if they had a disparate impact on
minority students).
354 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 747
(2006) (striking down controlled-choice plans that sought to integrate schools and broaden
minority access to competitive schools because the racial identity of students was considered in school assignments); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 273–75 (2003) (striking down
an admissions policy that awarded a specific number of points to minority applicants
because race was outcome determinative).
355 Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141, 1142–43
(2002).
356 Post-identity or universal equality frameworks attempt to move away from the identities and suspect classes recognized by Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, and focus
instead on rights and privileges that should be protected among all people, regardless of
identity. See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747,
776–87 (2011) (promoting an equal protection doctrine that focuses on liberty rather than
equality); Fineman, supra note 152, at 8–10 (suggesting mobilization around shared human
vulnerability, rather than around identity).
357 Yoshino, supra note 356, at 776–87 (2011).
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claims under the amendments’ due process guarantees,358 thus legitimating calls for an end to race-conscious remedial measures. Similarly, vulnerability theory is laudably responsive to the pluralism
anxiety that has precluded protection for additional suspect classes,
and the social backlash to racial identity that undergirds calls for an
end to race-conscious remedial measures. Freed from incentives to
perceive ourselves as belonging to distinct classes that must compete
for material and legal resources, people are encouraged instead to
mobilize around an understanding of shared vulnerability.359
Concerns about balkanization, however, are likely misplaced, as
the real danger of balkanization comes not from race-conscious measures, but from the lack of diversity at institutions themselves. Indeed,
structural diversity leads to substantive and positive cross-racial interactions when accompanied by institutional attempts to foster a positive racial climate.360 Moreover, the problem with a universal
framework is precisely its post-racial outlook. Ultimately, race pervades all facets of social life, impacting collective identities and social
structures, and permeating individual psyches and relationships on
conscious and unconscious levels.361 Identity politics remain necessary
because people cannot see past identity,362 making it unclear that
358 See id. at 748, 776–87 (explaining the Court’s shift toward individual liberty claims
and the implications of that shift).
359 See Fineman, supra note 152, at 17 (framing the idea of “shared vulnerability” in the
context of the sub-prime mortgage crisis and welfare reform during the 1990s).
360 See Uma M. Jayakumar, Can Higher Education Meet the Needs of an Increasingly
Diverse and Global Society? Campus Diversity and Cross-Cultural Workforce
Competencies, 78 HARV. EDUC. REV. 615, 641–42 (2008), available at http://her.hepg.org/
content/b60031p350276699/fulltext.pdf (arguing that attending a school with a diverse student body can aid developmental growth for students, even if they are raised in segregated
communities).
361 Ultimately, race’s permeation of all facets of social life, and the problem with any
legal doctrine that does not acknowledge this reality, is at the heart of this Article’s central
point. Many works, too numerous to list, address the impact of race on social life, including
ALLEN, supra note 21; GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 21; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note
9; WHITE OUT: THE CONTINUING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACISM, supra note 160; Crenshaw,
supra note 140; Flagg, supra note 20; Ford, supra note 175, at 1845; Glennon, supra note 8,
at 1252; Lawrence, supra note 157, at 1368–75; Lawrence, supra note 156, at 352–53;
McCabe, supra note 121, at 139–43; McIntosh, supra note 7; Onwuachi-Willig, supra note
180, at 883.
362 The salience of identity, and of racial identity in particular, has been consistently
documented in all sectors of American life. See, e.g., Bernard, supra note 9 (documenting
research findings which conclude that independent of income, home ownership, assets, and
education, Blacks are twice as likely as Whites to wind up in the more onerous and costly
form of bankruptcy); supra note 256 (documenting racial disparities in healthcare, even
after controlling for socioeconomic status). In public education, for example, racial minorities are generally subject to over-identification for special education, independent of their
disproportionate representation among the poor. See supra notes 8, 299 and accompanying
text (describing the disparate identification of racial minorities as mentally retarded or
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identity can, or should, be subsumed into more universal equity
frameworks. Recognition that we are all vulnerable would have to
override deeply held beliefs that particular racial and ethnic groups
are vulnerable due to their own cultural deficits. The intransigence,
however, of beliefs regarding race has been well documented, particularly because they are so central to (white) beliefs about self-worth
and superiority.363
Unfortunately, the current deployment of the diversity rationale
accelerates troubling doctrinal shifts away from identity and remedy,
and ultimately crowds out the antisubordination values underlying the
Fourteenth Amendment.364 Although the diversity narrative is one of
inclusion, by magnifying the transparency phenomenon, the rationale
encourages simplistic and unrealistic notions of merit, while discouraging recognition of white privilege. It also perpetuates white identities grounded in racial innocence, such that would-be plaintiffs are
free to challenge even the diversity rationale itself as unfair to Whites.
Diversity’s focus on individualism further obscures structural inequality,365 permitting those suffering from pluralism anxiety to justify
disturbed). Furthermore, black school children, in particular, are underrepresented in the
least stigmatizing “hard” disability categories like deafness or blindness, for which assessment is most objective, and overrepresented in the most stigmatizing “soft” disability categories like educable mentally retarded or emotionally disturbed, for which assessment is
most subjective. See Losen & Welner, supra note 8, at 415–17 (arguing that poverty alone
could not account for black children’s increased rate of categorization in “soft” disability
categories and that this overclassification was a result of systematic discrimination). Similarly, minorities are overrepresented in public school suspensions and corporal punishment, with black students being 2.19 (kindergarten to fifth grade) to 3.78 (sixth to ninth
grades) times more likely than their white peers “to be referred to the office for problem
behavior.” Russell J. Skiba et al., Race Is Not Neutral: A National Investigation of African
American and Latino Disproportionality in School Discipline, 40 SCH. PSYCHOL. REV. 85,
93 (2011).
363 See Onwuachi-Willig & James, supra note 238, at 92–94 (attributing the value of
whiteness to some of the problems in the campaign election of President Barack Obama).
364 See supra notes 25, 177 and accompanying text (describing the shift toward the diversity rationale and its impact on the antisubordination values of the Fourteenth
Amendment); see also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Preventing Balkanization or
Facilitating Racial Domination: A Critique of the New Equal Protection (Mar. 13, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the New York University Law Review) (advocating
for antisubordination theory to inform Supreme Court doctrine and arguing that the
Court’s efforts to discontinue class-based equal protection in order to avoid balkanization
actually “enforces dominant racial perspectives that legitimize racial inequality”).
365 The modifier “structural” before inequality is meant to convey the unexamined and
often invisible—but nevertheless impactful—cultural, political, and social patterns and
practices that, although not invidious, result in societal inequality. Structural racism, for
example, has been defined as a system “conferring social benefits on some groups and
imposing burdens on others that results in segregation, poverty, and denial of opportunity
for . . . people of color. It comprises cultural beliefs, historical legacies, and institutional
policies within and among public and private organizations . . . to create drastic racial
disparities in life outcomes.” William M. Wiecek, Structural Racism and the Law in
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doctrinal shifts away from legal frameworks that focus on race and
remedy.
Ultimately, the impact of the diversity rationale on white identity
has long-term negative consequences for racial justice. Race-conscious
measures meant to advance racial justice will continue to be challenged, with the permanence of the measures undermined by the negative impacts of the measures on the development of antiracist white
identity. If, in an ironic twist, stunted white identity development
leads to the prohibition of diversity measures, institutions of higher
education will have lost one of the last remaining tools for openly promoting racial diversity on and maximizing access to college and university campuses. No longer able to explicitly consider race,
institutions are left to rely on measures like Texas’s Top Ten Percent
Plan, which produces some diversity but relies on segregation of
public K–12 schools by race and class to do so.366 This result sacrifices
the type of thoughtful individualized consideration that allows admissions officials to consider which applicants will bring the most to a
particular educational community. Moreover, it is unlikely that institutions will give up on the diversity rationale, given the cultural cachet
of diversity and the importance of broadened racial diversity in higher
education. Accordingly, the use of race will become even more
opaque and mysterious as institutions take their consideration of race
completely underground. Unable to determine whether and how race
is considered, applicants’ feelings of mistrust and suspicion regarding
the admissions process will intensify. In broader society, the problemAmerica Today: An Introduction, 100 KY. L.J. 1, 5 (2011). It is distinguishable from traditional overt racism by several characteristics, including (1) its manifestation in raciallydisparate outcomes, rather than invidious intent; (2) its invisibility and operation behind
the illusion of “colorblindness”; (3) its interconnectedness across multiple social domains,
including housing, education, and healthcare; and (4) its automatic perpetuation, without
overt action. See id. at 5–7 (citing as an example of structural inequality the exclusion of
agricultural and domestic workers for eligibility for Social Security benefits in 1935, an act
which resulted in the inability of field hands, sharecroppers, maids, and nannies—the bulk
of the black labor force in the New Deal South—to amass wealth or collect survival assistance during economic downturns). Consider, also, Ian Haney López’s work on institutional racism, in which he describes New Institutionalism as an understanding that
“frequently repeated but largely unexamined social practices or patterns . . . structure and
give meaning to human interaction.” Ian F. Haney López, Institutional Racism: Judicial
Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1723 (2000).
Haney L—pez ultimately applies this understanding to race and insists that there is an
obligation to “respond to these immensely harmful but previously little-recognized social
and organizational dynamics.” Id. at 1730.
366 See Torres, supra note 51, at 98 (noting that Texas’s Top Ten Percent Plan, which
guarantees all students who finish in the top ten percent of their graduating high school
class automatic admission to Texas’s flagship public universities, relied on the “obdurate
residential segregation of Texas”).
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atic deployment of the diversity narrative will likely continue,
unabated.
In the meantime, Whites—distracted by the possibility that the
consideration of race has marginally impacted their chances of college
and university admission367—fail to address larger and more pernicious threats to equity in admissions, like the underrepresentation of
white working-class students on college and university campuses, particularly at elite institutions.368 Lani Guinier has pointed out, for
example, that Cheryl Hopwood’s rejection from the University of
Texas was as much, if not more, about class as it was about race, as
indicated by the admission committee’s belief that her GPA belied her
community college origins.369

REMEDIATING

THE

III
DIVERSITY RATIONALE

Given the problems with diversity, scholars may be too quick to
give up on the remedial uses of race inside (and outside) higher education. Progressive scholars and activists have never been completely
satisfied with the diversity rationale,370 nor should they be, given its
367 See Siegel, supra note 16, at 802 n.99, 807 n.112 (noting that affirmative action programs have a greater impact on the admissions prospects of Whites in the middle range of
applicants); see also Liu, supra note 16, at 1050–78 (contending that the perception that
affirmative action causes rejection of deserving white applicants in favor of less qualified
minority applicants is exaggerated and a distortion of statistical truth).
368 See WILLIAM G. BOWEN ET AL., EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE IN AMERICAN HIGHER
EDUCATION 74, 96–97, 119–22 (2005) (finding that, nationally, “[o]nly 54 percent of high
school graduates from the lowest-income quartile enroll in college, compared to 82 percent” of those in the top quartile, and noting that low socioeconomic status (SES) students
are underrepresented for several reasons, including failure to take college entrance exams,
lower rates of application to selective colleges despite high standardized test scores, and
slightly lower graduation rates (quoting THE COLL. BD., TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 4
(2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Derek V. Price & Jill K. Wohlford, Equity in
Educational Attainment: Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Inequality in the 50 States, in HIGHER
EDUCATION AND THE COLOR LINE: COLLEGE ACCESS, RACIAL EQUITY, AND SOCIAL
CHANGE 63–64 (Gary Orfield et al. eds., 2005) (finding that “more than 150,000 collegequalified students each year do not enroll in any postsecondary education” because of a
lack of financial aid).
369 In fact, admissions officials took points off of her application because she attended
community college and nonflagship state schools. See Guinier, supra note 327, at 511–13
(explaining how class determines both test performance—by limiting ability to pay for test
preparation—and college matriculation—by limiting ability to pay for private and/or flagship state institutions).
370 See, e.g., Jones, supra note 285, at 176–88 (arguing that the diversity rationale may
lead to confusion, distortion, and obfuscation, while failing to ensure the inclusion of certain groups); Girardeau A. Spann, The Dark Side of Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 221
(2004) (arguing that the Court, in Grutter, embraced a colorblind conception of racial
equality that is actually constitutionally suspect because it is what now constitutes American culture’s preferred form of racial discrimination).
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flaws. While hailed as a victory for proponents of affirmative action,
Grutter legitimized the diversity rationale as the sole justification for
race-conscious admissions policies while failing to recognize minority
interests that do not overlap with societal interests more generally.371
Ultimately, the Court reaffirmed its commitment to the de facto/de
jure distinction that makes societal discrimination so difficult to
address, and made the remedial use of race at most universities and
colleges difficult, if not impossible, to justify.
The emergence of post-identitarian equity frameworks like dignity, human rights, and vulnerability have developed, in part, as a
response to the failures of equal protection jurisprudence to yield necessary remedial measures.372 And yet, remedial measures are needed
because of the simple fact that racial discrimination persists. In the
education context, racial discrimination impacts any number of policy
decisions, including special education identification,373 discipline policies,374 and teacher assignment. These acts of discrimination, though
not always conscious, nevertheless impact academic outcomes for children of color, making preparation for college education difficult.
371 The Courts in Bakke, Grutter, and Parents Involved in Community Schools have all
either rejected or refused to rule on the goals of undermining racial isolation, addressing
economic racism, or eliminating discrimination through disparate impact in the admissions
processes—to name just a few minority interests that might have been validated. In
Grutter, interveners’ claims regarding racialized credentials bias in college admission were
met with complete silence by the Court. See Brown-Nagin, supra note 77, at 1480
(explaining that no Justice who endorsed race-conscious admissions in Grutter engaged the
credential bias argument).
372 The de jure intent requirement, in combination with tiered levels of review, has drastically limited the reach of equal protection for identity groups. The tiered levels of review
create a strong presumption in favor of weak rational basis review, as heightened scrutiny
will only apply when a court is convinced that a racial or gender classification (or a burden
to a fundamental right) is at stake. The discriminatory intent requirement, however, poses
an evidentiary obstacle: Not only are most decisionmakers savvy enough to conceal discriminatory intent behind neutral language, but the sentiments underlying government
action with a racially disproportionate impact are often the result of unconscious racism.
See Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 1076–83 (describing how the structural
aspects of modern equal protection analysis dramatically limit the reach of equal protection); Hutchinson, supra note 177, at 633–37 (explaining the doctrinal “tiered” test the
Court has established for equal protection anaylsis); see also Lawrence, supra note 156, at
355–64 (discussing unconscious racism and possible ways to address the problem).
373 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (describing racial disparities in special education identification).
374 Minorities are overrepresented in public school suspensions and corporal punishment, with schools being more likely to implement extremely punitive discipline and zero
tolerance policies, and less likely to use mild discipline and restorative techniques, as the
percentage of black students enrolled increases. Glennon, supra note 8, at 1255–56. Black
students, in particular, are 2.19 to 3.78 times more likely than their white peers to be
referred to the office for behavior problems, and Blacks and Latinos are more likely to be
expelled or suspended than their white peers are for the same or similar conduct. Skiba et
al., supra note 362, at 85.
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When relying on standardized test scores that have a disproportionately negative impact on students of color, institutions of higher education are then complicit in the discrimination.375
Moreover, recognition of implicit bias is gaining scholarly traction
in the law, potentially providing avenues for new litigation strategies
that utilize the equal protection framework to vindicate these
claims.376 Even though alternatives to remediation must be considered, it is important to continue discussing remedy until the courts are
prepared to hear it—not only because it may someday result in a solution, but because it forces a more robust national dialogue on racial
subordination, even if this dialogue is not fully recognized within the
law.
Judicial recognition, however, of the necessity of race-conscious
measures for a broader array of harms is admittedly not forthcoming
in the short-term, especially given the likely failure of even the
Justices to develop antiracist white identities.377 At the same time, the
diversity rationale, although used with positive intentions, has had a
negative impact on antiracist white identity. The question then
becomes: What should scholars, policymakers, and institutions of
higher education do to encourage development of the antiracist identities the diversity rationale has undermined? I offer some preliminary
thoughts about how the diversity rationale can be employed to more
375 Kidder & Rosner, supra note 137, at 141–45, 156–59 (finding not only that standardized tests fail to fairly or accurately reflect group differences in educational attainment, but
that for purely statistical reasons independent of animus, facially neutral test construction
guarantees the lower performance of African Americans and Chicanos on the SAT). Many
institutions, however, are starting to decrease their reliance on standardized test scores. See
infra note 381 and accompanying text (noting that many colleges and universities no longer
use—or at least make optional—standardized test scores in the admissions process).
376 See, e.g., Jonathan Feingold & Karen Lorang, Defusing Implicit Bias, 59 UCLA L.
REV. DISCOURSE 210, 221–23 (2012) (examining implicit bias and its impact on an individual’s decision to fire a weapon at a perceived threat); Dale Larson, A Fair and Implicitly
Impartial Jury: An Argument for Administering the Implicit Association Test During Voir
Dire, 3 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 139, 140–41 (2010) (exploring methods to determine potential jurors’ implicit sterotypes during voir dire); Natalie Bucciarelli Pedersen, A Legal
Framework for Uncovering Implicit Bias, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 97, 98 (2010) (suggesting a
framework for addressing implicit bias in the workplace); Anna Roberts, (Re)forming the
Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827, 830–32
(2012) (evaluating current proposals to ameliorate implicit juror bias and suggesting
improvements to juror orientation to address this problem); L. Elizabeth Sarine,
Regulating the Social Pollution of Systemic Discrimination Caused by Implicit Bias, 100
CALIF. L. REV. 1359, 1363 (2012) (explaining the difficulty of challenging implicit discrimination under the equal protection clause).
377 Supreme Court Justices, who have increasingly rarefied personal and professional
experiences, are not immune to the problematic phenomenon of white transparency, belief
in the myth of meritocracy, or the investment in white innocence. Accordingly, it is not
surprising that the Court’s jurisprudence on racial justice has been limited.
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positively impact white identity. In this, I aim to provide a foundation
for future work offering a more detailed account of how the diversity
rationale and its deployment can be improved, changed, or replaced in
order to help—and not hinder—social justice.
As an initial matter, deployment of the diversity rationale must
be accompanied by genuine commitments to broadening racial access.
Use of the diversity rationale at universities, for example, without
genuine cultivation of a positive racial climate, results in superficial
diversity that balkanizes students, negatively impacts nonwhite identity, and stunts antiracist white identity development.378
Moreover, institutional narratives about diversity and use of the
diversity rationale as justification for race-conscious measures must
shift away from extolling the usefulness and benefits of a diverse educational experience, and toward addressing the illegitimacy of allwhite institutions. Diversity is not just about training students for a
global marketplace, citizenship, or deepening intellectual exchange.
Rather, institutions that function as gatekeepers to valuable social and
cultural capital are simply illegitimate if that access is limited to the
racially and economically privileged. Erik Olin Wright notes that two
of the values fundamental to the American ethos—individual freedom
and democracy—share the same underlying value of self-determination.379 Neither individual freedom, nor democracy, nor citizenship380
can be advanced if particular segments of society are disproportionately excluded from higher education—particularly from access to the
elite education typically required for participation in the higher-level
decisionmaking that impacts American society and culture. Disproportionate exclusion, then, of non-Whites from elite education also
presents an obstacle to self-determination, as it denies members of
nonwhite groups the opportunity to shape and impact American
society in the same ways that Whites do. As promoters of democracy,
and as institutions that benefit from privileges distributed by the state,
colleges and universities have an obligation to be inclusive and
advance self-determination for all by allowing access to the value they
provide.381
378 See supra Parts II.A and II.B (exploring how the diversity rationale can shape white
identity, and the subsequent impact of that identitity).
379 Erik Olin Wright, Transforming Capitalism Through Real Utopias, 78 AM. SOC.
REV. 1, 5 (2012).
380 See Sturm & Guinier, supra note 277, at 1033 (arguing that the exclusionary “testocracy” at institutions of higher education operates like a modern-day poll tax, constricting opportunities for full participation in contemporary forms of citizenship, like work
and education).
381 Admittedly, the commitment of many colleges and universities to either pursue or
maintain “elite” status is not likely to diminish soon. Indeed, an insistence on race-con-
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At colleges and universities, this necessitates more than a blurb
about diversity in the glossy pages of admissions materials. Instead,
institutions should initiate broader campaigns committed to informing
potential and current members of university communities that their
mission necessarily includes broadened access for all. Schools may not
universally adhere to such a mission, but institutions that advocate a
commitment to the diversity rationale in admissions purportedly do,
and can thus be expected to deepen their commitment to diversity in
ways that positively impact white racial identity.
Prior to admissions, a more robust justification for the consideration of race in college admissions is needed. Diversity is currently
sanctioned as a compelling interest only for nonremedial reasons.382
There is a difference, however, between considering race to remedy
racial discrimination and acknowledging that race is necessarily a crucial consideration in the pursuit of diversity. Accordingly, institutions
should pull away from justifications that focus merely on the contributions non-Whites bring to white classrooms and move toward broadcasting and teaching about the larger societal dynamics that
marginalize minorities and minority perspectives in politics, policymaking, and popular culture, thus making the inclusion of those perspectives inside classrooms—particularly at elite institutions—crucial.
Relatedly, institutional commitments to individualized review
must be better contextualized for students. Admissions is an inherently individualized, subjective, and idiosyncratic process. That reality,
however, should not be used only to justify the consideration of race,
but should also be used to help students understand the multitude of
factors that are considered in the application of each student. Individscious measures is how universities counter the exclusionary effects of their commitment to
the use of standardized test scores that allow them to identify and admit the most competitive students and thus maintain elite status. Nevertheless, colleges and universities are
increasingly waiving SAT or ACT examinations in favor of AP or IB exam results, and
several top liberal arts colleges have decided not to require any standardized measures of
achievement. Colleges and Universities that Do Not Use SAT/ACT Scores for Admitting
Substantial Numbers of Students into Bachelor Degree Programs, FAIRTEST,
http://www.fairtest.org/university/optional (last accessed Mar. 13, 2014). Professor Erik
Olin Wright’s work on progressive societies reminds us that “real utopias” are about envisioning the institutions of an ideal alternate social world, and then looking for social innovations based on these visions that can be created in the world as it is. ERIK OLIN WRIGHT,
ENVISIONING REAL UTOPIAS 5–9 (2010). In a world in which exclusionary admissions criteria will likely remain in use for some time to come, race-conscious admission practices,
although not perfect, move us closer to an ideal, or at least limit the damage of those
traditionally exclusionary practices until better alternatives are accepted. For an example
of alternate admissions and hiring practices that are more inclusive, see Sturm & Guinier,
supra note 277, at 1008–34.
382 See supra Part I.A (discussing cases where the Court has upheld the diversity rationale almost exclusively on utilitarian justifications).
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ualized review may consider the athletic background of some students, the legacy status of others, and the unique social experiences of
minority students—experiences that were informed by race, no matter
what the student’s ultimate worldview. Individualized review may also
consider the racial or ethnic background that privileged some students
prior to college. Other factors like class or disability may (or may not)
have mitigated or compounded marginalization or privilege on
account of race and ethnicity, and admissions officers will often have
to make hard decisions about how these factors impacted students and
whether the institution and the student would be best served by that
student’s admission and enrollment. To this extent, individualized
review does not attempt to remedy societal discrimination, but it does
take into account the social dynamics of race on all applicants—white
and nonwhite—and on the institutions themselves, and should be discussed as such. The goal is not necessarily to make every rejected (or
admitted) applicant perfectly happy with an institution’s admissions
decisions, but to help the Abigail Fishers of the world accept those
decisions by helping them understand the larger societal context in
which those decisions are made.
In the post-admissions context, a more substantive commitment
to diversity might include mandatory classes for incoming students
about the racialized nature of opportunity and inequality in the
United States.383 Given the aspects of white identity most negatively
impacted by superficial deployments of diversity, such a course would
explore white and nonwhite racial identity, racial privilege, or narratives of meritocracy in the United States.384 This approach signals not
just a commitment to an improved racial climate, but a step toward
unpacking myths about merit while making white privilege more vis-

383 Research has found, for example, that courses on multiculturalism and race relations
positively impact racial attitudes. See Rachel F. Moran, Diversity and Its Discontents: The
End of Affirmative Action at Boalt Hall, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2241, 2263–64 (2000) (exploring
the change in the educational experiences of students at Boalt Hall after the elimination of
affirmative action).
384 Lest some believe that such courses are unnecessary, consider the case of Shannon
Gibney, a Professor of English and African Diaspora Studies at Minneapolis Community
and Technical College (MATC). In 2013, Gibney was reprimanded under MATC’s antidiscrimination policy after three white students filed a discrimination complaint alleging that
the classroom conversation she led on structural privilege made them feel uncomfortable.
In 2009, students similarly alleged discrimination after she “suggested . . . that fashioning a
noose in the newsroom of the campus newspaper—as an editor had done the previous
fall—might alienate students of color.” Tressie McMillan Cottom, The Discomfort Zone:
Want to Teach Your Students About Structural Racism? Prepare for a Formal Reprimand,
SLATE (Dec. 3, 2013, 11:23 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/life/counter_narrative/2013/
12/minneapolis_professor_shannon_gibney_reprimanded_for_talking_about_racism.html.
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ible, thus encouraging the development of antiracist white identity
among students.
Furthermore, colleges and universities must implement a
broader, more substantive conception of diversity, which means
ending the practice of using people of color to maximize reputation
and status. When institutions do commodify race and people of color
in this way, it should be identified and acknowledged, and should then
prompt a compensatory measure that reduces future use of nonWhites in this manner and also furthers equality.385 Take, for example,
the case of Diallo Shabazz, a university student whose image was
photo-shopped into a University of Wisconsin admissions brochure to
portray a more racially diverse campus than the university actually
had. In response, Shabazz sued the school over unauthorized use of
his likeness, ultimately winning a “budgetary apology” in the form of
ten million dollars earmarked for diversity initiatives and the recruitment of minority students within the University of Wisconsin
system.386 Ideally, those initiatives would include the sort of training
and engagement already outlined above.
The same is true for any other institution or individual employing
the diversity rationale. For example, corporations that promote their
diversity initiatives should educate employees on the nature of racial
exclusion and the power of white privilege in the workplace, and
should organize service projects or pro bono activities that seek to
broaden minority access to the business sector in surrounding communities. Even elementary and secondary schools can deepen their commitments to diversity.387 It is not enough, for example, to boast
diverse viewpoints in the classroom. Rather, schools can adopt
antibias curricula that help children form identities that are not rooted
in white supremacy or racial subordination,388 while educating stu385 See Leong, supra note 134, at 2220–21 (discussing the “difficulties inherent in
moving from our current, nonideal world to an ideal one,” including the tension inherent in
acknowledging that “the diversity rationale has reinforced a way of thinking of race as a
commodity” even as it has also materially benefited many lives).
386 Id. at 2206.
387 See Jacqueline Johnson et al., Doing Anti-Racism: Toward an Egalitarian American
Society, 29 CONTEMP. SOC. 95, 102–03 (2000) (explaining that a move to a nonracist society
requires that schools affirmatively teach students, through example and ideology, that all
people have a right to grow and develop to their fullest potential, and that schools actively
work to destroy the sense of white innocence and common denial about past and present
racism in the United States).
388 For examples of, and guidance on, implementing antibias curricula, see generally
LOUISE OLSEN DERMAN-SPARKS ET AL., WHAT IF ALL THE KIDS ARE WHITE?: ANTI-BIAS
MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION WITH YOUNG CHILDREN AND FAMILIES (2011); STACEY
YORK, ROOTS AND WINGS: AFFIRMING CULTURE IN EARLY CHILDHOOD PROGRAMS
(2003).
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dents and parents on why public schools—which act as symbols of a
community—have a responsibility to be racially inclusive.
CONCLUSION
Although racial diversity is an important societal goal, the narrative surrounding deployment of the diversity rationale fractures and
undermines coherent nonwhite identity, while simultaneously stunting
the development of antiracist white identity. The result is perpetual
attack on race-conscious measures designed to bring about racial justice, led by plaintiffs like Abigail Fisher who—unaware of the privilege they have been afforded by virtue of their whiteness—pursue
their own interests to the detriment of people of color. Learning, however, to critically examine our deployments of diversity makes possible more substantive and honest justifications for the diversity
rationale that ultimately benefit both nonwhite and white racial identity, as well as racial justice in general.

